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THE BIRTH OF ADONIS

By Alexander H. Krappe

Adonis was the son of Theias, king of the Assyrians. This Theias, so the story runs, had a daughter called Smyrna, who, having incurred the displeasure of Aphrodite, fell in love with her own father. With the help of her nurse she succeeded in her incestuous designs, sharing her father's couch for twelve nights running without being recognized by him. At last, however, he discovered her identity and, in just indignation, pursued her, sword in hand. Taking pity on her, the gods transformed her into a tree, the very one which still bears her name. Ten months later this tree opened, giving birth to the fair Adonis.[1]

The account of Antoninus Liberalis (c. 34) adds several details on the subterfuge employed by the nurse: she tells Theias that a girl of good family, madly in love with him, desires to enjoy his embraces, and the monarch has a sufficiently high opinion of his own male charms not to doubt her word. The plot succeeds for a time, but in the end the king, wishing to see the face of the fair charmer, causes a fire to be lighted in the middle of the night and thus becomes aware of his daughter's shame. The birth of her child takes place *before* his mother's transformation into a tree, but the latter is said to weep still over her fault; her tears are what men call myrrh. Theias does not survive long the terrible discovery; seized with despair, he puts an end to his days.

Ovid knows the names of the heroine's parents, Kinyras and Kenchreis; the sorry heroine herself is named by him Myrrha. On the advice of her nurse, she takes advantage of a feast to approach her father when he is in his cups. After the discovery Myrrha flees, wandering for nine months over the face of the earth; but finally she returns to her own country, Arabia, where she is transformed into a tree. In this form she gives birth to Adonis.[2]

According to Hyginus (fab. 58) Kinyras, the heroine's father, is king of the Assyrians. It is not the girl but her mother, Kenchreis,

1. Apollodorus, III. 14. 4. 1-3; Athen. X. 83, p. 456 (Dindorf). Apollodorus follows the plot of a lost tragedy of Panyasis, who lived in the fifth century before our era; cf. also Sir James G. Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, Osiris* (London, 1914), I, pp. 227 f.

2. *Metam.* X. 298-514.

who arouses the anger of Aphrodite by praising her daughter's beauty above that of the goddess. After the incest Myrrha hides herself in a wood. Taking pity on her, Aphrodite transforms her into a tree, which gives birth to the fair Adonis. Elsewhere (fab. 242), Hyginus reports Kinyras' suicide after the discovery of the incest. In a third text (fab. 164c), he adds the following interesting details: Myrrha makes her father drunk to be able to carry out her design. Subsequently the king splits the bark of the tree with his sword, and Adonis steps forth from the opening. According to Servius,[3] it is not Kinyras who splits the tree but a boar who runs against it with his tusks. Kinyras is a king of Cyprus, and the offended deity is not Aphrodite but Helios.

As will be readily seen, this account is composed of two independent myths fused, more or less imperfectly, to wit, (1) the incest and (2) the birth of the god from the trunk of a tree. Our enquiry will therefore have three objectives, viz.: (1) to furnish a plausible explanation of the incest story; (2) to find an acceptable explanation of the myth of Adonis' birth; and (3) to determine the circumstances responsible for the fusion—far from natural—of the two themes.

There is no need to discuss at length the speculations of C. Vellay,[4] who saw in the incest a corruption of the primitive idea of a god engendering himself (whatever that may mean) since he is androgynous, embodying the male as well as the female principle. Nor is it admissible to see in the myth a simple reflection of the age-old custom of consanguineous marriages, as the same author seems to assume in another passage of his book;[5] for if such were the case there simply would be no incest at all, and we should fail to understand the rage and despair of the heroine's father after the discovery. Again, as so often before in the course of my researches, I can only repeat that the comparative method alone is likely to furnish tangible results.

Incest stories are by no means rare in universal mythology and in the epic legends of many nations, though in quite a number of these this type of consanguineous union is not represented as something illicit or criminal, for the very good reason that marriages between blood relations were frequently tolerated or even recommended.

In many mythologies the two great luminaries are considered

3. Ad Verg. *Ecl.* x. 18.

4. *Le culte et les fêtes d'Adônis-Thammouz dans l'Orient antique* (Paris, 1904), p. 29.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 91.

brother and sister, e.g., Helios and Selene, Sol and Luna, Mani and Sol, the sun god and the moon goddess of the Armenians[6] and the Polynesians of the Pelew Islands,[7] the moon god and the sun goddess of the Japanese. Or else they are husband and wife, e.g., the moon god and the sun goddess of the ancient Prussians, the Lithuanians,[8] and probably also the Germans,[9] the sun god and the moon goddess of many African tribes,[10] and of the folk-lore of the rural populations of Spanish Galicia.[11] By a juxtaposition of the two concepts it could easily happen that the conjunction of the two heavenly bodies, at the time of the new moon, was interpreted as a sacred marriage or an incest, depending on whether or not brother-sister marriages were permitted.

According to a tradition of the East European Gypsies, this wandering tribe is descended from an incestuous union of Sun and Moon. By way of punishment the Sun and all his descendents were cursed and debarred from ever settling down in a permanent abode.[12] If a Rumanian legend is to be believed, the Sun fell in love with Helen Simdzeana, his own sister. The latter turned away in horror, saying:

> Where has one ever seen or ever heard
> That a brother should marry his sister?

In the end, however, Helen agreed to marry the Sun on condition that he construct for her a bronze bridge across the Black Sea and, at the bridge-head, a marvelous church in which to celebrate the wedding. On having accomplished these tasks, the Sun crossed the magnificent bridge with his sister; but the latter leaped from the bridge into the sea, transforming herself into a beautiful little fish, which was promptly taken to heaven by angels and saints. Out of this creature, with its shining scales, the Lord made the moon; but the two

6. M. Abeghian, *Der armenische Volksglaube* (Leipzig, 1899), pp. 45 f.
7. Frazer, *The Belief in Immortality and the Worship of the Dead*, III (London, 1924), p. 261.
8. Karl Simrock, *Handbuch der deutschen Mythologie* (Bonn, 1878), p. 402; C. F. Coxwell, *Siberian and Other Folk-Tales* (London, 1925), p. 925.
9. O. Henne-am Rhyn, *Die deutsche Volkssage* (Leipzig, 1874), p. 359.
10. Frazer, *Anthologia anthropologica: The Native Races of Africa and Madagascar* (London, 1938), pp. 150, 173, 245, 298, 302, 407; *Garnered Sheaves* (London, 1931), p. 355.
11. H. W. Howes, *Folk-Lore*, XL (1929), p. 54.
12. W. Crooke, *The Popular Religion and Folk-Lore of Northern India* (Westminster, 1896), II, p. 150.

heavenly bodies never meet—when the one appears in the east the other sets in the west.[13]

This story is apparently the Christian form of an ancient pagan myth, as may be safely concluded from a large number of parallels from many parts of the earth. Thus the Cherokee Indians regard the Sun (female) and the Moon (male) as sister and brother. The Sun received the nightly visits of a young man but was unable to recognize his features because of the darkness reigning in her hut. So once she soiled her hands with soot and blackened his face without his noticing it. The following morning she realized that her lover was her own brother, hence the spots on the face of the moon.[14] This myth is widespread on the American continent, variants having been collected from the land of the Eskimos[15] to Panama, and even in South America.[16]

It is clear that the story of Smyrna's incest has much the same basis, except that here the father of the heroine has taken the place of her brother, and that the heroine takes the initiative, driven on by Aphrodite or by Helios, to deceive her father.

This conclusion is borne out by other considerations. In several texts, when Kinyras discovers his daughter's shame he pursues her, sword in hand. But this is one of the most common features of myths explaining the phases of the moon. According to a Latvian tradition, the moon god and the sun goddess were a married couple living in rare connubial bliss—until one day the Sun became aware of the fact that her husband had spent the night elsewhere. In her jealous fury she pursued him with a sword, eager to cut him to pieces. In this she was plainly successful, and thus originated the phases of the waning moon.[17] The Bushmen relate that the Moon is a man attacked by the

13. *Revue des traditions populaires*, IV (1889), pp. 193 f.; Moses Gaster, *Rumanian Bird and Beast Stories* (London, 1915), p. 72; Marcu Beza, *Paganism in Roumanian Folklore* (London, 1928), pp. 17 f.

14. S. Hagar, in *Anthropological Papers written in honor of Franz Boas* (New York, 1906), pp. 355 f.; cf. James Mooney, "Myths of the Cherokee," in *Reports of the Bureau of American Ethnology*," XIX (1900), pp. 256 f.

15. Paul Sock, *Eskimomärchen* (Berlin, s.d.), p. 34; W. Thalbitzer, *Légendes et chants esquimaux du Groenland* (Paris, 1929), p. 154; Henry Rink, *Tales and Traditions of the Eskimos* (London, 1875), p. 326; Stith Thompson, *Tales of the North American Indians* (Cambridge, Mass., 1929), p. 4.

16. Paul Ehrenreich, *Die Mythen und Legenden der südamerikanischen Urvölker* (Berlin, 1905), pp. 36 f.; cf. also L. Frobenius, *Das Zeitalter des Sonnengottes* (Berlin, 1904), p. 347; F. Boas, *Indianische Sagen von der nord-pacifischen Küste Amerikas* (Berlin, 1895), pp. 37 ff.

17. Coxwell, *loc. cit.*

Sun who cuts him to pieces with a knife, reducing him to almost nothing. Then the Moon implores her to spare him and he begins to grow again, and the process starts afresh.[18] In Cafir traditions the Sun pursues the Moon, reducing him in size day by day, but the Moon by a ruse knows how to recover his former size, and the process begins all over again.[19] In British India the Sun and the Moon are two women, mothers of numerous children (the stars). Afraid lest humanity be unable to endure so much brightness, they agreed to swallow their offspring. The Sun promptly did so, but the Moon, instead of carrying out her promise, concealed her children. Having found out this trick, the Sun has ever since pursued the Moon, endeavoring to kill her by cutting her to pieces.[20]

Let us now consider the names of the protagonists of the myth. A superficial glance at the texts will reveal two groups of versions. In the first (*A*) the heroine's father is called Theias, in the other (*B*) his name is Kinyras. In *A* he is king of Assyria or Syria; in *B* he is king of Cyprus. As such he cannot be separated from the dynasty of the Kinyrades, whose ancestor he is. That dynasty ruled in Cyprus until the time of Alexander the Great and presided over the cult of Aphrodite,[21] which sufficiently explains her connection with the fair Adonis. Similarly the name Ἀῶα borne by the heroine according to a lexicographer,[22] cannot be separated from Ἀῶ, one of the names of Adonis and title of the kings of Cyprus, or from related names in the toponymy of the island.[23] Conversely, we should look in vain for a Theias in the lists of the kings who ruled in Niniveh or Damascus.

Theias has all the appearances of a Greek name, closely related to *Theia,* who is one of the six Titanides, daughters of Okeanos and Gaia. According to Hesiod (*Theog.* 371 ff.), she is the wife of Hyperion and mother of Helios, Selene and Eos. Hyperion, father of the new sun, is evidently the old sun, a mere double of Helios. Theia would

18. J. A. MacCulloch, *The Childhood of Fiction* (London, 1905), p. 94; Alice Werner, *African Mythology* (Boston, 1925), p. 227.

19. Th. Waitz, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker,* II (Leipzig, 1860), p. 412.

20. E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture* (New York, 1889) I, p. 356; W. W. Skeat and C. O. Blagden, *Pagan Races of the Malay States* (London, 1906) II, p. 320; A. Bastian, *Die Völker des östlichen Asien* (Jena, 1866-71) V, p. 117 n.

21. On the Kinyrades of Cyprus, cf. Hesychios, s.v. Κινύραις and Κινυράδαι; Schol. Pind. *Pyth.* II. 27.

22. *Et. M.,* 117, 35.

23. Cf. P. Kretschmer, *Glotta,* VII (1916), p. 39.

then be the old moon,[23a] as Selene is the new moon. Theias, whose name is evidently derived from the same root, would then be the equivalent of Hyperion, that is, a sun god. His incestuous daughter would again be the Moon, which would put our myth among the large number of stories relating how the Moon (generally of the masculine gender) deceives his sister, the Sun, to share her couch, and how his identity is finally discovered. This is as much as to say that the myth of Smyrna's incest is a solar and lunar myth belonging to a type which has been found among many peoples both of the Old World and the New.

How are we to explain the transformation of the heroine into a tree and the birth of Adonis? Smyrna (ἡ σμύρνα) and Myrrha (ἡ μύρρα) are the Attic and Aeolic forms respectively of the name of a useful tree, the myrhh (*Commiphora abyssinica*), whose habitat is South Arabia, Erythrea, and Northern Ethiopia.[24] The resin exuded by this plant, when heated, diffuses a penetrating, pleasant odor which was highly appreciated in the ancient Mediterranean world. The name of the tree and of its product, μύρρα, is of Semitic origin: Heb. *mōr*, Aram. *mūrā*, Arab. *murr*, all derived from the verb *mārrar* "to be bitter."[25] The Semitic origin of both the name and the tree is therefore certain.

The antiquity of the myrrh trade is well attested. The scent of myrrh is mentioned in the dialogue of the man tired of life with his soul, a poem composed in Egypt as early as B.C. 2000.[26] In the biblical story of Joseph we read: ". . . and, behold, a company of Ishmeelites came from Gilead, with their camels bearing spicery and balm and myrrh, going to carry it down to Egypt."[27] Again, in *Exodus* (30: 23-25), the Lord says to Moses: "Take thou also unto thee principal spices, of pure myrrh five hundred shekels, and of sweet cinnamon half so much . . . , and of sweet calamus two hundred and fifty shekels . . . , and thou shalt make it an oil of holy ointment. . . ."

23a. The same conclusion was drawn by W. H. Roscher, *Ueber Selene und Verwandtes* (Leipzig, 1890), pp. 79, 95 f., and by E. Siecke, *Drachenkämpfe* (Leipzig, 1907), p. 35.

24. W. H. Schoff, *The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea* (London, 1912) pp. 112 ff.

25. H. Lewy, *Die semitischen Fremdwörter im Griechischen* (Berlin, 1895), pp. 42 ff. The Semitic origin of the word μύρρα was recognized, as early as the seventeenth century, by the French humanist Samuel Bochart.

26. Alfred Schmidt, *Drogen und Drogenhandel im Altertum* (Leipzig, 1924), p. 3.

27. *Gen.* 37: 25.

From Herodotus (II, 86 ff.) we learn that myrrh played a large part in the art of embalming bodies of dead Egyptians and their divine animals. Myrrh was burned with corpses in Roman antiquity,[28] and even in the Middle Ages, witness a passage of the *Song of Roland*[29] —unless we are merely dealing with a classical reminiscence.

In classical times the spice trade was entirely in the hands of the Phoenicians.[30] To guard the secret of the trade routes, they spread fables about the dangers besetting the roads in the spice land.[31] Naturally enough, in the Aegean lands Syria was for a long time believed to produce balm and myrrh,[32] which sufficiently explains the Syrian nationality of King Theias. It was only through Alexander's expedition that the Arabic origin of the myrrh was definitely established.[33] Even so, the fact that a part of the myrrh crop did not originate in Arabia proper, but on the east coast of Africa, remained unknown for a long time to come.

It would be erroneous, however, to assume that the Phoenicians had enjoyed this profitable monopoly from the beginning. The myrrh trade, as we have seen, is much older than the rise of the Phoenician city states, and there are many indications that, prior to their entry on the stage of history, the Sabaeans themselves exported this precious product of their country and that they founded settlements along the west coast of Asia Minor, a conclusion suggested by the toponymy of that region. The name of the city of Ἀδραμύττιον, for example, is evidently the equivalent of *Hadramaut*, capital of the Adramitae in South Arabia. The same holds true for the island of Ἀδραμύττις, on the coast of Lycia. The name of the city of Smyrna presupposes founders who spoke a Semitic tongue, for Asia Minor produces no myrrh trees. It is well to recall, also, the name of the city of Myra

28. Martial, X. 97.

29. Ed. Th. A. Jenkins, vv. 2958-9:

> Mirre e timom i firent alumer;
> Gaillardement toz les ont encensez.

30. E. Glaser, "Punt und die südarabischen Reiche," in *Mitteilungen der Vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft*, IV (2), Berlin, 1899, passim; Sir E. H. Bunbury, *A History of Ancient Geography* (London, 1883), I, p. 219. Cf. also the anecdote told by Arrian (*Anab.* VI. 22. 4) of how Phoenicians accompanying Alexander's army, on discovering myrrh trees in Gedrosia, immediately collected the precious substance, loaded their beasts of burden and made off with it.

31. Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

32. *Ibid.*

33. Theophr., *Hist. plant.* IX. 4. 8; Diosc. I. 64; Pliny, *N.H.*, XII. 51.

(Μύρα)[34] in Lycia, known from the *Acts of the Apostles* (27: 5), and from the history of St. Nicholas and his cult, as he was Bishop of Myra at the time of the Council of Nicaea. The account of the translation of his body to Bari, Italy, in 1087, has preserved the curious trait that it was brought thither in a vessel with a cargo of myrrh, which sufficiently proves the tenacity of the tradition.[35] Nor is it possible to separate the name of the city of *Abydos*, which is mentioned already in the *Iliad*, from *Abbud*, in Arabia.[36] However this may be, from the *Periplus of the Red Sea* cited above and which was composed in the reign of Domitian, we learn that even then the Arabs had a large share in the Red Sea trade.[37]

From the facts just reviewed a Semitic origin of our myth would appear rather likely. The question arises: Is it a Phoenician (Syrian) or an Arabic myth. The lost tragedy of Panyasis followed a tradition according to which the heroine's father, the grandfather of Adonis, was a king of Assyria. The unknown source of Antoninus Liberalis localized the birth of the god at Smyrna in the Lebanon. In Ovid's poetic narrative the father of Myrrha is the ancestor of a dynasty ruling in Cyprus. All this would favor the hypothesis of a Phoenician origin of the story which, from North Syria, might be supposed to have reached Cyprus and, ultimately, Greece.

Unfortunately for the thesis, there are a number of other facts which oppose it. In the first place, it has left no traces in Phoenicia, although the cult of Adonis is well attested in that region. In the second place, Ovid (or his Alexandrian source) states that Adonis was born in Arabia. True enough, this detail may be plausibly ascribed to the desire of Alexandrian *savants* to harmonize the myth with the fact that myrrh is a product of the Arabian peninsula. But we also have the testimony of Ausonius (*Epigr.* 29), who points out the close similarity noticed by the ancients between Adonis and Dionysos: "Ogygia calls me Bacchus; Egypt designates me under the name of Osiris; . . . India under that of Dionysos, Rome under that of Liber, Arabia under that of Adonis." In the third place, the name Theias,

34. Μύρα is the plural of μύρου, "unguent."

35. Cf. J. Rendel Harris, "Adramyttium," in *Contemporary Review*, CXXVIII (1925), pp. 194-202; cf. also J. Olshausen, *Rheinisches Museum f. Philologie*, VIII (1853), pp. 322 f.

36. D. S. Margoliouth, *The Homer of Aristotle* (Oxford, 1923), p. 88.

37. *Periplus* § 21; Schmidt, p. 130; O. Peschel, *Abhandlungen zur Erd- und Völkerkunde* (Leipzig, 1877), p. 86.

inseparable from that of Theia, not only does not give the impression of a fairly recent coinage but clearly belongs to an early, pre-Olympian stratum of divine names. It is therefore likely to hark back to a period anterior to the rise of the Phoenician trade monopoly. Lastly, the myrrh tree does not grow in Syria; its product was, to the Phoenicians, simply a merchandise. But poetic stories are rarely, if ever, invented by traders on the subject of the goods they trade in, quite apart from the fact that the Phoenicians do not appear to have been endowed with a strong poetic or mythopoeic imagination. We must, therefore, look farther afield.

According to the version handed down by Antoninus Liberalis, the tree weeps over the fruit which is born from its trunk. The obvious etiology of this tale cannot be subject to doubt. It recalls another. A Celtic myth, related by Apollonius of Rhodes, has it that amber, another precious resin, though the product of fossil trees, is nothing but the tears of Apollo exiled by Zeus into the land of the Hyperboreans.[38] It is clear that this myth can have arisen only in a country producing amber. For the same reason, the myth of the transformation of Smyrna into a tree and the birth of Adonis originated, to all appearances, in the land of the Sabaeans, which produces the myrrh trees. If such is the case, the god born from the tree can only be an Arabic divinity, identified, rightly or wrongly, with the Syrian Adonis.

The myth, at all events, makes it clear that the god was somehow connected with a tree, which was sacred to him. This inference is all the more obvious because Adonis was by no means the only Near Eastern divinity with such arboreal connections: Attis was the god of the Pine, and Osiris that of the Acacia, but neither one appears to have penetrated into the Arabian peninsula. Among the Greeks the god ἐν δένδρον *par excellence* is Dionysos, and it is therefore no mere accident that Plutarch[39] considers Adonis as a special form of Dionysos. This naturally raises the question: Did the southern Semites worship a god currently identified with the Hellenic Dionysos?

If we may trust the Arabic and Greek inscriptions, the Nabataeans knew only two great divinities, a male god, known as Dusares, whose cult center was Petra and who was commonly identified with Diony-

38. Apoll. Rhod. *Arg.* IV. 611 ff.

39. *Symp. probl.* IV. 5. 3; cf. also *Hymn. Orph.* 42; F. C. Movers, *Die Phönizier* I (Bonn, 1841), pp. 337 ff.; 234; Vellay, pp. 64 ff.; R. Briffault, *The Mothers*, London, 1927, III, p. 134.

sos,[40] and his divine mother,[41] the virgin goddess Allât, called Χααβοῦ by Epiphanius,[42] and generally identified with Aphrodite Ourania,[43] who was regarded sometimes as the planet Venus,[44] sometimes as the moon.[45] One of her special forms is Manât, the Arabic Fortuna,[46] mentioned in the Qur'an.[47] Dusares was a god of fertility,[48] which sufficiently explains why the Greeks thought him the equivalent of their own Dionysos, while on the other hand he was equated with the Babylonian Tammuz, the prototype of the Syrian Adonis.[49]

We do not know definitely whether Dusares was connected with a tree cult. Arabic tradition has it that, like the Persian Mithra, he was born from a stone, which was but a form of the Arabic Aphrodite.[50] But, in view of the scantiness of our sources, no *conclusio ex silentio* is admissible. His constant identification with the Hellenic Dionysos would rather favor the opposite view.

Conversely, his divine mother appears to be closely related to the "Mother of the Grapecluster," who had a temple at Lagash in Meso-

40. Herod. III. 8; Strabo, XVI. 1. 11; Arrian, *Anab.* VII. 20; Orig. *Contr. Cels.* V. 37; Hesych.: Δουσάρην τὸν Διόνυσον Ναβαταῖοι; Steph. Byz., s.v. Δουσάρη; Euseb., *De laude Const.* XIII. 3. Tertullian (*Ad nat.* II. 8; *Apolog.* 24) considers him as the Arabian god *par excellence*. Cf. also E. Blochet, *Le Culte d'Aphrodite-Anahita chez les Arabes du paganisme* (Paris, 1902), pp. 11 ff.

41. In his book, *Les Arabes en Syrie avant l'Islam* (Paris, 1907), p. 127, René Dussaud points out that it is not proven that Allât is the mother of Dusares and that she seems to be rather his companion; but on p. 142 he notes that Allât's companion god was Allah.

42. J. H. Mordtmann, *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, XXIX (1875), pp. 99-106, esp. p. 101; cf. also Dussaud, *Notes de mythologie syrienne* (Paris, 1903), pp. 174 ff.

43. It is well known, of course, that Aphrodite Ourania was the Hellenic equivalent of the Syrian goddess, Atargatis; cf. Vellay, p. 43.

44. Dussaud, *Les Arabes*, p. 131; Nielson, *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, LXVI (1912), pp. 469-72; S. Langdon, *Tammuz and Ishtar* (Oxford, 1914), p. 171. A similar fluctuation between the planet Venus and the moon has been noticed in the character of the Egyptian Isis, who appears to have begun her divine career as the goddess of the morning star and one of the spouses of the moon god Osiris, to become subsequently a lunar goddess. Much the same evolution was pointed out for the Babylonian Ishtar; cf. Langdon, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

45. F. Baethgen, *Beitrage zur semitischen Religionsgeschichte* (Berlin, 1888), p. 101.

46. Cf. Th. Nöldeke, *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, III (1865), pp. 132 f.; Blochet, p. 23; Dussaud, *Les Arabes*, p. 121.

47. LIII. 19-23.

48. Baethgen, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

49. G. W. Gilmore, in *The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopaedia of Religious Knowledge*, VIII, 75.

50. Blochet, pp. 1 ff.

potamia.[51] She reappears among the western Semites under the name of Dalilah, the "Vine Branch," who had a cult center at Nachal Sorek, the "Valley of the Vine."[52] This "Mother of the Grapecluster" survived the fall of paganism. The Arabic historian, 'Izz ad dîn ibn al-Atîr, who flourished about the year 1200 of the Christian era, relates a ritual wailing, said to have been observed in 1204, when Syria was ravaged by an epidemic. The wailers invoked "a woman of the jinn" called Umm 'Uncûd, "Mother of the Grapecluster," who had lost her son. The ritual words recited on that occasion were "O Umm 'Uncûd, pardon us, 'Uncûd is dead; we knew it not."[53] It is thus evident that this 'Uncûd, the demon of the grapevine, is a sort of Dionysos or Adonis. But this is as much as to say that the pagan Arabs (or some of them) worshipped a great mother goddess and her divine son, whose death, in the flower of his youth, was lamented ritually.

Nor is it to be supposed that the identification of this Arabic god with Dionysos is in any way recent and more or less fortuitous. In the *Bacchai* of Euripides the great god states that he left the wealthy lands of the Lycians and Phrygians, the sun-parched plains of the Persians and the Bactrian walls, to come over the stormy land of the Medes and the *happy Arabia,* and all Asia which lies along the coast of the Salt Sea, where he had established his mysteries, where all nations celebrate these orgies.[54]

This leads us to inquire into the relationship between Allât and the mother of Adonis. Tradition, as we have seen, explains Smyrna's strange passion by the action of Aphrodite. The motivation is one of the most banal, the cruelty of the heroine toward the other sex, or the *hybris* of her mother. Though of minor interest in the present inquiry, it yet recalls another story, rendered famous by a tragedy of Euripides, that of the unhappy Phaedra. Now it has long been recognized that this tragic heroine is only a hypostasis of Aphrodite: the victim of an irrational incestuous passion inspired by Aphrodite is merely the heroic form of the great goddess herself.[55] Applying this reasoning to the

51. Langdon, p. 43.

52. *Judges,* 16:4.

53. W. Robertson Smith, *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites* (London, 1894), p. 412; F. Liebrecht, *Zur Volkskunde* (Heilbronn, 1879), p. 254.

54. Eur. *Bacch.* 13 ff.

55. S. Wide, *De sacris Troezemiorum, Hermionensium, Epidauriorum commentatio academica* (Upsaliae, 1888), pp. 86 f.; Preller-Robert, *Griechische Mythologie,* I[4], 373; Roscher, *op. cit.,* p. 83; Siecke, *Hermes der Mondgott* (Leipzig, 1908), p. 17.

problem under discussion, we infer that Smyrna, too, is merely a form of Aphrodite. Making the necessary transpositions, we conclude that Smyrna is the heroic form of Allât. Smyrna's son would then be Dusares, of whom he would be the dendromorphic manifestation.

Here another consideration must be added. Hellenic tradition does not say that Adonis was the son of Aphrodite, though he most certainly was her lover. The essential identity of Smyrna and Aphrodite would make Smyrna's son both the son and the lover of the great goddess. But we do know that among the southern Semites Tammuz is both the son and the lover of the great Sumerian mother-goddess.[56]

How are we to explain the transformation into a tree of a lunar goddess? What connection is there between the moon and the myrrh tree? There is no need to rehearse here the numerous absurdities advanced on the subject. The myrrh tree was sacred to Adonis, according to some, because myrrh was commonly used in funerals; according to others, because it was burned during the festivals of the god or in honor of Astarte, the Phoenician equivalent of Aphrodite.

Here again it should be noted that we are not dealing with a phenomenon *sui generis* and lacking in analogues elsewhere. In Vedic India the moon was identified with soma, the holy plant *par excellence*.[57] In Latin America, another intoxicating drink, called *chicha*, is, in the belief of the natives, the blood of the moon.[58] In Egypt, Osiris, a lunar divinity, was also the first vine-grower.[59] In Greece, the great god of the grape-vine, Dionysos, was, according to Cicero,[60] the son of Jupiter and the Moon. To come down to more recent times, the alcohol produced illegally in the mountains of Kentucky and elsewhere is still called "moonshine," a term which is but the English rendering of an Indian word, since the natives prepared and drank their *chicha* in honor of the moon, as they still do in Mexico.[61] Among the Iroquois, the god Odendonnia ("Maplebranch") is a moon god, but, on the other hand, we know that the Indians of North America

56. Langdon, pp. 10, 15, 24 f.

57. Alfred Hillebrandt, *Vedische Mythologie* (Breslau, 1891-1902), I, pp. 3 ff.; II, pp. 209 ff. A. Wesselski, *Archiv Orientální*, I (1929), pp. 305 ff.; Bastian, *op. cit.*, V, p. 178; Briffault, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 131-33; 191. Cf. also Firdousi (trad. Mohl), VII, p. 194: "Leur voie (i.e., la voie des Hindous) est le culte de la vache et de la lune." The moon is, of course, Soma.

58. E. Seler, *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, XXXIX (1907), p. 10; Briffault, II, p. 361.

59. *Ibid.*, III, p. 134.

60. *De nat. deor.* III. 23. 58.

61. Briffault, II, p. 631; III, p. 133.

extract from the maple tree a sirup the fermentation of which furnishes them with an alcoholic beverage of great potency.[62]

What is true of moon gods is no less so of moon goddesses. In Babylonia, Ishtar was closely linked to tree cults. The Phoenician Astarte (and the Carthaginian Tânit) cannot be separated from the *ashera* of the Old Testament, represented by a tree or a sacred wooden pillar. In Egypt the sycamore of the South was the living body of the lunar goddess, Hathor. In Greece, Hera, clearly a lunar divinity, was born under a willow tree in the isle of Samos, where twice a year her idol was placed in the hollow of a willow, rediscovered and carried back in triumph to her temple.[63] In Sparta a sycamore was sacred to Helen, another moon goddess.[64] Artemis is sometimes a walnut tree, sometimes a cedar, sometimes a laurel tree, a myrtle, and even a willow.[65] The tree sacred to Persephone was the poplar. The relations between the Arabic Aphrodite and the myrrh tree are likely, then, to be of a similar nature and to be explained on a common basis.

From time out of mind men have noticed that plants grow more rapidly during the night than in the daytime, especially in tropical and subtropical regions, because the intense solar irradiation effectively checks growth while the sun is above the horizon. Though perfectly able to manufacture food substances under the action of the sun, plants cannot assimilate these to their protoplasm except at night. Ignorant of these basic facts, man in those remote epochs concluded that the nocturnal growth of vegetation is due to the rays of the moon. Thus, in Bombay people still say: "A child and a tree are never seen to grow except during the night."[66] Thus the moon came to be designated as the Lord of Herbs. To cut a tree on the day of the new moon was, in India, a crime as serious as that of slaying a brahmin.[67] The native woodcutters of Peru still make sure that the moon is favorable before starting their work.[68] Certain native tribes of Brazil call the moon the

62. P. Ehrenreich, *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, XXXVIII (1906), pp. 571-73.

63. L. R. Farnell, *The Cults of the Greek States* (Oxford, 1896-1909), I, pp. 185 f.; Salomon Reinach, *Cultes, mythes et religions*, I[2], p. 241.

64. Theocr. *Id.* XVIII. 48.

65. Farnell, *op. cit.*, II, p. 429.

66. R. E. Enthoven, *The Folklore of Bombay* (Oxford, 1924), p. 52.

67. E. W. Hopkins, *Epic Mythology* (Strassburg, 1915), p. 7.

68. Cf. *Oil Weekly*, v. XC, No. 5, p. 42 (July 11, 1938); cf. also M. Martin, *A Description of the Western Islands of Scotland* (John Pinkerton's *Voyages and Travels*, III (Philadelphia, 1811), p. 630; F. Pérot, *Folk-lore bourbonnais* (Paris, 1908), p. 129.

"Mother of Plants." The agricultural Indians of North America saw in her the corn mother. In Celebes the moon produces rice;[69] in ancient Persia and Babylonia she was responsible for all plant life.[70] We now begin to understand the true reason why the great lunar divinity of the Arabs was thought to preside over the myrrh tree and its precious product.

While it was then logical enough to make the god of the myrrh tree, the fair Adonis, the son of the great lunar goddess, we still have to account for his paternity. Why should his father be the sun god? Here again botany furnishes the clue of the problem. Myrrh, as was pointed out above, is a resin exuded, like all resins, by the bark of the tree under the action of the oxygen of the atmosphere and the sun. This central fact was quite well known to the ancients, though they were ignorant of the exact nature of the physiological and chemical processes (which, be it noted, are none too well known even now). This explains the role of the sun god in our myth.[71] This conclusion is borne out by analogous myths found elsewhere. Thus amber, the resinous nature of which was known in antiquity,[72] was fabled to be the tears of the Heliades, the daughters of Helios and sisters of Phaëton, who had been transformed into trees at the fall of their brother.[73] The myth of the birth of Adonis and Myrrha's tears is, therefore, nothing but a poetical paraphrase of the banal truth that myrrh is produced by a lunar tree exposed to the rays of the tropical sun.

This myth, it is worth repeating, can have originated only in the country of the myrrh tree; it is therefore south Semitic and appears to have been carried by Arabic colonists and Arabic myrrh traders to Smyrna, to Myra, to Adramyttion, and no doubt to many other points

69. Briffault, II, p. 629.

70. *Ibid.*

71. On the sun cult of the ancient Arabs, cf. J. Wellhausen, *Reste arabischen Heidentums* (Berlin, 1897), p. 60; Th. Nöldeke, *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, I (1908), s.v. *Arabs (Ancient)*; E. Osiander, *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, VII (1853), pp. 468 f.; XIX (1865), pp. 262 f.; A. Sprenger, *Das Leben und die Lehre des Mohammed*, I[2] (Berlin, 1869), p. 252, n. 1. Islam does not appear to have uprooted completely this sun cult; cf. Palgrave, *Narrative of a Year's Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia*, I (London and Cambridge, 1866), p. 8.

72. Karl Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, I (Berlin, 1890), p. 217.

73. Ovid, *Metam.* II. 363 ff.; Eur. *Hip.* 732 ff.; Apoll. Rhod., *Arg.* IV. 602 ff.; Paus. I. 4. 1; Diod. V. 23. 2 ff. Cf. A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, II (1925), p. 476; Frazer, Apollodorus, *The Library* (London, 1921), II, 388 ff.

along the coast of Caria and Lycia, as well as to Cyprus, at a period far anterior to the rise of Phoenician sea power, that is, probably, in the second millennium before our era. Nor can it be objected that Adonis is a Phoenician deity. For, in the first place, assuming that he is, it would have been natural and logical enough for the Phoenicians, when they took over the spice trade, to take over also the god of the myrrh tree. In the second place, the researches of Paul Kretschmer[74] have thrown the gravest doubt on the Phoenician provenance of Adonis.

The question arises: Where was the incest story added to the myth, in Arabia or in pre-Hellenic Asia Minor? The name of the heroine's father, Theias, and also the names given in the Cypriote versions (called *B*) would decidedly favor the latter view. Furthermore, incest stories of a similar type abound in the traditions of the pre-Hellenic populations of Greece and Asia Minor,[75] but are very rare among the Semites. Lastly, the very clever fusion of the two myths, the incest story, which originally explained the phases of the moon, and the transformation of the heroine into a tree (which recalls the story of Apollo and Daphne) with the birth of the god, betrays all too clearly the poetic fancy and literary skill of the pre-Hellenes or Ionians. It is doubtless they who gave the story the perfect form in which we know it, and which must have been the delight of the Alexandrian poets who gave the cue to Ovid.

74. *Glotta*, VII (1915), pp. 29-39.

75. Cf. E. Rohde, *Der griechische Roman und seine Vorläufer* (Leipzig, 1900), p. 448.

THE "E" AT DELPHI

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The essential procedures of initiatory rites, by which the death of an old man and the rebirth of a new man are effected, and the conditions of access to *penetralia*, are alike all over the world. Firmicus Maternus, *De errorum profanarum religionum* (ch. xviii), dealing with these subjects,[1] reminds us that there are right answers to the right questions (*habent enim propria signa propria responsa*), and that the right answer (*proprium responsum*) is made by the initiand (*homo morituras*) precisely as the proof of his right to be admitted (*ut possit admitti*). A typical example of such a *signum* and of the wrong and right answers can be cited from the *Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa*, iii. 14. 1-5. When the deceased reaches the Sun-door the question is asked, "Who art thou?" If he answers by his own or by a family name[2] he is dragged away by the factors of time. He should respond, "Who I am (is) the Light thou (art) (*ko'ham asmi suvas tvam*). As such have I come to thee, the heavenly Light." He (Prajāpati, the Sun) replies, "Who thou art, that same am I; who I am, that same art thou. Enter in." Of numerous parallels that might be cited, perhaps the most striking is Rūmī's myth of the man who knocked at his friend's door and was asked "Who art thou?" He

1. For Firmicus Maternus, see G. van der Leeuw, "The ΣΥΜΒΟΛΑ in Firmicus Maternus," in *Egyptian Religion*, Vol. I, 1933.

2. "Names are fetters" (*Ait. Ar.*, II. 1. 6). God has no personal or family name (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, III. 8. 8.), nor ever becomes anyone (*Kaṭha Up.*, II. 18), and it follows that there can be no return to God, no *deificatio* (for which, in Cusa's words, an *ablatio omnis alteritatis et diversitatis* is indispensable) for anyone who still is someone. The initiate is nameless, is not himself but Agni (*Kaus. Br.*, VII. 2. 3), cf. Gal. 2: 20, *vivo autem jam non ego, sed Christus in me.* God is a Sea, "nostre pace, ella è quel mare, al quai tutto se move" (*Paradiso*, III. 85, 86); and as the names of the rivers are lost in the sea, so are our names and likeness lost when we reach Him (*Praśna Up.*, VI. 5). "Also sich wandelte der tropfe in daz mer" (Eckhart, Pfeiffer, p. 314), cf. Rūmī, "that your drop may become the sea," and "None has knowledge of each who enters, that he is 'So-and-so'" (Odes XII and XV in Nicholson, *Shams-i-Tabriz*), and Lao Tzu, *Tao Te Ching*, XXXII, "To Tao all under heaven will come as streams and torrents flow into a great river or sea." And so, according to the inscription cited by Magnien, *Les mystères d'Éleusis* (1938), p. 334, "Pour mon nom, ne cherche pas qui je suis: le rite mystique l'emmena en s'en allant vers la mer empourprée. . . ."

See also my "Ākiṁcaññā; Self-naughting," in the *New Indian Antiquary*, III. 1940, and "Svayamātṛṇṇā; Janua Coeli," in *Zalmoxis*, II. 1, 1939 (1941).

answered "I." "Begone," said his friend. After a year's separation and tribulation he came and knocked again, and to the same question replied " 'Tis thou art at the door," and received the reply, "Since thou art I, come in O myself."[3]

Now there can be no question that the entrance to the temple of Apollo at Delphi was literally a Sun-door, a way into the house or temple of the Sun. The superscription, "Know thyself" (γνῶθι σεαυτόν) demands a knowledge of the answer to the question, "Who art thou?"[4] and may be said, in the veiled language of the mysteries, to ask this very question. The injunction, as Plutarch says,[5] is addressed by the God to all who approach him; and the famous "E" he takes to be their right answer. If now, as he also suggests, "E" stands for EI, and if we take from his various interpretations the meanings (1) the Sun (Apollo) and (2) "thou art," and assume that both these meanings are contained in the one enigmatic syllable, we have the *signum*, "Who art thou (at the door)?" and the *responsum*, "The Sun thou art (am I)." It is certain that no other true answer could have been given by anyone "qualified to go in unto union with the Sun."[6]

3. Jalālu'ddīn Rūmī, *Mathnawī* I. 3056-3065 (R. A. Nicholson, *in Gibb Memorial Series*, IV. 2). Cf. Cant. I. 8, *Si ignoras te, egredere.*

4. That the inscription actually puts this question is explicit in Xenophon, *Mem.* IV. ii. 24, where Socrates asks Euthydemus "Did you heed it, and try to consider who you were?" (ὅστις εἶ ης).

5. *Moralia*, 384 D.f ("The E at Delphi"). It is likewise assumed in Plato (*Charmides*, 164 D) that the injunction "Know thyself" is "the God's salutation (πρόσρησις) to those who enter," and that the words are spoken by the God to those who are entering his temple "otherwise than as men speak" and "very enigmatically" (αἰνιγματαδέστερον); i.e., "non in doctis humanae sapientiae verbis, sed in doctrina Spiritus" (I Cor. 2:13).

The words "Know thyself" are "enigmatic," it would appear, only because they can be taken to refer to a knowledge of either one of man's two souls or selves, the bodily and mortal or the incorporeal and immortal, so often spoken of by Plato and in the Vedic philosophy. In Xenophon, *loc. cit.* (cf. III. 9. 6), Socrates speaks of "self knowledge" as the knowledge of one's own powers and limitations; but this is in conversation with a conceited man who thinks he already knows himself, "who" he is, "Euthydemus" by name. But, in *Alcibiades* I. 130 E f., Socrates says that "he who orders, 'Know thyself,' bids us know the soul," and goes on to say that one who knows only what is of the body "knows the things that are his but not himself" (τὰ αὑτοῦ ἀλλ' οὔχ αὑτόν), cf. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, I. 5. 15.

As a parallel to these distinctions may be cited Plutarch's ridicule of those who cannot distinguish Apollo from the Sun (*Moralia*, 393 D, 400 C, D), passages that echo *Laws*, 898 D, where Plato says that "the body of Helios is seen by all, his soul by none," and recall *Atharva Veda* X. 8. 14: "Him (the Sun) all men see, not all know with the mind."

6. *Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa*, I. 6. 1.

A CHANGING IDEAL

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In religions we find man ever with an ideal in view, an ideal who, or which, is in some way a better, a greater than himself as he is usually manifested. But we also find him, from time to time, outgrowing the form in which he contemplates and worships that ideal. At one time and place, it may be power; at another, it may be the good in deed, word, and thought; at another, it may be the Divine will. And he may yet come to have other ideals, for, even if it be unconsciously, he seeks the New, since for him ultimately the More that he seeks lies in the New. When he is intent only on maintaining, or on reverting to a status from which he has fallen, he is then really seeking a Less. For, as seeker and, as such, one who is coming to be, it is his to pass on to a novel Better.

In speaking thus of "man," I have had "men," mankind, in thought, whose varying quests after a More, a New, emerge for us in surviving ritual and scripture. It is rare to come upon such a change in ideal, in the letter, being consciously made and recorded, the one to make it being one of the most famous "saviors" of man. But there it is, in records written down about a thousand years ago, albeit only in this century turned into English, first, I believe, by myself in 1917, then in a parallel context by Mr. F. L. Woodward, sixteen years later. That the ideal was being changed, and consciously changed, is clearly recorded by both text and commentary, the latter on both passages using the word "new." But this "new" is not, in the text, stated as a discarding of a present ideal for the new. The new is referred to as naming an effectual means for attaining to, or approaching a current ideal, thus: "He who strongly desires X should worship, as I worship, Y." A later passage shows this "savior" enjoining his followers to make both X and Y, together with a third ideal, their "dominant influence." And, to the end of his life, he is shown bidding his followers to "live with X and Y as their lamp and refuge . . . and no other." Hence, what I have called a changing ideal is not an exchange in ideals, but an enriching of an older ideal, a change in emphasis, a transformation of an ideal into something truer.

What is it I have in mind? It is strange that I should need to explain, as if the scripture I cite had been somehow buried all these centuries. None the less, so far as Buddhist utterances on the matter, or writings of non-Buddhist comment, have come to my knowledge, not a word on this repeated context has reached me. On the contrary, speakers and writers have ignored it. This is not due to lack of proclaiming it on my part. In one decade I have referred to it in six books,[1] so that I now draw attention to it for the seventh time. And I hope that the magic of this number may prevail! What then was this X and Y about?

The English-reading world can now learn from translations[2] how the man, Gotama the Sakyan, later called Buddha, is shown, when deciding to start a religious mission, coming to a decision. He is seeking a worthy object of worship. If this seem strange, let the reader remember how, in his day, nature gods had been discarded in a cult of Immanence—Deity as ideal "man-in-man." His pondering is recorded in prose, and also his decision. The latter is also recorded in mnemonic verse. The former amounts to this: "I do not see in the whole universe anyone, divine or human, whom I, for his perfection in morals, concentration, wisdom, or emancipation should worship. Is it not this *dhamma* (which is) for me the very enlightened (thing), just that which I should worship?"

Thereupon he is said to tell how there comes a vision of the chief of the Brahmā world, who, saluting him, says: "Even so have the enlightened in the past worshipped *dhamma,* as also the enlightened today worship, and as also the enlightened in the future will worship."

This affirmation is then repeated in four lines of verse, and then come these two lines:

> Wherefore by one desiring weal, by one for *mahattaṃ* yearning,
> very *dhamma* is to be revered, mindful of wakened ones'[3] behest.

Here is explained my statement above, "He who desires X worships Y," i.e., to obtain weal, to win *mahatta,* one should worship *dhamma.*

1. In *Sakya,* p. 68; more fully in *Manual,* pp. 165 f.; *Buddhism* (2nd ed.), p. 84; *Outlines,* p. 21; *To Become . . .* , p. 82; *Original Buddhism,* p. 46. (Nay, in *seven* books—*Gotama the Man,* p. 56.)

2. *Book of the Kindred Sayings* (Third Collection of the Pali Canon), I, pp. 174 ff., and *Book of the Gradual Sayings* (Fourth Collection), II, pp. 22 f. (Pali Text Society's editions, 1917, 1933).

3. Buddhas.

Now what was meant by *mahatta*, and wherein lies here a change of ideal? There is here a difficulty in true rendering, since *mahatta* may mean (a) greatness, abstract of *mahā*, (b) great soul or spirit, better known to us in its Sanskrit form, *mahâtmā*. On the surface, it is impossible to say which is right here. Nor is it quite easy if we go below the surface and ask which is the more *likely* meaning, given the time and place of the original saying of the founder, if, indeed, he really said it. The word in either meaning is rare in Buddhist literature, especially in the latter meaning. I know of only one context in which the latter meaning is the true one, but there, at all events, one cannot doubt that it is true. In the Fourth Collection, in the chapter preceding that containing the cited verse, is a discourse in which the man who is "a little soul" (*appâtumo*) is contrasted with him who is *mahatto*, one, that is, "who has cultured body, morals and thought, has developed insight . . . is a great soul; his life is immeasurable." The man who is *appâtumo* is, in each respect, the opposite.[4]

The former meaning, "greatness," is found, but in most cases it refers only to material greatness or number, e.g., size of a mansion,[5] number of monks.[6] But not always. In such later works as Jataka No. 532, and the *Visuddhi-magga*,[7] *mahatta* is applied to moral eminence of good parents, "winning them the epithet of Brahmā," of the Master's character, and to excellence of spiritual qualities. In other Indian literature, e.g., early Upanishads, especially such as were first composed probably not earlier than the beginning of Buddhism, the term *mahâtmā* does occur, if rarely. It occurs once only in the early *Chândogya*, where they who attain "greatness" are said to brood in alertness like mountains and other great natural phenomena, but here again, in a different context, the Deva is said to have swallowed up certain "great spirits," that is, certain natural forces. But in the later *Kaṭhaka*, death is called "great spirit," and in the yet later *Shvetâsvatara*, it is Deity Itself who is termed *mahâtmā*, "that all-worker great soul seated in the hearts of men . . . exercising universal overlordship . . ."; and in the perhaps even later *Maitri*,[8] too, Deity, the

4. The more unusual form here used of "soul," *ātumo*, may have been used because the corresponding form, *app'atto*, would equally well mean *appatto*, one who has not attained.

5. *Vimānavatthu*, I, 5, 12.

6. *Jātaka*, Cambridge trans. V, p. 174.

7. P.T.S. ed., pp. 132, 232.

8. These four works may be consulted in R. E. Hume's *Thirteen Principal Upanishads*.

mahâtmā, "has a dual nature"; and men who are devoted to That become themselves manifest as "great souls."

Again, in that poem of uncertain date, the *Bhagavad Gītā*, there are, in all, eight contexts with the word *mahâtmā*, four referring to Deity, four to men of divine promise. In the vision revealed to the warrior Arjuna, when Deity, the One, appears as the Many, "the light of that *Mahâtmā*" is as sunrise a thousandfold. On the other hand, we find: "the man of knowledge, the *mahâtmā*, who finds refuge in Me is very rare." And so on.

From such passages it is clear that, in early days of Buddhism, the compound term was current in that accepted religion of Immanence, which saw in Deity and man an identity of nature, differing only as More and Less. And, in the idiom of that religion, which came to be called Sanskrit, the ambiguity of meaning could not arise, namely, between *mahâtmā* and *mahatā*. Hence it is legitimate to say that, during the infancy of Buddhism, the term *mahâtmā* was current as meaning immanent Deity and, also, adherents of that cult. But it is not quite so certain that, in earliest Buddhism, aspiration to "greatness" without qualification was a religious phrase—greatness of this or that person or quality, yes, but not greatness as such. In so saying, I feel more cautious than I seem. For inquiry in all Vedic and early Vedantic literature we have the guidance, so precious for the history of terms, of two great Concordances. But in Pali literature, even of the Canon only, the slowly growing Concordance is not yet completed, and we must depend on our own reading and on invariably defective indexes.

But what, it may be asked, of the very copious Pali exegeses? Do these not tell us how we should read the word *mahattaṃ*, which you have cited? Well, even if they do, it by no means follows that they give the true explanation of such an ancient tradition as is suggested by that verse. Commentaries are the explanatory patter of vocal exposition, varying with exponents of a differing time and place, and not reduced to an "authentic" version till centuries had passed, skies had been changed, and therewith the whole religious outlook. Our earliest knowledge of a written Pali edition of the Commentaries tells of an earlier Sinhalese version converted into Pali some 450 years later. What modifications will not monks of Ceylon have wrought on that older pattern brought in verbal form from India, where at the birth of Buddhism a religious ideal prevailed which Buddhism sought to

expand, but which was alien to Ceylon? Let us consult these results.

In the Commentary on the verse actually cited (Third Collection), after a brief chat on the monk-compiled pondering of the founder, in which the only emphasis is laid on the alleged conviction that no one human or divine could teach him anything—"There is no teacher for me; there's none like me!"—the more ancient verse is dismissed with the curt comment, "By one longing for *mahattaṃ* means by one aspiring to great being (*mahā-bhāvaṃ*). He was evidently in no doubt on the matter. Neither was the editor of the corresponding Commentary in the Fourth Collection. But he had further to comment on a fairly obvious gloss in the text: the introduction of the Sangha, or Order of monks—a body which had not come into being when the founder, "first thing after his enlightenment," makes the new ideological outlook. *It came to be held* that, where "Buddha" and "Dhamma" were in the foreground, there also must be mention of the Sangha. And this is also to be worshiped "because of its longstanding (*rattaññu-*) abundance (!), holy living, and supremacy in achievements (or gains)."

I would also mention that this other version of the verse gives the more usual form of the word for "greatness," namely, *mahantaṃ* (with one *v.l. mahattiṃ*); also, that the identical verse, that is, line of verse, occurs in the little anthology of the Pali Canon called "Story of the Mansions," its commentary explaining, with a qualification, that it is "greatness of result" (*vipāka*) that is longed for. So we are here tied up fairly tightly to "greatness" as the accepted reading.

Let me turn to the first half of the line of verse. In this other context, it is not weal (*attha*) that is desired—it is *atta-*, i.e., *ātmā:atta-kāmena*—by one desiring spirit, self, or soul. Now this is a compound not unknown in Pali.

In the Kosala chapter of the Third Collection, we come upon suttas closely linking teaching ascribed to the founder with current Immanence doctrine. He is shown talking with the king of Kosala and his queen on the Upadishadic emphasis laid on the love felt in Immanence for the Deity as the More in and of the human spirit, and maintaining, with a logic not well emphasized in that teaching as we have it, that

> Since aye so dear the soul to other is,
> Let the soul-lover harm no other man.

"Soul-lover" is here more literally "one who desires the spirit" (*atta-kāmo*). Here the rendering *attha-* would be without the point there is in *atta-*. Now this compound, *ātmakāma,* is of Upanishadic diction, both early and of middle date. Thus in *Bṛhadārañyaka:*

> Verily this it is in which his desire is satisfied, in which (the) Spirit is his desire (lit., "he is *ātmakāma,*" 4; 3, 21; 4, 6).

And in *Maitri:*

> He verily is God . . . he is to be sought by one desirous of *Ātmā* (6, 7). But the compound *atthakāma* (*arthakāma*) is later, occurring once only in the *Bhagavad Gītā* (11, 5), and meaning only "desirous of worldly goods," namely, in the depreciated meaning which *artha* came to have *outside* of Buddhist tradition.

Again, in a sutta of the Second Collection, the founder is shown calling at a park gate, seeking a cousin who is in a "chummery" of three disciples, and bidden by the keeper of the park to keep away, since "these are such as are *attakāmā.*" The English and German renderings are quaintly different: "there for their souls' good," and "die selbstzufrieden scheinen" (who appear to be self-contented). There is here, apparently, no *v.l.* of *atthakāmā,* although that is the interpretation put on the phrase by Lord Chalmers' translation.[9] He was doubtless influenced by the Commentary (as was his wont), which conjures up a picture suitable probably under the changed skies of a later Ceylon, of men who, in forsaking the world, had genuinely sundered from all traffic with it. Neumann's rendering is hardly worth discussing. But if we consider the sutta in the light of Indian culture centuries older—and for me it bears marks of belonging to very early tradition—we may not feel contented with this minimizing of the historic significance of that compound, "desiring spirit" (*atta-kāmā*). After all, the acceptance of that great volte-face of Immanence, with its abandonment of vedic polytheism, must have meant, for deeply religious minds, a "coming apart" to seek what this God-within-man upheaval involved and implied. Indeed, it is not incredible that research will one day see in that coming apart the beginnings of Indian monasticism, so far removed at its inception from the "monastery" as producing the recluse, rather than the later cenobite—a love of withdrawal to which the old recluse-program in the Collection testifies.[10]

9. *Further Dialogues of the Buddha.*
10. *Ibid.*

But, with the widening of the rift between Brahman teaching of Indian well-born youth and the tendency in the Sakyan (or early Buddhist) teaching, we should expect to find this prolonged sacrament of forest-life losing its original urge and object; we should expect to find that departure losing its positive significance and winning credit of a merely negative sort—just a turning away from worldly activities. And *then* would come the tendency to interpret *atta-kāma* by *attha-kāma*, the desire for (spiritual) profit in development of "character" (as we might say), and to interpret *mahâtmā* by *mahatta*, or eminence of attainment in such qualities.

If, on the one hand, we wed, in the two contexts cited, the *attakāma* in the one with the *mahâtmā* in the other, we get an access of poetic stress in the two halves of the *sloka* verse, enhancing what is for me the older meaning, thus: "By one desiring the Spirit, by one longing for the Great Spirit . . . ," beside which the renderings of Commentator and of translator become, in religious values, relatively a Less.

If, on the other hand, we hold, as more probably meant, the relatively less in religious value as the truer rendering of those two terms, then the significance in the repeated Sutta is not thereby destroyed; it is only made less striking. I refer to what I have said as to the change in concept of a religious ideal. The worship of Y remains; the desire for X is lowered. Let us come to the "worship of Y."

The Commentaries on both versions are unanimous on this point: "the Teacher thinks, 'I will live depending upon and honouring the new supramundane religion (*dhamma*) which I have discerned.'" Here, if anywhere, was opportunity for an exponent of historical perspective to have told us the real reason for this feeling out after a More in ideal. But his tradition had long lost sight of what had been the ideal when its founder was on earth, and it was the quasi-deified greatness of that founder which alone had formed the tradition that they, the exponents, had inherited. Namely, the founder tells himself he has topped all spiritual attainment, and must find new worlds to conquer, a new spiritual *summum bonum* before which even he could bow. That is all. None the less, the importance of my theme lies in that confession of a "new."

But that which they had lost to view need not (thanks be!) by us be lost to view. We can, as they could not, see the episode of this "new" in its right perspective. We know that in the founder's day

religious culture was teaching that Deity, as the self or spirit in man, was to be sought after, inquired into, contemplated, "known."[11] The seeking was a quest, a travel, a travail of *mind*. Knowing, it was held, involved being. But for Gotama, the founder, this was not enough. For him, this seeking was no mere work of mind. It was a striving so to will, so to do, so to live, as to be ever becoming That Who the man potentially is. It is true, this is not declared in so many words, but it may be seen in the whole trend of the teaching. The *wording* of that day's culture fell out of favor in the movement he started, but the effect of that movement lasted. For static contemplation of identifiable Deity he substituted a dynamic living, the will-to-become. And this he found best in the word *dharma* (Pali, *dhamma*), best expressed in our, alas, defective verb "ought." *Dharma* is not necessarily what is; it is what ought to be; it is an appeal from man's mind to man's will.

When Gotama, at the start of his mission, remonstrates with the young nobles, "Seek not that woman thief! Were it not better that you sought thoroughly for the Spirit?" and they acquiesce, he talks to them, not of how to conceive spirit, but said, "I will teach you *dhamma*." It is true that what has survived is a little set piece used as a formula, but, poor little relic though it is, it tells not of what should be *thought*, but of what should be *done*, of the "religious life," as we might say. Thus did he show that if spirit—that is, in that day, Deity —were to be sought after as desired, the way to do so was by honoring that inward monition to the better life that was then implied in *dharma*, but which we have come to call "conscience." As to that, I have often reminded readers that we, too, have identified conscience with Deity or spirit in our own poets' words.[12]

In this way did Asoka, true heir of this ideal of religion in the deed, in his Rock Edicts, make aspiration to a better world resolve itself into a "walking according to *dhamma*," reminding his subjects of what was the content of that word.

That Gotama rejected the current ideal of the "Great Self, or Spirit" cannot rightly be maintained, however much Buddhism now claims that he did. Our own lowered use of the word "self" has greatly hindered us in right understanding here. There is no anti-ethical meaning in the Indian term. That "self" (spirit) is the More

11. See frequent passages in *Chāndogya* and *Maitri Upanishads*.
12. Shakespeare (*Tempest*), Sir Thomas Browne, Goethe (*Faust*).

in man's make-up is often made clear. That self, with *dharma* and the judgment of worthy men, here and in other worlds, are a trinity in ideals survives in an emphatic discourse. And the two, *ātmā* and *dharma,* at the founder's life's end, are solemnly commended to his followers as the two things, or two in one, by the light of which, in the shelter of which, they are to live: "Live as men who have Spirit as lamp and shelter, as men who have *Dharma* as lamp and shelter, and nothing else!" I have tried here and there to show how irrational, for India of that day how impossible, is the interpretation that we of here and today have put into that injunction. It may be that only better knowledge coming to us in other worlds will show whether I am right.

It is true that another parting word of this great Reformer, seeking not to destroy, but to deepen and heighten the ideal of his day, names "Dharma" but excludes "Spirit" as his successor. Actually two are named *Dhamma* and *Vinaya:* "Let them, after I am gone, be the Teacher to you."[13] *Vinaya,* or discipline, implied a body of Rules. And were it not too misfitting, the reader might be content to see herein a dual legacy—to the laity and to the order; misfitting, since the two are collectively called "Teacher" (*satthā*), and rightly; the second was but an appendix to the former, suitable only to the special life of the monk. This injunction is recorded as made to his cousin and attendant, Ānanda, only, and it is just possible that this man's future loyalty needed this reminder being made dual.

As a gospel not specifically for the monk, such as it later mainly became, but for Everyman, there can be little doubt (as the attentive reader of Indian literature deriving from the sixth century B.C. will admit) that the words best expressing the difference between early Vedânta and Pitaka are these two, *Ātmā* and *Dhamma,* and the emphasis given to the former term in the one, and to the latter term in the other. Incidentally, it may be recalled that, in a book of the Vedânta, the *Maitri Upanishad,* "a wrong teaching" is condemned because it enjoined "study of *Dharma,* and in ways destructive of the Vedas and other teachings." That among these teachings the then inculcated Immanence was not rejected by the man who took *Dharma* as his ideal, but, on the contrary, was held to be the better "sought

13. *Dialogues of the Buddha,* II, p. 171. *Dharma* is the Sanskrit, *Dhamma,* the Pali form.

for" by the way of cultivating *Dharma,* is for me vindicated by his holding up the two ideals side by side as comprising for men religious guidance. If this is so, it certainly points to the twain as coupled in the verse; wherein aspiration of the one should be forwarded by veneration of the other—aspiration, that is, for the "great spirit," and not for just "greatness."

Nor need there be for us anything ancient or out-of-date in this subject. Actually, for Buddhism the new order that arose let drop the older ideal—and sorely to its loss has this been. For us, not under the burden of that tradition, there is here, surely, matter of perennial adolescent truth in the strengthening of an older ideal of mind by the wider and deeper foundation, that in an ideal of man's will, of man as willer, our quest of the supreme ideal and goal is more truly pursued.

UNIVERSALS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

By Robert Leet Patterson

It would probably be generally conceded that one of the most crucial problems, both of epistemology and of metaphysics, is the age-old problem of universals. Whatever answer we return to it must affect profoundly our views both of the nature of knowledge and of the character of that which is known. My object in the present paper is to examine its relation to certain fundamental questions which confront the philosophy of religion. It is an inquiry which seems to me timely, in view of the increasing attention which the philosophy of religion is likely to receive in the future, partly because of the rising interest in the adjacent field of values, and still more because of the wide-spread and ever-growing conviction that the present peril to our civilization is due primarily to a breakdown of the spiritual life.

I shall not attempt the hopeless task of trying to frame a definition of religion which will command general assent. It will be sufficient for my purpose to indicate what I take to be the irreducible minimum which, from the historical point of view at least, justifies us in terming any outlook religious, and that is the presence of other-worldliness. By this I do not mean that the interests of religion are diametrically opposed to those of the normal and natural man. On the contrary, I take it that religion is basically concerned with the conservation of all that in this life we find most precious. What I do mean is that, from the religious standpoint, the spatial and physical universe is never viewed as a closed system, but is invariably regarded as no more than a province—perhaps, even, as no more than a reflection—of reality, and as, therefore, to be understood only in relation to its total environment or ultimate ground. And what I wish to emphasize is the fundamental opposition which consequently obtains between the religious outlook and the purely this-worldly position which materialism, naturalism, and humanism share in common.

This much being presupposed, I shall now enumerate the problems to which I have just referred. In the first place, there is the question of the relation of the various historical religions to religion, or, to put the point in another way, the relation of religion to history. Can we

venture to maintain, as Theodore Parker maintained, that the principles of religion are true in the same way that the principles of mathematics are true, in that they hold good universally regardless of place or time, and that, accordingly, such progress as history records is merely one of discovery and application? Dare we assert, as he asserted, that, had Jesus never lived and the gospel first been preached at Athens and not at Jerusalem, the essence of Christianity would still have been the same?

If we dare, we do so in defiance of the lucid, outspoken, and unqualified expression of the opposite point of view by Professor Brunner. Christianity, he contends, is founded upon an actual historical event which was nothing else than the breaking through of the Eternal into time, an event, in its very nature final and unrepeatable, which falls under the category of "once-for-allness" (ἐφ' ἅπαξ). The πρῶτον ψεῦδος is Fichte's dictum, "It is the metaphysical element alone, and not the historical, which saves us." Thus the relation between Christianity and what Professor Brunner terms universal religion is one of irreconcilable antagonism. What renders his exposition especially valuable, however, is the clarity with which he makes out his case for the uniqueness of Christianity in its claim to "once-for-allness." In the case of every other great world-religion, he contends, the Founder is the mere mouthpiece of a revelation which leads beyond himself and aims at making the disciple independent of the teacher. "There is no ἐφ' ἅπαξ," he boldly asserts, "either in Zoroastrianism or in Buddhism."[1] And, presumably, he would say the same of Islam. These religions, then, are popular forms of universal religion. The same may be said of the notion, so characteristic of the Orient, of a succession of teachers or incarnations, for that which can be repeated is not unique. Even Hegelianism, with its insistence upon Christianity as the Absolute Religion, falls under this condemnation, since, by its interpretation of the successive periods of history as stages in the manifestation of the Divine, it eliminates the vital element of uniqueness, and exalts the metaphysical at the expense of the historical. None the less, it is of great significance, for, like Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism, it represents universal religion at the self-conscious level, emancipated from local limitations, and expressing itself in the realm of thought. It is this universal, philosophical, mystical, type

1. *The Mediator*, p. 27. n. 1.

of religion which Professor Brunner regards as the great enemy of Christianity.

What primarily concerns us is not Professor Brunner's defence of the uniqueness and "once-for-allness" of Christianity. It is conceivable, in spite of his denial, that similar claims on behalf of their own religions might be made by the champions of other faiths. What concerns us is that such a claim can be made at all, that religion can be conceived of as thus indissolubly linked to a particular historical event. It is evident—and we have to thank Professor Brunner for having made it so evident—that between such a view and the universal outlook which he so abominates there is no middle ground. Every attempt at compromise, as he has so ably shown, concedes the case to universalism. It is an instance of either-or.

In the second place, there is the problem of revelation. It is sometimes assumed, in fact Professor Brunner himself assumes, that the idea of revelation is contained implicitly in the very notion of religion. "There is no religion," he writes, "which does not believe itself to be based upon divine revelation in one way or another. There is no religion worth the name which does not claim to be 'revealed religion.' "[2] With this position we may contrast that of Professor Hocking, who insists that only religions of the Semitic group, by which he means Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, can properly be termed "revealed" religions.[3] We may reasonably complain, indeed, that this classification is too narrow. If by revelation we understand the impartation of hitherto unknown truths by God to man through vision and prophetic inspiration, it would seem that Hinduism and Zoroastrianism must also be included.[4] But equally obvious is it that Jainism and primitive Buddhism must be left out. For by these religions the notion of divine agency is rejected, and appeal is made only to the supernormal, but not superhuman, insight of the advanced contemplative. Here we have the notion of intuition as distinct from that of revelation. Clearly such a notion is not self-evidently absurd. It raises the question, however, whether man can become directly and non-inferentially aware of other realities than sensa or

2. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
3. *Living Religions and a World Faith*, pp. 63-64.
4. Hinduism has its own doctrine of revelation. The ṛshis did not compose the Vedas; they saw them. The visions of Zoroaster, again, are as truly revelation as those of Isaiah or Jeremiah.

sensible objects, whether, in fact, he possesses the capacity for what Dr. Broad has called "non-perceptual intuition."[5]

The thinker who is content to accept one of the so-called revealed religions on its own terms, to acknowledge it as final and supremely authoritative, and to condemn all its rivals as spurious—or, at least, as hopelessly inadequate—by that acceptance returns one possible answer to this problem. At the opposite pole stands the champion of universal religion. The latter, by refusing to accept *in toto* and on its face value the content of any particular self-styled revelation, and by invoking the arbitrament of reason, implicitly denies that there is any distinction between theology and the philosophy of religion; thus he unavoidably falls heir to all those problems which he will not permit the professional theologian to settle for him. The questions, therefore, as to whether revelation, in any sense however qualified, be a fact, whether intuition of supersensible reality be also a fact, and how one is to be distinguished from the other, will assume for him a primary importance.

And, in the third place, there are the great fundamental types of religious life and thought which cut across the boundary lines of the historic faiths and tend to manifest themselves everywhere. There is the mystical type, the rationalistic, the ethical, the legalistic, the sacramentarian. The forms and combinations in which these have appeared on the stage of history, and the degrees of emphasis placed on one or the other, now here and now there, are manifold. Once more, if we accept implicitly and fully any one of the great world-faiths, the problem will thereby be largely settled for us. Our own religion, or our own preferred form of it, will be the norm; every deviation from that norm will be indicative of error. If, however, we approach the matter from the standpoint of universal religion, the situation will appear very different. It will be our duty to bring to light the presuppositions which are responsible for these various attitudes, and to determine their mutual compatibility or incompatibility. Where opposition occurs we must seek to discover whether it represents an ultimate and irremovable antithesis, or is capable of being resolved in a higher synthesis.[6] If, as a result of our inquiry,

5. See his *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy*, vol. I, pp. 51-53.

6. As an example of what I mean I would point to the attempt in the *Bhagavadgītā* to reconcile the seemingly antagonistic gospels of faith and works.

we are left with an irreducible divergence between certain fundamental outlooks, it will be our task to attempt their respective evaluation. If, on the other hand, our efforts at synthesis prove successful, we shall have arrived at a point of view more adequate because more inclusive, more impartial, and less parochial than that of any of the historic religions.

Let us now return to the problem of universals. Here the opposite poles between which speculative thought has constantly fluctuated are constituted, on the one hand, by the standpoint of the extreme realist for whom universals have being both *in re* and *ante rem*, and, on the other, by the position common to the nominalist and the conceptualist who agree in contending that only particulars are to be found *in rerum natura*. With an apparent dogmatism—for which I plead the obvious excuse of the inescapable limitations of this paper—I propose to treat this antithesis as exclusive, and to assume that any intermediate view is capable of being reduced to one or the other of these antagonistic theories. In particular, with apologies to the conceptualist—inasmuch as his position seems to me only a disguised form of nominalism—I shall take the liberty of classifying him, for the purposes of the present inquiry, as a nominalist. What I wish now to consider are the consequences which follow, from the adoption of either one of these opposing points of view, for the philosophy of religion as it attempts to deal with the three problems before us.

What happens if we adopt the nominalistic point of view? All knowledge, of course, will be of particulars, and, if intuition be limited to sensa or sensible objects, these alone will be directly known. Such an attitude is congenial to naturalism, logical positivism, and humanism. Religion—in the historic sense of the word—will be dismissed by thinkers of these schools as an illusion; ethics and aesthetics will naturally be dealt with upon a basis of subjectivism. If the nominalist be content with such a position, I shall not now try to dislodge him. But many nominalists are not so content. They feel the desire, or the need, to vindicate religion. Yet how is it to be done? If intuition be confined to the realm of the senses, it can be done only inferentially, by a process of argumentation. Whither will the arguments lead, and upon what principles will they be based? To be effective they must conduct us, one may assume, either to the God of theism or to an all-inclusive Absolute. And, to fulfill either

task, it seems clear that an argument must be based upon some principle—such as that of causality—which, if it can be known at all, must be known a priori. A nominalism, however, which admits direct awareness only of sensible particulars, is not in a position to vindicate such knowledge. But how if we extend the field of awareness to include objects which are not sensible? Even so, these will still be particulars, whereas a priori knowledge is of the universal. None the less, such an extension may be defended on the ground that it opens the door to the consideration of religious, and especially of mystical, experience. It can plausibly be maintained that the attempt to build an adequate foundation for religion without utilizing the material which religion itself provides is a hazardous one. Such is, indeed, the method employed by the Thomists, who are fearful of conceding anything to the claims of religious experience lest, in so doing, they be delivered over to the tender mercies of the Calvinists or the Ontologists. Yet the non-Roman Catholic thinker, who is subject to no such dogmatic restraints, may well feel inclined to adopt the more empirical procedure.

We must again inquire, however, whither such a course will lead us. Is it possible that from the data provided by religious experience we can at once infer the truth either of theism or of absolutism? Will not the variegated and multiform character of such experience be indicative rather of the truth of polytheism? If it be objected that polytheism belongs to the mythological, rather than to the philosophical, level of thought, and that its incoherence loudly proclaims its theoretical inadequacy, the force of the contention may be freely granted. Yet by thus appealing to considerations of a general character, such as that of coherence, we implicitly confess than an experience unanalyzed, uncriticized, unco-ordinated with any other is worthless, that its value lies in its interpretation in the light of universally valid principles.

And here we touch one aspect of a wider problem—the limits of induction. The claims of religion are based upon a world-view; they are grounded in the nature of the universe envisaged as a whole. Yet only a part of the universe is empirically known to us, and as to the proportion which obtains between that part and the unknown which surrounds it we are ignorant. Any conclusions, therefore, as to the character of the whole which are based upon our experience of the

part are plainly valueless. No mere process of induction—be the nature of the experience upon which it is based sensuous or non-sensuous—can avail us anything. It follows that, if a metaphysical system is to be constructed at all, this can be done only by the a priori method—as philosophers, I think, are increasingly coming to realize. And here, I would suggest, is where the nominalist who is also a religionist is at a disadvantage. For how is he to justify an appeal to the a priori? I can see but one way, and that is by an appeal to the Augustinian doctrine of illumination. Yet will not such an appeal irreparably ruin his own doctrine? A priori knowledge which holds good always and everywhere is nothing but a knowledge of the universal, and, if such knowledge be imparted by God to man, does not this imply that the universal has being *ante rem* in the divine consciousness?

There still remains, perhaps, a way of escape for the nominalist if he be willing to take it. Renouncing the working out of an autonomous metaphysics as a task exceeding the unaided powers of the human intellect, he may nevertheless employ the doctrine of divine illumination to provide him with the guarantee of an historic revelation. This is no mere abstract possibility. The view suggested was actually elaborated by Calvin, and it is the solution proposed today by the renascent Calvinism which, under the leadership of M. Lecerf, has recently created a stir in France and the Low Countries. According to this theory, the special revelation embodied in the Scriptures is ineffective unless the mind of the reader be enlightened by the Spirit bearing witness to the authenticity of its own recorded word. If the nominalist care to avail himself of this ingenious theory, he can employ the doctrine of illumination without entangling himself in the realm of universals.[7] Thus the denial of the subsistence of universals *extra mentem* may lead either to the adoption of a hostile or sceptical attitude toward the claims of religion or, on the other hand, to an alliance with an extreme form of supernaturalism.

It would seem, then, that our three questions will be answered as follows. In the first place, a nominalistic interpretation of religion will logically tend directly away from universalism and toward the ac-

7. Notwithstanding the fact that Calvinistic epistemology is Aristotelian. See M. Lecerf's *Introduction a la Dogmatique Réformée*, Premier Cahier, pp. 65-67 and 134-35.

ceptance of a particular historic revelation with its category of once-for-allness. Secondly, in the name of this particular revelation, the natural capacity of the human mind for "non-perceptual intuition" will be emphatically denied. We must not be misled in this connection by terminology. The believer in illumination may speak of intuition, as Calvin does, for instance, but he does not mean by it an act of direct awareness falling under the native powers of the intellect. On the contrary, it involves for him the actual co-operation of the Deity in the knowing process whereby the enlightened soul is enabled to discern that to which it would otherwise be blind. And, in the third place, if such illumination be mediated by some external revelation—and we have seen no other way in which the nominalist can make use of the doctrine without giving away his case—the resultant type of religion will be at once mystical and sacramental; mystical in that it is based upon the experience of divine activity in the soul of the believer—the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum*—and sacramental inasmuch as this experience is brought about by contact with the Scriptures which thus function as a sacrament par excellence. Whether it will be legalistic or anti-legalistic will depend upon its acceptance or rejection of the efficacy of works. Either position would appear to be equally compatible with its attitude toward universals.

Let us next examine the situation from the realist's point of view. We are now confronted with two mutually interconnected orders of being, universals and particulars. Without scrutinizing in detail the precise nature of this inter-connection, we can see at once that the doctrine of the subsistence of universals *ante rem* clearly involves that of non-perceptual intuition; for how, otherwise, are universals to be known? The same inference, moreover, can be drawn from the fact that some universals, such as moral qualities, never characterize sensible objects. From the outset, therefore, we are in touch with an intelligible, as well as a sensible, world. And, since we are directly aware of universals, we are also aware of the relations—themselves universals—which subsist among them, such as entailment or exclusion. Awareness of this sort, however, is precisely what we mean by a priori knowledge. There is no mystery, therefore, as to its origin—except in so far as all knowing is mysterious—and no justification for restoring to the notion of illumination to explain how it is imparted to us.

From what has been said it is obvious that we cannot, without further ado, describe the realist's position as religious. As in the case of nominalism there is a dividing of the ways. And our choice of ways will depend upon the answer we return to the question as to whether the mind which apprehends universals is itself a native of the intelligible world, or merely an external observer. This is, of course, the problem of the *Phaedo*. And it is, I would suggest, the crucial one, pushing the question of theism—important as it is—into the background. As before, in the matter of the nominalist's choice, I shall make no attempt to vindicate the religious outlook, but shall merely inquire what will be the consequences for those who find it inevitable.

The answer to our first question seems quite obvious. Inasmuch as the realist professes to enjoy a direct contact with a realm of moral and aesthetic values, the need for a special, historic, revelation will be, if not eliminated, at least greatly diminished, and the importance attaching to particular events and persons will be correspondingly lessened. Thus the tendency of epistemological realism will be toward the development of Professor Brunner's pet abhorrence—a universal, philosophic, type of religion.

As before, the response to the first question determines in great measure the replies which we shall return to the others. In the former case, however, it tended to simplify our answers, whereas now it invests them with an almost appalling complexity. Especially is this true of our second question. Instead of being introduced to save an apparently hopeless situation, the notion of revelation is now challenged to show cause why it should not be discarded altogether. Yet, as our problem decreases in importance, so does the solution of it become entangled with that of others logically antecedent to it. The establishment of theism is, of course, a pre-requisite, if the notion in question is to be vindicated; yet, even should this be accomplished, the matter will not be settled, for, although revelation implies theism, theism does not necessarily involve a theory of revelation. As a matter of fact, the whole problem of revelation is intimately connected with the philosophy of mysticism, as Al-Farabi and Avicenna so clearly indicated, thereby drawing upon themselves the displeasure of modern Roman Catholic commentators. The chances for survival of any doctrine of revelation would, therefore, seem to depend upon the possibility of discovering some criterion whereby the experience of revelation can

be definitely distinguished from the mystical experience; otherwise the two problems will fuse into one. But although we cannot anticipate the answer—since it can be given only after a metaphysic has been in great part worked out—we can see that, whatever it may be, it will be of relatively subordinate importance.

In regard to our third question, it is obvious that a religious attitude which is conditioned by the adoption of a realistic epistemology is bound to be mystical in the broad sense of the word, since it involves the admission of non-perceptual or intellectual intuition. Its mysticism, however, will be very different from that of the nominalist, inasmuch as it is not imported *ab extra*, but, on the contrary, is rooted in this very way of thinking. Accordingly it will be rationalistic, rather than arbitrary and authoritarian. It is natural to suppose that such an outlook will be unfriendly to any form of sacramentarianism. Its ethics, no doubt, will be intuitionist. Whether a position of this sort will be compatible with religious legalism will depend upon the answers that it will return to the problems of free-will and determinism, of faith and works, which we cannot at this stage foresee. Such, it seems to me, are the important and very different consequences which follow from the giving of either one of the two possible answers to the apparently simple question whether resemblance be a relation about which no more can be said than that it is ultimate and unanalyzable, or whether, on the contrary, it be a relation which both demands and admits of an explanation—an explanation that involves the admission of an objective reality which is not particular but universal.

ON THE CONTEXT OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE*

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I

I once read the following passage from an anthropological monograph to a man who had devoted a long life to religious ministry in New York:

> While the average Reindeer Chukchee is quite unable to explain who the beings are to whom he sacrifices, he is very positive about the details of the sacrifice and about various acts connected with it. There is a marked tendency to maintain the observance of these performances, which have obtained a firmer hold than the ideas they represent.
>
> (Bogoras, *The Chukchee*, p. 340)

The gentleman to whom I read was a person of much experience in religious matters, and I have not forgotten his comment that perhaps few generalizations would apply more truly to observations he had made in his New York ministry than these statements about those east-Siberian primitives.

The question has sometimes been raised, for instance, by Kant, how far religious knowledge should be concerned to eliminate such particularized adherence on the part of New Yorkers and Chukchees to their respective observances in favor of a common "rational religion." An analogy with man's situation and concern in the matter of his bodily food may help to clarify various issues involved. A universal science of nutrition would no doubt indicate certain conditions of wholesome nourishment for the entire race. And it is even conceivable that such a science might achieve an efficiency which would make it possible for human organization to eliminate malnutrition everywhere. Meanwhile, however, in the absence of such efficient science and organization, the peoples of the earth have each a more urgent need to live by whatever they have and can secure under the particular circumstances in which they are severally placed. The pursuit of a universal dietetics may well be justified by its good fruit, yet the facts suggest

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that the customary provincial fare of each people can claim a still more insistent importance.

But this simple observation does not yet contain the main point of the analogy. Provincial fare and universal dietetics each has its obvious justification. But to live well, knowledge of both—and this is the main point—should be taken up into a still more comprehensive and flexible *connaissance* which aims to determine the relation of provincial fares to local conditions and to one another, as well as to universal principles of nourishment. The purpose of this analogy is not to compare religion with eating. It is to ask whether there can be such comprehensive knowledge with respect to religion, overcoming provincialism yet favoring the appropriate relation of differences in practice consonant with valid universal principles.

Words adequate to suggest the essence of religious activity are not easy to find, but it may be called a consecrating activity. The term—consecration—may suggest a priestly more than a prophetic emphasis, devotion and ideal focus more than liberation and power, what is inviolable more than what is shared, rite and ceremony more than spontaneous realization. But such special accents are not intended here. The term is used as a brief label instead of circumlocutions for all the great diversity of religious activity. Spirit and devotion maintained against evil seems to be the general background occasioning the various forms of human consecration. An aim at more complete relation to what is inviolable pervades them. But in religion, as in other human affairs, the mechanism of life's labor and the desire for security occupy a very large place.

A more cumbersome formulation is that religion, whether institutionalized or not, is always a matter of participation in relations carrying a sense of sacredness, holiness, or kindred numinous sense. Religious participation is practical as well as effective and noetic. To ascribe the numinous to some transcendent ground of the soul, or to "the unconditioned," is not to specify it, but, as those who use these terms often say, it is rather to protest against any specification which makes a finite sanctity too absolute. At the same time, whenever in the confluence of human affairs consecration, or participation in sacred relations, takes place, it is always specific and has its focal points, its *sancta* and their symbols. Religious symbols, moreover, function not only to express, but also to help organize such a specific context of religious participation.

Religion exists and can be identified only in its particular forms. Religious knowledge relates to some specific context of religious participation. It is a knowledge of powers and issues of consecration in the interest of consecration. The problems of theology and of religious philosophy are significantly different according to the particular values, myths, and rites of each religion, and every important change in public or private cultus is apt to give them a new turn. On the other hand, although religious knowledge is thus always linked to some specific context of religious activity, the orbit of its possible extension over life and nature is quite unlimited. This is because consecration takes place within life as a whole, and has its own manner of relevance to everything. Religion is not self-contained. Though having special *sancta* and symbols, cult, whether public or private, dwells within culture at large, and has a necessary continuity with it in materials, in certain functions, and categories. It may focus attention upon unique mysteries, yet if it is a major cult it will link up with the pervasive organization of life. And religious knowledge, in its interconnections with other branches, may indeed from its own angle come to take cognizance of everything.

Now nothing is more natural, and well-nigh inevitable, for human beings than that they should regard their chief consecrations as the mainsprings and central bearings of life. That religion should have a centrality in human affairs seems to be part of its very essence. And yet in all candor it must be confessed that it is extremely difficult to obtain an exact view of its actual role in any specific man or group's life-economy. We live and move in our consecrations, justify ourselves by them, are uplifted by them, and are not greatly inclined to explore them critically. The same applies to most radicals just as much as to conservatives. We do indeed very readily speculate about some of our consecrations and explain them to one another in terms of theories or of ideologies. But how exact a knowledge of the religious process in which we participate is obtained in this way is surely a problem.

In my present reflections this problem has a specific focus, namely, to discover the form of religious knowledge which will most assist men to find, as far as possible, their exact spiritual bearings. My thesis is that this will be what I call a comprehensive type of religious knowledge, a form that includes yet surpasses, both provincial and universal components.

But what is meant by finding spiritual bearings? There are some, indeed perhaps many, who would prefer to drop this word "spiritual" because of its vagueness. I might myself agree with them did I know what to substitute as a term linking the integration of powers, ideality, and care for other lives. Thus, the *Bhagavadgītā* describes the Yogin as, "Holding the sense instruments under his sway, following the rule, his self become the self of all born beings." To inquire after our spiritual bearings is to inquire: what lives we care for? with what ideals? and with what kind of integration of forces? What are we doing with our distinctive powers as persons? may be a way of uniting these questions. And to speak of finding, as far as possible, our exact spiritual bearings means to know as accurately and comprehensively as we can how we actually stand in these respects, not simply what we like to say about them. There is involved something of the confession: Thou hast searched me, O God.

It is not claimed that to find one's exact spiritual bearings is *the* aim of religious knowledge, nor necessarily its highest aim; nor is it claimed that to pursue this aim is exclusively a function of religious knowledge. Indeed, I shall emphasize that other branches of knowledge must participate in this function along with religious knowledge. And religious knowledge, on its part, is at the same time occupied with one or more other essential aims, for example, to conduct sacraments, to find a purification of life, to know God, to serve a central art of life, to establish spiritual relations or to advance in them.

II

The implications of what has been said for our view of the development of religious knowledge, from rudimentary to more comprehensive forms, must now be stated in more detail.

The first point has been that religious knowledge arises within, and is necessarily linked to, some primary context of religious participation, of consecrating activity. It aims essentially to know the powers and issues of consecration, and then, since these come out of all life, it secondarily extends over everything. But it is not a knowledge of nature and society as such—not astronomy, biology, economy added together—but of nature and society in relation to consecration. Religion is in every age conditioned by the ignorances of the time. But essentially it develops the kind of depictions of nature that it does, not

out of ignorance, but because, from orthodoxy to the Monists and Rudolf Steiner, nature in a context of consecration, we might also say in a context of religious society or communion, is its theme.

Now there are cases of genuine religious participation without any knowledge, as when an infant participates in baptism, or a one-year old in the celebration of its birthday. But religious participation generally carries with it some degree and kind of knowledge of the components of consecration. Obviously much that is important in this domain must occur with little conscious knowledge. In degree, religious knowledge will vary according to experience and the understanding of grounds. In kind, it varies according to functional and social differences, such as exist, for example, between priest lore and priest code, prophecy, myth, and theology. The knowledge of priests is especially directed toward superintending an order of ceremony, sacrifice, and law. The function of social criticism, on the other hand, that attaches in greater or less degree to prophecy, usually involves another kind of appeal to special revelation. The differences and relations between priestly and prophetic knowledge furnish an extensive theme of great interest. Still I prefer, in the limits of this discussion, to devote more immediate attention to forms of religious knowledge generally familiar to layman and theologian, rather than to such as are peculiar to priest and prophet. Hence I turn next to some reflections on myth, and then to theology.

The laymen, among both the Chukchees and the New Yorkers previously mentioned, usually know many customs of their groups, and some of the stories that give reasons for them. It is probably not a passing phase of religion in which the reasons why, the grounds of action and belief, are largely given in terms of symbols like myths. I do not say that such symbols arise purely to give reasons, but, in their own way, they serve that purpose among others. Now with respect to myth, which is by no means exclusively a vehicle of religion, it is pertinent to recall Plato's saying that "poets say many fine things without knowing the meaning of what they say." This does not mean that there is no meaning. But to explore the meaning of symbols like myths may be a subtle and complex task, because such symbols generally have multiple meaning, partly concealed, and often arising out of the confluence of conflicting tendencies. Energies and associations from all the important areas of life and experience converge into

major religious symbols, and in religious activity such symbols have the significance not only of noetic expressions but also of dynamic organizers.

Malinowski and other anthropologists have frequently pointed out that in primitive societies myths are "hard-working cultural forces." Our present problem is to speak more precisely about how they work in connection with religious situations. It seems to me that we can approach this matter fruitfully if we think of myths in religion as *invitations to occasions and activities of consecration.* But social invitations from host to guest usually stand too much before their occasions. Let us think rather of something like Weber's waltz called "Invitation to the Waltz," which may be an intrinsic part of the occasion to which it invites. In religion, myths are invitations of this type, although differently composed, because consecration is a different activity from waltzing. In both instances, however, the compositions are not forms of theoretical knowledge, but rather inducements to and organizers of activities and their frequent repetition.

The story of the Holy Child is a reason to "Fear not," to come and be joyful, to participate in the consecration of Christmas, as the music is a reason to join in the dance. Obviously neither the music nor the story is the complete reason for doing these things. But will those who think that religious myths are purely emotive, on such a view, claim that a Strauss waltz conveys no knowledge of waltzing? Furthermore, there is very great variety in the occasions of consecration; they are not all holidays, not all formal occasions. And, when we try to think of them all, we realize at once that their many programs, taken together, involving as they do blood, tears, and wine, may well involve all kinds of knowledge too. Even highly technical scientific demonstrations may figure as powers in the consecration of some occasions.

It may be argued that the view here expressed is unsuited to interpretation of the great cosmic myths. But I am unwilling to concede the point, if such myths are being considered in their relation to religion. I cannot, for instance, understand the first chapter of *Genesis* as an explanation of creation at all. In fact, that topic seems there to be placed very clearly beyond all possibility of explanation. But I can understand this chapter as an invitation to view all things in their creatureliness, to imagine a universal harmony before the fall, and above all to worship the transcendent majesty of the Creator.

The purpose of these remarks is to suggest a positive frame for the interpretation of myths in religion. It is not by some evasion to escape familiar difficulties in determining the noetic scope of myths, difficulties which come clearly enough to view through the illustrations just given. Myths often convey in condensed and symbolic transcription many specific facts of environment and usage open to ordinary empirical confirmation. But, furthermore, they generally affirm, either explicitly or implicitly, a type of world order. And finally, they usually tell of specific facts beyond the possibility of present or even all empirical test. So the myth of a Last Judgment urges us to measure our lives by a certain standard, and we can to some extent check empirically the kind of reference we make to this standard. But the myth of a Last Judgment also means that this world is one to which that standard will always remain pertinent and final. And lastly, it foretells in the coming of time a great day of special reckoning. It is a call to repentance while there is time.

Such examples illustrate how myths in religion furnish reasons for the activities of consecration which they help to organize and to inspire. But, in order to elaborate the themes of consecration, myths need to show conversance with other activities as well. At this point our previous comparison with music and dancing becomes dubious, since it may be sufficient for a waltz to show knowledge of waltzing. But consecration requires more explicit connection with the rest of life. The Greek myth of Persephone, according to Professor Martin Nilsson, carries a symbolic reference to the agricultural usage of storing the harvested grain in underground silos as the wealth of Plouton. This transcription in the myth of economic activity is not to be identified with its religious use, but neither can it be excluded from it. The consecration of the farmer's works and days involves more than his toil, but it cannot be uncognizant of that. The great cosmic perspectives of some myths are not colored spectacles to be put on for special occasions of religious expression. Their suitability or inadequacy to serve as frames for all activity is a consideration not identical with their religious significance but very relevant to it.

The advance of religious knowledge from mythology to theology does not alter this situation, but only renders it more explicit. It is an advance to more deliberate and sustained analysis of the reasons why, the grounds of religious action and belief. New didactic needs gen-

erally give rise to it. In the progress of theology the double reference of its analysis to the context of consecration and to knowledge of the world becomes more and more manifest. This double reference underlies both the general relation of theology to other sciences, and much of its subtler reasoning, such as in the scholastic method of analogy. Theology's distinctive aim is to know the powers and issues of consecration; its special function is to achieve in the interest of consecration a science of their order and interrelation. God, formally conceived, is the ground of this order, the ultimate cause of consecration in the sense of demanding it preeminently. The divine is conceived to be this before it is conceived as ground of the world. It may be thought desirable, in the interest of clarity, to use the terms "God" and "theology" only in a traditional sense. But the general problems of religious knowledge, it should be noted, exist outside of such tradition as well. Theology, or its functional equivalent, must thus approach its object from some particular context of religious activity.

There are two recurrent problems for theology that arise out of its double orientation. The first is: what organizes knowledge of the order of consecration? the second: what use is to be made of the sciences of the world? The first of these questions evokes a general answer that is not in itself satisfying, but that indicates a frame within which a more adequate answer can be sought. It is that requirements of practice organize knowledge of the order of consecration. But let this be ever so true, in the general sense that the core of religion is practical, still the question immediately comes back: how may we know what are the requirements of practice with respect to consecration? The classic answer of theologians seems to be that revelation plays a fundamental role in meeting this question. But, as everyone even slightly acquainted with theological history knows, revelation for a theologian is itself not a simple, easily discernible organizer. Our analysis leads us to acknowledge here a functional need for a factor competent to settle on practice organizing knowledge of the order of consecration. The performance of this function seems to be precisely the theological use of revelation. We are not obliged, however, in recognizing this to withhold criticism of much that is said about the nature of this factor. We may question its isolation as a factor that breaks into this world from another order of being. We must consider that even Barthians, like other theologians, have to find

revelation—or be found of it, if they insist—within a context of tradition and present culture, in the history and acts of human lives and institutions.

Here then the second question presents itself; what role the sciences of the world are to play in religious knowledge? They do not seem to be negligible, even if not altogether competent. The Church was not obliged by natural knowledge to celebrate the Annunciation on March 25, but it would have been unwise not to consider that possibility. It certainly would be extreme fanaticism to hold that knowledge of how things happen in nature and in society is irrevelant to understanding the order of consecration. It is, indeed, conceivable that such knowledge, by growing more adequate in the matter of norms and ways of living, may eventually come to organize the distinctive branch of religious knowledge directly. But this is not that present state of science, in reference to which I wish to consider the significance of other branches of knowledge for theology. The present reflections are considering existing science without counting on future developments. I have said, then, that the function of revelation in theology is to settle on practice organizing knowledge of the order of consecration. I now add that any revelation to which theology appeals must be able to maintain this function amid all that the sciences of the world reliably disclose, or must eventually be discredited.

But this statement puts the relation rather negatively, as if the other sciences constituted simply a check upon theology. The emphasis I prefer is a different and more positive one, as will appear the moment we take seriously the aim already referred to as that of helping men find, as far as possible, their exact spiritual bearings. This aim was defined as that of wanting to know how we actually stand with respect to other lives, ideals, and integration of our powers. In so far as religion is interested in such a question—as it surely claims to be—it would seem obliged to examine men's actions, not only through the lenses of theology, but also to urge other sciences to search them to the utmost of their power. All that the social sciences and psychology can truly disclose about the lines of force, the tendencies running through specific forms of religious activity itself would be most relevant to the question of *quo vadis*. The fact that questionable hypotheses and generalizations are present among the factors at work in these sciences certainly complicates the problem, but does not offer

a good reason for neglecting methods of fruitful inquiry. Theology, which uses largely a dramatic method to state what transpires in the context of consecration, must not ignore the analysis of natural and human processes by other methods, if it is to take its own bearings soundly with regard to the general events of life.

It will be said that, of course, the sciences of the world can help us to discover, in some measure, where we do stand. But what of where we *ought* to stand, or at least where it were better to stand? Can they help theology in the determination of ideals and their sanctions? The answer again is clearly that they can and do. If ideals are not to be only essences for contemplation, they must be reconstrued in terms of new possibilities and requirements arising in the changing conditions of life. We need insist only that knowledge of those conditions is very relevant to a sound and vital reconstruction, not that it completely determines what ideals are valid. Elements of preference and of commitment to norms far transcending the immediate situation and all experienced situations will remain. But such commitment can only become wiser through the process of fusion with fuller knowledge.

Consecration, whether or not by faith alone, is rarely, perhaps never, without assurance of relations that cannot be wholly demonstrated. The importance of faith is well-known to theology, which makes it an explicit theme. Here again the assistance of psychology is pertinent, because the nature of religious assurance is neither a complete mystery nor to be fully comprehended by a compendium of scholastic beliefs. Its functional relations in behavior need to be explored, if the blindness of faith is to be diminished. The test of religious faith is not just its power to endure no matter what, but equally its capacity to fuse with increasing wisdom. The criteria of validity most appropriate to religion seem to be of three main types: indispensability in a context of consecration, spiritual fruitfulness, and coherence with or reasonable adaptability to life and culture. The term spiritual fruitfulness is not meant to exclude appeal to such mundane results as business and agricultural profits, but it indicates that those in themselves are not sufficient without regard for the effect on persons. Esthetic and scientific fruits are also included as relevant with the same proviso. The question of whether something is indispensable in a specific context of consecration rarely fails of having its

relevance, although such indispensability is not a universal requirement of religious validity, and the grounds on which it is determined are often obscure or dubious. It is, therefore, an important but an imperfect criterion by itself. By coherence more is meant than the logical consistency of religious beliefs with each other and with further beliefs. This is included, but reference is also made to practical coherence, meaning a reasonable adaptability of the activities of consecration to other relations of life and culture. The term—reasonable—here implies an intelligible connection, so that the consequences of the adaptation can be explored. Without such intelligible relation to consequences, war, for example, is consecrated neither by ritual nor by the sheer bravery involved.

The claim of such a principle as the Hebrew-Christian ideal of love between persons to universal validity can be thoroughly tested only in the course of the efforts to extend its practical coherence with the relations of life. The coherence at which religious belief ultimately aims is often interpreted in terms of arriving at what is called "the meaning of the universe." Certainly nothing is more characteristic and needful for the human spirit than to understand whatever has great meaning for it in the fullest possible, the most universal, relations. And surely we are profoundly concerned with the depth of support and the range of relevance that may be claimed for the meanings involved in our consecrations. We can only find our bearings in the universe in terms of convictions on such matters. Perhaps this is, after all, what is meant by finding "the meaning of the universe." But I must confess that the expression also suggests to me an element of inflation that I should prefer not to have in religion. It would be interesting to know how this element became as prominent as it is. Somehow it does not seem to be so evident in the records of western religion before the Hebrew exile and before the decline of the Greek cities. Yet its absence was then connected with a tribalism that is still too much with us. In postexilic and Hellenistic times wonderful developments occurred in science, philosophy, and religion. I should not want to dispute that many of them belong to the truth that is valid forever. But there was also an intoxication in the Hellenistic atmosphere that went to people's heads, and perhaps this continues in confusing meaning that has universal implications with "the meaning of the universe."

III

A crucial problem, however, lies in the fact that there are many important meanings with universal implications. In what order are these to be held? From a religious point of view what gives paramount meaning—the love of Christ, the realization of nirvana, the promise of a classless society? Whether or not we call any of these "the meaning of the universe," a problem of primacy remains. Theory has long ago recognized that this problem cannot be solved without appeal to spiritual decisions that grapple with practice. And with regard to the meanings given primacy by such decisions, bountiful faith is certainly appropriate. But what such decisions actually come to cannot be known without reference to their functioning. And without knowledge, faith will hardly be saving or even safe, especially not for a democratic way of life.

In conclusion, religious knowledge always has distinctive relation to particular activities of consecration and their specific context. As a knowledge of the order and grounds of consecration, in the interest of consecration, theology is a special kind of knowledge with a distinctive function. But, because of the relation of the specific activities it interprets to the rest of life, it is not self-contained knowledge. It needs rapport with the layman's experience; and also it needs alignment with other sciences that analyze man's world and his affairs by methods less dramatic than its own. The interpretation of the religious process in its own interest should utilize all available resources of contemporary knowledge, and this will involve fuller integration of experience on the part of clerics, laymen, and other specialists.

Universal practical wisdom is one standard to be applied to religion. As in the case of diet, what is found to be poisonous or too deficient should be eliminated as far as possible. Religions are justified in claiming only implicit completeness; as explicit they all require supplementation and modification in major as well as minor features. The meanings given primacy in the world's chief faiths are by no means mutually exclusive; in large measure they overlap each other. Yet differences in nature, in culture, and in spiritual decisions give lasting point to differences in cult and religion. Contemporary philosophy can do more than regard such differences as provincialisms to be either superseded or tolerated. A more comprehensive knowledge of local conditions, and of the nature of religion in its individual and social as-

pects, can aid in finding appropriate relations between differences consonant with valid universal principles of practice. It can consider concretely and critically the differences in ways of consecration as factors in a process aiming at more complete life in all parts of the world.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Prophets and Their Times. By J. M. Powis Smith. Second Edition. Revised by William A. Irwin. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1941. xvii + 342 pp. $2.50.

The first edition of this book was issued in 1925. Since that time it has proved to be one of the most useful one-volume works dealing with all of the Old Testament prophets. Because of the progress which has been made since 1925 in the interpretation of the prophets, it is fortunate that the publishers were not content simply to reprint the old edition but invited Professor Irwin to revise the whole work. Irwin has had the advantage not only of close association with the late Professor Smith as student, friend and colleague, but also of possessing Smith's own copy with marginal notes of proposed changes and corrections. The result is a true *revision* which, while retaining many of the views and much of the language of the first edition, brings the reader up to date in the study of the prophets.

It was the great merit of the first edition that it sought to interpret the prophets in the light of "their times,"—that is, against their historical, social, and religious background. It is just in this area that great advances have been made in the last sixteen years, thanks to archeological discoveries and patient analysis of texts which have been published. We now know infinitely more of the myth and ritual, folklore and legend, of the ancient Near East. This new knowledge makes possible new interpretations of the thought of the prophets and of their *Sitz im Leben* at crucial points. It is now clear that much of the religion of the Hebrews and their neighbors, especially the Canaanites, was centered around mythology and ritual which had as their aim fertility and material prosperity. The most important myth, which was enacted in ritual, was that of the dying-rising god, known under many names (Tammuz, Osiris, Baal, Adonis), but always essentially the same deity.

The religious thought of some of the prophets is placed by Irwin in a new light against this background. One of the most interesting and important insights concerns The Second Isaiah's magnificent conception of the Suffering Servant. While retaining in large measure Smith's view that the Suffering Servant is the nation Israel, he maintains that the prophet was influenced by the myth of the dying and

rising god. The people of Israel, he says, "were the Servant of the Lord, enacting in their tragic history the divine cycle of death and resurrection, through which life and healing should come to all the world" (p. 237). Likewise, the influence of this myth is seen in the popular expectations of the Day of Yahweh in the time of Amos, who set himself against the prevailing view.

But it is in Hosea's life and thought that the influence of the fertility cult is most clearly seen. Smith held the view that Gomer was an ordinary prostitute, a woman of the street, and that chapters 1 and 3 of the Book of Hosea are but different accounts of the same situation. Irwin thinks that Gomer was a temple-woman, a "religious prostitute," and that chapters 1 and 3 recount different events; the second woman whom the prophet married was "a bad woman . . . an adulteress" (p. 74). This view of the relationship of the two chapters seems to the present reviewer to confuse the issue unnecessarily, but the interpretation of Gomer as a temple-woman is probably correct. Hosea's thought and message, as well as his life, owed much to the contemporary fertility cult. The prophet combated the primitive features of this cult in popular religion, but saw an underlying truth in it that led to his exalted idea of Yahweh as a god of love, stated clearly for the first time in his book.

The religious practices of Jeremiah's time were doubtless connected largely with the fertility cult, and figures employed by that prophet, as in 5:7 f., may now be understood as derived from that cult. In interpreting the famous Immanuel passage of Isaiah 7:14, 16, Irwin suggests the possible influence of popular legend concerning the Wonder Child who, in some versions at least, was thought of as deposing the reigning king and ruling in his place. He doubts that the "prophetess" of Isaiah 8:3 was Isaiah's wife, but thinks that Isaiah had an experience paralleling that of Hosea.

Old Testament scholars are sometimes criticized today for making too much of the ancient fertility cult and of seeing evidences of it everywhere. Irwin has not gone to extremes in this respect, and has seen that pagan cult and ritual actually made valuable contributions to Old Testament religion when they were spiritualized by the prophets and relieved of their more primitive and crass elements.

On one basic issue Irwin departs from the view held by Smith.

He denies that the canonical prophets, as distinguished from the early "Sons of the Prophets," were ecstatics—"At the most they were mystics rather than ecstatics" (p. 14). He has carefully omitted from the new edition the sentences in the chapter on Jeremiah in which Smith presented that prophet as an ecstatic. Irwin is probably correct in the main. There *is* a difference between the earlier ecstatic prophets and the prophets whom Albright has called "rhapsodists." Yet we should not rule out entirely the possibility that the later prophets occasionally had ecstatic experiences, or, at least, that they appeared to their contemporaries sometimes to be ecstatic. This is evidenced by Jeremiah 29:26, a reference which Irwin has retained on page 7. Also, he has not deleted a sentence from the earlier edition in which Smith wrote, "The interpretation of some episodes in Ezekiel's experience is greatly facilitated by an adequate recognition of the place of ecstasy and trance or vision in Ezekiel's prophetic activity" (p. 197).

The interpretation of many of the prophets has remained relatively stable during the last sixteen years; this is true especially of the post-exilic prophets and minor ones of the pre-exilic period such as Micah, Zephaniah, and Nahum. The one prophet who has received most attention from scholars of late is Ezekiel. Smith took the view that the Book of Ezekiel is what it purports to be, and expounded it as the genuine work of the prophet. He entitled the chapter "The Father of Judaism." Irwin has placed a question mark after this title and has re-written the chapter almost wholly, taking a line which differs from all previous solutions of the riddle posed by this book. The genuine portions are from the prophet Ezekiel who began his work in Jerusalem some time before 586 B.C., who may or may not have ever been in Babylonia, and who continued his career down to 571 B.C. Among the genuine passages are 4:1-2, 9-11; 5:1-2; 6:1-5, 11-12; 7 in large part; 12:1-25 in part; and 37:1-15. The genuine oracles "are in the main, though not exclusively, poetic" (p. 212). Our present book contains, however, much editorial material, including all of 40-48. One important criterion of editorial activity is the omission of 36:24-38 from the Greek papyrus of Ezekiel No. 967. Passages similar in tone and style to this must also be considered as secondary. With so much late material the book becomes "a cross-section of Jewish piety and teaching through the last five centuries

B.C. or perhaps longer . . . [and] well-nigh priceless as the deposit of Jewish piety through those little-known centuries when Jewish institutions were taking shape" (p. 215). "The Book of Ezekiel is not the father, but the child, of Judaism" (p. 216). In principle Irwin's solution appeals to this reviewer as more nearly correct than the radical view of Torrey or the view of Smith. It is doubtful, however, whether we have yet discovered adequate criteria for distinguishing the genuine from the editorial material in this difficult book.

One of the valuable features of the new edition is that it gives, at appropriate points, references to recent publications dealing with the subjects discussed. Two important additions may be suggested. To the list (p. 155, note 9) of those scholars who consider the Book of Habakkuk as belonging to the Greek period should be added the name of C. C. Torrey, whose view has been most recently published in *Jewish Studies in Memory of George A. Kohut* (New York, 1935), pp. 565-82. To note 17 on p. 172 should be added H. Bardtke, "Jeremia der Fremdvölkerprophet," *Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 1935, pp. 209-39; 1936, pp. 240-62.

Smith wrote in the preface to his edition, "The prophets are perenially interesting. . . . Each generation needs their message." This is still true, as shown by the remarks of Irwin at a number of points (e.g., pp. 121 f., 162 f., 317 f.) with their references to the tragedies of our times which definitely "date" the revision. There are many who will not agree with the editor's specific applications of the message of the prophets, but it is certain that the Hebrew prophets have a message for days of tragedy which cannot be found elsewhere.

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Bibliography of Jewish Social Studies, 1938-39. By Salo Wittmayer Baron. (Jewish Social Studies Publications, No. 1.) New York: Conference on Jewish Relations, 1941. iv + 291 pp. $3.00.

Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research, Volume x, 1940. ed. by Committee on Publications. Ralph Marcus, Chairman. New York: The American Academy for Jewish Research, 1940. xx + 194 pp. $2.50.

Professor Baron's excellent, full, and helpful *Bibliography* represents a project which should be continued. By accepting the widest possible sense of the term "social" and by including "a large number of publications on contemporary affairs, written by politicians and publicists . . . even though they can hardly be called 'studies' in the technical sense" (p. 7), Baron has compiled a valuable tool for research in any phase of Jewish life and culture.

The more than four thousand entries are precisely classified in forty-two sections, many of which are subdivided for convenience. In addition, cross references have been provided which simplify the problem of dealing with entries which might be placed in various categories. Altogether, no effort has been spared to make this as mechanically perfect as it can be.

More significant, at this time, than its formal values is the spiritual value attached to its production. In many respects, as Professor Baron points out, our generation represents a peak of interest in Jewish studies among both Jews and non-Jews. It is a climax of the period of enlightenment and emancipation which has paralleled the development of the democratic concept of human rights. Yet, as 1938-39 represents a peak of interest, it also marks a climax of the attack on the Jews and Judaism, as well as the attack on democracy in the contemporary world. Anti-semitism bulks all too large among the materials listed. Still there is evidence here of a vitality, a creative energy in present-day Jewish culture.

> Much of this creativity has unfortunately been cut short by the outbreak of the Second World War. The German conquests have not only silenced some of the main centers of Jewish learning but have impeded the publication and circulation of new books and journals in Palestine and other free countries. Unwittingly this bibliography has become a monument to the last two pre-war years of a great quantitative and qualitative achievement (pp. iii-iv).

But the monument itself is a preventive to pessimism. Only the total extinction of the Jew can dam so vast a stream.

One partial solution to the problem of keeping the stream clear is presented in the *Proceedings* of the American Academy of Jewish Research. This relatively small organization maintains six exiled Jewish scholars as Research Fellows, thus enabling their projects to

be carried out in relative security. Two of these Fellows are represented in this volume of the *Proceedings*, and a third is the author of a recent article in *The Review of Religion*. Whatever their private difficulties, their work is carried on.

Of special interest in this volume is the article of Professor Guido Kisch (formerly of the University of Halle, Germany). This is a continuation of the author's researches in "The Jewry-law of the Medieval German Law-books," of which the first part was published in Volume VII of the *Proceedings* (1935-36). Dr. Kisch summarizes thus the aim of these studies, and of the special studies he has published in various periodicals in the interim:

> Their principal aim, after clarification of the source history of the Jewry-law provisions in the German law-books, is to explore the history of the ideas underlying the medieval theories of the Jews' legal status, in order to prepare the way for a pragmatic exposition of Jewry-law in the Middle Ages (p. 100).

By a careful examination of the original sources and a critical re-evaluation of previous writers in the field, Professor Kisch arrives at stimulating interpretations of the application of the "King's Peace" and the concept of "Chamber Serfdom" to the position of the Jews in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in Germany. He demonstrates convincingly that these represent a degradation of the status of the Jews, consequent upon the retraction of their right to bear arms.

Of particular importance, beyond the general argument, is the clarification of "Chamber Serfdom," long a stumbling-block in the consistent analysis of the status of the Jews in the Empire. This Kisch shows to have been a logical development of the religious distinctness of the Jew. The Jew was not of the Church, yet it was of the essence of Imperial policy that every force, however small, should be turned to the advantage of the State. The integration of the Jew into the fabric of the Empire had to be effected by bringing the entire people into direct, if inferior, relation with the Emperor.

A second substantial contribution to the *Proceedings* is Berthold Altmann's "Studies in Medieval German Jewish History." The author announces this group of essays as the first of a series of studies in the constitutional history of the Jews. The conclusion to which these essays lead is that the Jewish community achieved autonomy before

the cities of the Middle Ages, because the structure of the Jewish community and the laws under which it had already achieved internal unity were sufficiently fixed to establish its right to legal independence. With the development, however, of the independent city, which expanded its control to include the Jewish community, the social, legal, and economic independence of the Jews had to be given up.

The third monograph in the *Proceedings* is from the pen of Ilse Lichtenstadter, and is an attempt to cast some light upon a dark spot in Jewish history by a study of "References to Jews in Pre-Islamic Arabic Literature." Although this paper is slighter, both in intent and in achievement, than the work of Kisch and Altmann, nevertheless the author succeeds in creating a picture of a rather isolated but courageous group of Jews attempting to maintain their unity and integrity in the face of a civilization not sufficiently hostile to or distinct from their own.

One conclusion forced on the reviewer of Professor Baron's *Bibliography* is that the day of the summary and superficial treatments of wide areas of Jewish history is at an end. Not spacious theorizing, but painstaking delving into limited areas is the trend of today in Jewish historiography. This trend is manifest in the work of the contributors to the *Proceedings* of the American Academy of Jewish Research, and in their work it proves its value. Perhaps Baron is right in his belief that never again will a period of two years see the quantity production of 1938-39; but, if the *Proceedings* are witness, there is little to be concerned about on the score of quality.

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Quaestiones de Mystica Terminologia ad Mentem Pseudo-Areopagitae et Sanctorum Patrum. By PASCAL P. PARENTE. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1941. x + 58 pp.

The word *mystic* has meant many things; Dom Butler insists that it "be jealously reserved for its proper traditional religious sense, given it in the beginning by 'Dionysius'—the secret knowledge or perception of God in contemplation" (*Western Mysticism*, 2nd ed., p. lxxxv), while Professor Montague extends it to include such intuitions as that "shad is so much better than custard" (*Ways of Knowing*, p.

227). The author of this book undertakes to establish the "genuine signification" of the terms *mystic, contemplation,* and *ascetic* by a comparative study of Pseudo-Dionysius and the Fathers who preceded him. The word *mystic,* originally denoting an initiate in the mysteries, and extended by the Neoplatonists to indicate one who closes his eyes to sensible things in order to contemplate abstract ones, was restricted by Pseudo-Dionysius to apply to infused or passive contemplation, the "superbrilliant darkness of the mystery-teaching silence." That his theology is "truly traditional" is shown by citations from Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, Rufinus, Cassian, and Augustine. These earlier Fathers, while they did not use the mystical terminology which Pseudo-Dionysius took over from the pagans, agree with his doctrine. They distinguish two elements of the spiritual life—active and contemplative, ascetic and mystic, Martha and Mary; and they describe infused contemplation as the goal of the Christian life. A separate set of citations establishes the meaning of asceticism, which "always indicated some activity," and so is the opposite of the passive contemplation called mystic.

Nearly one tenth of the book is a quotation from the 1607 edition of Augustine's *Meditations, Soliloquies, and Manual.* Dr. Parente emphasizes this as representing the doctrine of the Latin Fathers: "sit pro omnibus sublime illud Soliloquiorum S. Augustini caput XXXI"; and he insists on its importance as bearing the authority of Augustine: "haec praeclara Augustini verba sint norma theologica ad iudicandum de modo loquendi valde exagerato mysticorum saeculi XVI"; but he neglects to point out that this work is falsely attributed to Augustine. It appears, in fact, to be a product of the twelfth century. Apparently Dr. Parente was under the impression that the *Soliloquies* which he read in his rare old edition of 1607 were the genuine *Soliloquies* of Augustine, an entirely different work.

The book concludes that, in the strict sense, *mystic* "signifies either cognition or union obtained from a special divine illumination, and not attained as a fruit of human activity and diligence"; *contemplation* is "a simple intuition of truth under the influence of divine illumination and action, which is mystical contemplation strictly so called, also called infused and passive contemplation"; and *ascetic* "signifies the pursuit of Christian perfection under the influence of

ordinary divine grace." The various extended meanings of the three terms are also carefully distinguished.

The notion of *mystic* which Dr. Parente derives from his study of the pre-Dionysian Fathers, who never used the word, is based on the dichotomy of active and passive. Although he says that it refers to nothing short of contemplation: "Mystic in the strict sense . . . is only that part of the spiritual life which begins from infused contemplation" (p. 2), he apparently understands the latter to include visions and auditions: "Paul might have gloried also in divine locutions, visions, revelations, in his rapture to the third heaven, but these are mystic" (p. 50). If everything passive in the spiritual life is mystic, mystical cognition is distinguished from equally passive sense perception only by being "special" and "divine." It is not necessarily ineffable. Besides the definitions of what *mystic* means *stricte*, *late*, and *latius*, there might be added a definition of what it means *strictius*—the ineffable, supersensual, and superintellectual sort of mysticism described by Pseudo-Dionysius himself.

The book repeatedly affirms that *ascetic*, on the other hand, applies strictly to the "active life" (Martha). Yet not once in the passages cited is the word *ascetic* associated with *active* or with *Martha*. Has not Dr. Parente oversimplified the spiritual life to the point of creating confusion? Does it not include, on the mental side, some sort of "recollection" by which the soul turns from the world to itself, then the development of the soul's spiritual power by some sort of love of God or creature, finally contemplation; and on the physical side, some sort of discipline, then works of devotion or charity, finally the activities which are the outcome of contemplation? Asceticism is the preliminary discipline. The "active life" which mystical writers contrast with the "contemplative life" is not the asceticism which makes contemplation possible but the sort of action which is chosen as an alternative to contemplation, or that which is made possible by contemplation. To identify asceticism, which is training yourself, with the "active life," which is service to others, is a confusion for which no authority is shown. It has resulted in the assumption that contemplation is always the end of the spiritual life, and action a "preparation" or "disposition" for it (p. 28): "Studio ascetico incipit, iusta operando, et, altius ascendendo, ad contemplationem pervenit" (p. 29). But this is a question which has always been in dispute among the mystics them-

selves. For example, we may consider three twelfth century mystics. For Guigo, a Carthusian, action was one of the impediments to the spiritual life: "Inevitable necessity, utility of honest action, human weakness, worldly vanity: the first is excusable, the second tolerable, the third lamentable, the fourth culpable" (P.L. 184, 483). For St. Bernard, a Benedictine, contemplation and action were equally ends: "Do not insist too much on the kisses of contemplation, for the breasts of preaching are better" (P.L. 183, 818). For Richard of St. Victor, an Augustinian, contemplation was only an intermediate step leading to action: "On the third step the soul is killed into God, on the fourth it is resurrected into Christ" (P.L. 196, 1222).

These remarks are meant only to suggest that the book oversimplifies the problem of mystical terminology. No doubt a concise treatment of the precise problem proposed would have been impossible otherwise. If Dr. Parente has not made all the distinctions relevant to mysticism, he has made certain ones very well. His careful definitions and his collection of relevant citations should be of interest not only to students of mysticism but to all students of patristic theology.

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Saint Patrick, Apostle of Ireland. By Hugh de Blacam. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1941. xi + 176 pp. $2.25.

What do the bulk of us know about the apostle with the adopted Roman name whose memory Irish people have cherished for fifteen hundred years? A white-bearded personage, excessively mitred, banishing a wriggling snake, or an open-air preacher holding up a shamrock by way of illustrating the doctrine of the Trinity—for most of us these effigies cover all we know about Saint Patrick. Both are ways of misunderstanding the apostle of Ireland. There were never snakes in Ireland, and so he was under no necessity to banish them. And while he was a strong Trinitarian (churchmen had to be strong on this point of faith in the fifth century, for Arianism had influential adherents) it is unlikely that he would have made use of such an inadequate image. Irish people wore the shamrock, it would seem, because it has resemblance to a cross; its association with the Trinity is through an after-thought, one that in late centuries give rise to

the story of Saint Patrick's impressing the King of Ireland with the analogy.

But to perceive what sort of person the apostle really was, we have to clear away the familiar effigies. He brought Christianity to a country *ubi nemo ultra erat,* as he himself wrote—"beyond which no man dwelt." Outside the Roman world was a land that had not known the Roman order; Patrick had been a captive in that land; he knew its people and its language; he desired to be the Christian and Roman pioneer in it. And he believed he was called upon by God to be such; in a vision he saw one coming to him with papers inscribed, "the voice of the Irish"; he felt himself possessed by a spirit urging him to leave his homeland and go back amongst a people who had held him as a slave.

In the past forty years important books dealing with the life of Saint Patrick have been published—Professor Bury's, Professor MacNeill's, Helena Concannon's, Oliver Gogarty's, and now Hugh de Blacam's. Each of them emphasized some particular aspect of Patrick's work or character. In the present volume the aspect emphasized is that of the apostle—Saint Patrick, Apostle of Ireland. It is the interaction of the man and the country that gives significance to this biography.

The Irish countryside, the Irish ways of life, Irish history, are shown as working on the national apostle. But Patrick was the accredited representative of a Church that had a great organization, a highly developed doctrine, a remarkable personnel. The apostolic side of Patrick has to be shown, and in showing it Hugh de Blacam has to relate him to the Western Church of the time. We have to remember that Patrick belonged to the time of Saint Ambrose, Saint Augustine, and Pope Leo the Great, to the period of the important Councils. He, too, was one of the great churchmen who were striving to bring a new order into Europe; he belonged to a movement, to an expanding process. Hugh de Blacam shows him at the conference at Auxerre where the project for a mission to Ireland was handled. Patrick was the man for the mission; his captivity in the country, his knowledge of the language, the voices that had made him know himself as one singled out by God, made this evident in his own eyes and should have made it evident in the eyes of others. But Patrick was passed over, and another was sent to Ireland. This was done on the

advice of one whom he had trusted. At the end of his life, even when he knew he had done the work appointed for him, he remembered the humiliation of his discharge. A year afterwards, however, he was consecrated bishop and commissioned to go to Ireland. He was a man of forty-five then.

His conversion of that land "beyond which no man dwelt" was not a local event; ultimately, it was a European event. In one of his valuable essays Christopher Dawson has shown us that it was only when churchmen were forced away from the typical organization of Christianity, the Greek and Roman urban organization, that they were able to deal with the barbarians of the north. Well, Patrick went into a country that had no towns, no urban life. He had to build up a Church that was different in organization from the Churches of Romanized Europe. In after centuries the Irish missionaries and the Saxon missionaries who had been trained by them were able to go as pioneers into the waste places of Europe, and, by being able to think, speak, and act like them, communicate with the hunters, fishers, and tillers. It was not the men of the urban tradition, but the men who had never been in the basilicas and the market-places who converted the Germanies.

One of the great letters that has come down to us is Patrick's letter to Coroticus. This was a British prince who had raided Ireland and had carried off as captives a number of Patrick's converts, youths and maidens. That should have been taken as a commonplace in the fifth century, we might think, something that a busy man could hardly get wrought up about, like the bombing of a town in our day. But injustice and violence were things that Patrick could not be callous to. With an indignation that makes us ashamed of our modern lukewarmness he drives on the tyrant of his day: "You deliver the members of Christ as it were to a house of ill fame. What manner of hope in God have you, or any that co-operate with you? God will judge." Through fifteen hundred years the Christianity that was the core of Patrick comes over to us: "Aye, and where shall Coroticus with his most villainous followers, rebels against Christ, where shall they see themselves, who distribute baptised damsels as rewards, and that for the sake of miserable temporal things which verily pass away in a moment makes an appeal to all whom his letter may reach, that they may like a cloud or smoke which is dispersed by the wind?" And then he

"liberate the baptised captive women whom they have taken, so that they may deserve to live to God and be made whole here and in Eternity."

Saint Patrick, Apostle of Ireland is a book that gives us a place and a time and the lineaments of a man of great conviction, great energy, great charity, one who combined visionary power with practical sense and soldierly audacity. Patrick might have been a good general or a remarkable poet, but he loved men and loved God, and we know him for a saint.

PADRAIC COLUM

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Benedictine Monasticism, as Reflected in the Warnefrid-Hildemar Commentaries on the Rule. By SISTER M. ALFRED SCHROLL, O.S.B. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. 217 pp. $2.75.

The scope and limits of this monograph are indicated by the qualifying phrase in the title. The author sets herself the task of describing the monastic life of a Benedictine abbey as it is reflected in the commentaries of Paul the Deacon and Hildemar, written between two and three hundred years after the death of St. Benedict. In that interval the great abbey of Monte Cassino had been sacked and destroyed by the Lombards, had lain waste for a hundred and fifty years and had been restored. During that period the Rule of St. Benedict had become the prevailing ideal and form of monasticism throughout the Western world. One question that in consequence arises is the extent to which the life as it existed under St. Benedict himself had survived, and again it may be asked what is the likeness and what the dissimilarity between Benedictine monasticism of that period and of the present day. To both questions the answer seems to be that the continuity was unbroken and the fundamental ideals never lost. Certainly St. Benedict did not foresee a great worldwide organization, but the principles he laid down proved sufficiently flexible to permeate every new development. The Rule as he wrote it is still the Rule of every Benedictine monastery, and underlies a large proportion of the multifarious rules of today, which, though not strictly speaking Benedictine, yet derive from the Benedictine tradition.

The authenticity and authorship of the two commentaries have been the subject of much controversy. It has even been thought that they

might have been written by one hand. The evidence, however, is to the contrary. The later commentary by Hildemar is based largely on that of Warnefrid, its value to be found chiefly in the passages which add to the information given in the earlier work. According to the author, Paul Warnefrid, known as Paul the Deacon, was born between 720 and 730 in Friuli, in Northern Italy, was educated at the Lombard court of Pavia, and attained to the clerical state. At a mature age, probably in about 774, he is known to have entered Monte Cassino, from whence in 782 he was transferred for some years to the court at Aachen. There he enjoyed the friendship of Charlemagne, who made use of him as instructor in the palace school. There is some controversy as to whether Paul wrote his commentary before 774 or after his return to Monte Cassino in 786. The author's judgment is "that Paul wrote his commentary in the monastery of St. Peter near Civate about 770, and that about seventy-five years later, in the newly founded monastery of Civate, Hildemar compiled his commentary based, as it is, on Paul's exposition." Very little is known concerning Hildemar except his approximate date and that he, like Paul, taught in the Milanese diocese.

The conclusion of the thesis is that "The historical importance of the commentaries selected for the present study lies chiefly in the aggregate of details which, when pieced together, form in mosaic an interesting and somewhat intimate picture of Carolingian monasticism. Particularly when compared with the meager glimpses available from contemporary chronicle literature and from legal documents, the picture loses, in large measure, the sketchiness it might appear to have on the first reading of the commentaries. Moreover, the information which they yield correlates well with the pertinent material in current conciliar and imperial decrees, and with the few scant monastic consuetudinaries of the period, thus adding weight and authority to the literature of the commentaries" (p. 193).

The chapters are arranged in an intelligent pattern. The earlier ones concern the material organization and the life of the household, then follows the treatment of the devotional, intellectual and social aspects of the monk's life, and finally of his liturgical practices, his spiritual and ascetic ideals.

It must be remembered that the three monastic vows according to the Rule of St. Benedict were stability, conversion of manners, and

obedience. The precepts of poverty and chastity are implicit in the Rule, but are not the subject of explicit vows. The exact meaning of the second vow has been a subject of much controversy. During the years between St. Benedict and the commentators the second vow had disappeared from the formula of profession. In his detailed and interesting discussion of the Benedictine vows in his *Benedictine Monachism*, Dom Cuthbert Butler quotes the text of the second vow as found in the Commentary of Paul Warnefrid as "conversione morum meorum saecularium" and gives the interpretation by Warnefrid himself as "the rooting out of vices and the planting of virtues." Dom Cuthbert Butler also notes that the introduction of the vow of stability together with "the elimination of authority and the sinking of the individual in the community" constituted a "revolution in monachism." Sister M. Alfred Schroll gives several pages to the question as to the exact meaning of "conversatio" or "conversio morum."

Another innovation of interest in the Rule of St. Benedict was his conception of religious poverty. It was not the poverty of the Egyptian desert, but rather that of the household at Nazareth, characterized by frugal and plain living. Moreover it was communistic, no monk might call anything his own, the sense of personal ownership was to be totally surrendered. On the other hand, he had a generous use of all that was necessary in the way of tools for his work and books for his learning.

In the development of the thesis many subjects of controversy are treated with considerable detail, and in certain cases with citations from various capitularies, from the canons of synods and other contemporary sources, to support the interpretation of the commentaries. The reception and training of child-oblates is given attention. At that period the action of the parents was final, the ultimate choice and self-dedication was not left to the adult oblate; when he was deemed sufficiently prepared he took his place among the monks with no ceremony of profession. The question of the status of laymen in the abbey is dealt with at some length, chiefly to show that they were not employed in the domestic service of the monastery proper, for only members of the family, Warnefrid states, may serve the monks. The author waives any discussion of the question as to the status of the field-laborers or serfs as not relevant to her thesis.

Among other controversial topics to receive attention, are the extent to which the Roman office was in some monasteries allowed to supersede the Benedictine arrangement; the relation between monastic and canonical excommunication as it might affect the subsequent admission of monks to the priesthood; the balance between the active and contemplative life in Benedictine monasticism; and the length of the hours indicated in the horarium or monk's order of the day. In the latter, it is evident that St. Benedict allowed sufficient time for unbroken sleep. He demanded from his monks no more than could be easily followed by a man of average health and strength. The same was true in the days of the commentators and is true today. The ideal of the monk was to be the service of the Lord. The spiritual ideals are founded firmly on the Gospel precepts. The Benedictine Life was to be the Christian life in the fulness of its principles, literally interpreted.

There is one point, not open to controversy, in which the author seems to be ambiguous, namely, that in all matters, however grave, the abbot has the ultimate decision. She says: "In deciding matters of great importance, the abbot is to hold council with the whole community" (p. 55), and later: "The major matters, therefore, are to be brought before the entire community so that what cannot be decided by human arguments may be referred to God by prayer" (p. 60). The first quotation would imply to the uninitiated that the opinion of the council would govern the decision of the abbot; and the second is vague. As a matter of fact the abbot, down to the present day, has the final decision, according to the chapter 3 of the Rule: "having heard the counsel of the brethren, let him consider within himself, and then do what he shall judge most expedient." This was illustrated in a striking manner within the experience of the reviewer. A French monk, visiting in this country some years ago, in describing the exodus of the monks from the Abbey of Solesmes at the time of the anti-clerical persecution in France, related that the Abbot, having consulted the monks assembled in council, then retired to pray and make his decision as to what course the community should pursue. The narrator added: "The Abbot alone has the responsibility of decision."

This volume should interest three classes of readers. First may be listed the students who find here a carefully documented thesis and access at second hand to authorities not easily available. There will

also be Benedictines everywhere, together with other religious inspired by Benedictine ideals, who meet with a detailed account of monastic life in the eighth and ninth centuries, and will be interested to note its many links with the practices of today. A third group of readers may well be made up of those with an intelligent interest in historical details and social customs and, also, in whatever may bring spiritual inspiration. The earlier chapters give a picture of medieval life as to clothing, food, and dwelling places; the final chapters on liturgy and worship and on ascetic ideals include passages of wise spiritual direction that will serve in any state of life.

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The Letters of Saint Boniface. Translated with an introduction by EPHRAIM EMERTON. (Number XXXI of the Records of Civilization, Sources and Studies. Austen P. Evans, editor). Columbia University Press, 1940. 204 pp. $3.00.

Few men of English birth and training have exerted a deeper influence upon the history of western Europe than St. Boniface, and it is doubtful if any Christian missionary has more completely expressed in his life the ideals of the unconquerable faith which sustained and inspired him. This volume of nearly a hundred of his letters, and of others to or concerning him, is an important and remarkably interesting addition to the sources of our civilization available to English readers. Hitherto there have been accessible in English, aside from very brief selections, only the forty-odd letters between Boniface and his English correspondents translated by Edward Kylie. The complete collection constitutes the record of nearly forty years of inexhaustible activity in the extension of Christianity in Germany and France. Boniface, known as Winfred until entrusted by Gregory II with a mission to the heathen in 719 when in his early forties, suffered martyrdom in 754, probably in his eighty-first year. In those decades the threads of every important development in a critical and formative period in western European history passed through his hands.

The appearance of the letters has a timeliness only partially recognized by the translator. Completing the translation just before his death, when the foreign missions of the Protestant churches had been

seriously reconsidered as to wisdom of direction and methods, Dr. Emerton referred in his introduction to a recent survey of the missionary activities of the important Protestant denominations by a commission of laymen and clergymen as a useful introduction to his own book. He was deeply impressed, as the readers of these letters will be, by the similarity of the problems involved in the eighth and twentieth centuries and of the suggestions for their solution, and rightly believed that the letters would be of service to missionaries in our day in the foreign field. What he perhaps did not realize was that the timeliness of the volume would be further emphasized by the knowledge of the imminent need in Europe itself for the same type of leadership as that of Boniface for the recovery of lost ground among the rising generation in wide regions embracing many of the lands which the "Apostle to Germany" indefatigably tramped twelve centuries ago. In the land where the eradication of the name of Boniface has been officially encouraged and his work decried, his most notable single foundation, Fulda, where his body lies, is once more expressing the spirit of Boniface; Fulda and the prisons wherein men like Pastor Niemöller still hope and pray, again offer proof of the constant refusal of Christianity "to be absorbed into any kind of syncretism," to use Dr. Emerton's words, and of its readiness to fight through to final victory.

In this volume, St. Boniface lives again as an exemplar of the spiritually gifted leadership requisite for those who must direct the missionary movement of tomorrow. It matters little than Boniface regarded conversion as only a first step toward the organization and concentration of all Germanic Christendom under the leadership of Rome, for at heart he was primarily concerned with the struggle for the welfare of souls in a society characterized by decadence and barbarism wherein he saw the Christian Church as the only possible civilizing and unifying force. As Dr. Emerton points out, Boniface was confronted by a rising empire of the sword with which he must maintain correct relations, and he was an agent of the empire of the spirit; the two empires, always rivals and often hostile to each other, were united only in a common enmity to the disintegrating forces of localism which, in our day in a different form, is represented by nationalism. The key to the success of Boniface, aside from his supreme faith, lay in his maintenance of a proper relation to the two empires.

From one he obtained the earthly sanction of a divine command, from the other the physical protection without which his work would be seriously hindered and quickly undone. His was a manifold task of herculean proportions: conversion of non-believers, construction of an administrative organization in fields newly won, reconstruction in wide areas formerly Christian and now merely nominally so at best, and co-operation with what then passed for the State. The Christian world is confronted with the same problem today. The perusal of these letters will be invaluable for all in the modern missionary field, enlightening and inspiring to every Christian.

The correspondence with the four popes whose reigns his missionary career nearly spanned is highly illuminating. The first response to his undoubted vocation had led him, as a free lance without specific sanction from Rome, to barbaric Frisia where many years later he met martyrdom; but there he apparently learned the futility of independent direct action. Returning to England, he again devoted several years to teaching in a monastery and, no doubt, to preparations for his second venture, and then went to Rome for a visit of nearly a year's duration. There the cautious Gregory II, when convinced of the sincerity of Winfred's "pious desire," and of his ability, after "testing your design as a single member of a body submits itself to the sovereignty of the head," entrusted him as the "devout priest Boniface" with the mission to the infidel "to teach them the service of the Kingdom of God by the persuasion of the truth in the name of Christ . . . using the sacramental discipline prescribed by the official formulary of our Holy Apostolic See." The firm foundation was laid, and from that time to the end of his life his hands were upheld by the supreme pontiffs, while he contributed mightily to the extension of their leadership. Promotions to the rank of bishop, archbishop, and legate were the recognition of his devotion and administrative capacity; through Rome he secured ultimately the co-operation of the Frankish power, never actively hostile to his efforts which they soon recognized as parallel to their own attempts to organize the western world.

In the correspondence with Rome, whose supremacy he never questioned and where his orthodoxy was never again in doubt, Boniface exhibited, however, a certain independence of judgment and action. As Dr. Emerton indicated in his introduction, this is shown chiefly

in a "liberal" attitude in the application of general principles to specific cases, but not all interpreters of the letters will agree with him that the loyalty of Boniface to the Roman system "was not so much an abstract sentiment as a necessary adjunct to successful missionary effort." He wrote boldly yet respectfully to Pope Zacharias citing alleged evils among the clergy in Rome and accusations of simony in papal relations with the Franks as obstacles in his own path. On the troublesome question of his relations with "false," "heretical," and "evil" priests among the Franks, he sought advice from colleagues in England as much as from Rome; and this was his custom in the face of other problems. The common sense he followed in his decisions was generally supported in Rome. The vexatious problem of marriage within forbidden degrees of relationship led Boniface to seek advice in every direction. Gregory II, in reply to his inquiry, wrote that "since moderation is better than strictness of discipline, especially toward so uncivilized a people, they may contract marriage after the fourth degree." A few years later Gregory III instructed him to observe the rules of relationship to the seventh degree. This must have been confusing to the Christians as well as to the heathen whom he was trying to convert, but it was on the greater complication of spiritual relationships that Boniface's critical faculties were aroused, specifically marriage of a godfather with the widowed mother of the child. Doubtful of the existence of supposed canonical rulings on the question, he wrote to his friend Bishop Pehthelm of Whithorn, in Scotland, from the "German ocean . . . dangerous for sailors," asking for information on possible apostolic, patristic, or papal authority, branding as a "serious crime" such a marriage for which he had granted permission; he also wrote to a certain Abbot Duddo, probably connected with the papal archives and once his pupil in England, begging that the abbot "kindly search the records to find out by what authority this is held to be a capital crime among the Romans." It is to Archbishop Nothelm of Canterbury, however, that he fully discloses his mind on the matter. After asking for copies of alleged letters exchanged between St. Augustine and Gregory I on marriages within the third degree, which he was informed were not to be found in the Roman archives, he said: "I cannot possibly understand how, on the one hand, spiritual relationship in the case of matrimonial intercourse can be so great a sin, while on the other hand, it is well estab-

lished that by holy baptism we all become sons and daughters, brothers and sisters of Christ and the Church."

The numerous letters to friends in the land of his birth, which he never again revisited after his departure for Rome, are deeply touching in their portrayal of his love for England. To England he looked for counsel, encouragement, and the learning for which the English church was famous. These letters illustrate, moreover, the great capacity for enlisting loyal assistance and followers which is one of the explanations for his success. To Archbihop Egbert of York, "such a friend in my long wanderings," he wrote in gratitude for books and other gifts, and in explanation of his letter of admonition to vicious King Ethelbald of Mercia, enclosing copies of letters of Gregory the Great recently acquired from the Roman archives. To Cuthbert of Canterbury went a congratulatory letter on the receipt of the pallium, with fraternal archepiscopal advice urging greater restraint in England in granting permission to so many women to make the journey to Rome to the peril of their bodies and souls and to the scandal of the whole English church. To Egbert of York, again, he wrote for "some spark from that light of the Church which the Holy Spirit has kindled in your land; namely, . . . some portion of the treatises which Bede, that inspired priest and student of the Sacred Scriptures, has put forth in his writings. Most especially, if possible, his lectionary for the year [the homilies] which would form a convenient and useful manual for us in our preaching"; and he sends by the bearer two small casks of wine "for a merry day with the brethren." To his former teacher and "beloved master," Bishop Daniel of Winchester, from whom as Winfred he had received a general letter of introduction when first going to Rome, there is a beautiful letter twenty-four years later describing the difficulties of his work and begging for the book of the six prophets which one of his former teachers in England had inscribed in a single volume: "I cannot procure in this country such a book of the Prophets as I need, and with my fading sight I cannot read well writing which is small and filled with abbreviations." And he sends the bishop a "bath towel, not of pure silk, but mixed with rough goat's hair, to dry your feet." In return came a letter addressed to "my hundredfold dearest friend," full of friendly advice recalling the precepts of St. Augustine in his English labors so similar to those of Boniface. To Abbot Huetbert of Wearmouth he

sends a goat's hair coverlet with a request for some works "of that keenest investigator of the Scriptures, the monk Bede, who, we have learned, shone forth among you of late as a lantern of the Church," and a warm English cloak for his journeys. With Abbess Eadburga of Thanet he corresponded for thirty years, receiving from her gifts of books and vestments; she was one of the many women upon whom he relied for aid, for Boniface as no other missionary perhaps until modern times gave a real place to women in his scheme of work; from Thanet came his kinswoman, Lioba, to be abbess of Bischofsheim. A cheerful epistle sent to King Ethelbald of Mercia by a messenger carrying "trifling gifts" of a hawk, falcons, shields, and lances, is followed shortly by a blistering castigation of the king for his vices and abuses of the clergy in his realm from Boniface as archbishop and legate and five other bishops. One of the most moving letters of all is one written toward the very end of his life seeking King Pippin's protection for his former boyish pupil, Lullus, who had long since come from England to be for many years one of his assistants in Germany and who ultimately succeeded him as Archbishop of Mainz. From the very beginning to the end of his career he relied upon England for the spiritual, intellectual, and material assistance which came in unstinted measure to this worthy successor of Augustine.

The winning personality of Boniface emerges from the letters as from no biography or history of his time, wholly free from the conventional misty aura of sainthood. The vigor of his thought and speech matched what must have been unusual powers of physical endurance. The crude credulity of his age is notably lacking. His humility, his gentle and kindly humanity gleam forth from letter after letter. When news of the martyrdom of Boniface in Frisia, where he had begun his labors, reached England, Archbishop Cuthbert wrote to the grieving Lullus that "although . . . bitter sorrow tortures our heart, nevertheless a certain triumphant, exulting joy softens and quiets our grief as we recall the wondrous—nay the ineffable—grace of God and render thanks that the English people were found worthy, foreigners as they are, to send out this gifted student of heavenly learning, this noble soldier of Christ, with many pupils well taught and trained, to far-off spiritual conflicts and for the salvation of many souls through the grace of Almighty God."

The translation is smooth and readable, perhaps less literal than

some scholars would wish. The editor of the series and his collaborator in the final preparation of the manuscript chosen for the task by Dr. Emerton, Professor La Piana, have wisely and courteously adhered for the most part, we are informed, to the canons of the translator. The translation has been made from the authoritative text of M. Tangl with numbered references to that edition. In accordance with Dr. Emerton's wishes, no critical apparatus accompanies the translation. There is a critical statement by Dr. Emerton on the editions of the letters, a short bibliography, and an index. The book is a worthy addition to the Records of Civilization. The letters are a moving record of a long life devoted to a dauntless struggle for the advancement of mankind in the western world.

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The Steps of Humility. By BERNHARD, ABBOT OF CLAIRVAUX, translated, with introduction and notes, as a study of his epistemology, by GEORGE BOSWORTH BURCH. Harvard University Press, 1940. xi + 287 pp. $3.00.

This volume presents the Latin text of St. Bernard's *Steps of Humility* together with an English translation on pages opposite the text. There is also a long introduction of 112 pages wherein Dr. Burch collates and systematizes out of the Saint's various treatises, sermons and letters, the texts which reveal the "epistemology" of Bernard. The volume is closed by lengthy notes of commentary on this introduction, and two appendices—one outlining Cistercian mysticism as revealed by Isaac, the English abbot of the Monastery of Stella, near Poitiers, and a contemporary of St. Bernard, and a second appendix on Bernard's criticism of Abelard's theology. There is also a bibliography and index.

It is significant that one does not find in the works of St. Bernard a systematic exposition of the theory of knowledge which Dr. Burch has pieced together here, and which, moreover, constitutes an ontology and *ascesis* of knowledge, rather than an epistemology. For St. Bernard tells us, "my philosophy is to know Jesus and Jesus crucified"; and his *Steps of Humility* begins with the words, "I am going to speak, therefore, about the steps of humility, which St. Benedict proposes, not to count but to mount." This does not mean that the great

Abbot of Clairvaux had no talent nor regard for speculative theology. M. Gilson's authoritative study, *The Mystical Theology of St. Bernard*, shows that although

> St. Bernard was in no wise a metaphysician, he must remain in our eyes a theologian whose speculative vigor and power of synthesis put him among the greatest. That his mystical theology is essentially a science of a way of life is not to be doubted, but I hope to show that it is nevertheless a science, and that its structure could hardly be more rigorously synthetic than it is. . . . When the author's principles are known, his language understood, his treatises, even his sermons, speak with all the severe precision and exact technique of the most densely-packed pages of St. Anselm or St. Thomas Aquinas.

These remarks of M. Gilson may be considered an anticipated justification of the enterprise of Dr. Burch.

Moreover, St. Bernard distinguished himself from certain of his contemporaries of the twelfth century mystical school, such as Gauthier of St. Victor, by refraining from polemics against philosophy and dialectics as such. And, in fact, he proved himself superior to an Abelard in controversial speculations on the Trinity. Dr. Burch even sees in him—and with justification—"a precursor of the later scholastic doctrine of faith and reason exemplified by Thomas Aquinas" (p. 274).

The main thesis of the *Steps*, namely that humility is the way *par excellence* which leads to truth, aims, in point of fact, at the knowledge of supreme truth and concerns the loving contemplation, the union with God to be attained. But this thesis remains valid in an analogical sense even for the other kinds of knowledge, for the merely rational kinds of knowledge; the fundamental attitude of every scientist is also a certain sort of humility with regard to the object of his science.

But St. Bernard added that only the first two of the twelve steps can be ascended outside a monastery. Clearly the history of the saints has proved the contrary thesis. As regards that supreme knowledge which St. Bernard had in mind, and the superior degrees of humility which introduced one to it, "the internal cell," as St. Catherine of Sienna said—not the monastery—is what is always and absolutely necessary.

Moreover, the very deeds of St. Bernard explain his doctrine. The founder and reformer of so many monasteries all over Europe, the

leader in so many Church councils, the mediator in so many disputes both civil and ecclesiastical, and the preacher of a Crusade, directed, indeed, his whole life toward internal sanctity and mystical union as supreme values, but his contemplation overflowed into intense and indefatigable activity. In fact, at one time Cardinal Hameric was provoked into writing to Bernard in the name of the Pope himself, "It is not proper that noisy and bothersome frogs come out of their marshes to trouble the Holy See and the Cardinals." But the Saint was able to reply, "Illustrious Hameric, if you so desired, who would have been in a better position to liberate me from the necessity of taking part in the council than yourself? Forbid these noisy bothersome frogs to come out of their holes, to leave their marshes. . . . Then your friend will be no longer liable to the accusations of pride and presumption."

Dr. Burch has done an excellent service in providing the public with the Latin text and an excellent translation of this capital work of St. Bernard, so important for an understanding of twelfth century mysticism and the environment in which it flourished. The hazardous undertaking of fitting together a noetic synthesis out of the diverse writings of the Saint, Dr. Burch has achieved in the most conscientious, attentive, and careful manner, although we may disagree with some details, especially in his explanatory notes. The risk of such a reconstruction is to give a too rigid and systematic character to more or less contingent expressions taken out of their context. For instance, "acquiring spiritual life by turning to God" (p. 10) is not a miracle and answers a natural movement of the human soul, but for St. Bernard the achievement of this movement is given by grace, and this grace which is not "miraculous," is nonetheless not natural, but supernatural. Bernard considered choice a property of reason, not its very definition (p. 13). For him, God is the being of all things, but in an eminent manner, which Bernard's doctrine of the absolute transcendence and simplicity of divine essence clearly emphasizes, in such a way that the mere introspection, even the most profound, whereby a man understands his own being does not suffice to procure for him the mystical perception of God (p. 46). I do not think that mystical contemplation was viewed by St. Bernard as "ecstasy" in the strict and proper sense of this term. (When he defines contemplation he uses the term *excessus,* which is not synonymous with *ecstasis.)* In an especially im-

portant part of his introduction, Dr. Burch has accurately described the characteristics of contemplation according to St. Bernard; his terminology, however, might perhaps be questioned; in any case, when it is said that the experience of God is "emotional," the peculiar and noetic character of such an "emotion" should be expressed.

I take the liberty of suggesting that the theory of mystical knowledge given in Note 41 and drawn from Ouspensky would probably not have been agreed to by St. Bernard, and that "the thing in itself, as described by Kant" does not correspond "exactly" to the manner in which the theologians describe God the Father (p. 250). It is no inconsistency on the part of St. Bernard to regard the Father as "the object of mystical contemplation," as well as the Son, to whom the role of Bridegroom was attributed in the sermons on *Canticles*. It is obvious that for St. Bernard as well as for St. Augustine and the other Christian theologians mystical contemplation bears on the three Persons of the Trinity. God (the Son as well as the Father) transcends all human comprehension, but mystical contemplation does not "comprehend" God, since it remains in the obscurity of faith.

The remarks I have just indicated are but a tribute to the interest of the work of Dr. Burch and an indication of the importance of the questions it raises. I read with special pleasure the analysis that he gives of the Bernardian theory of Love. Dr. Burch rightly points out against Rousselot, that "Love, as St. Bernard understands it, *is* real possession." Now the very problem begins with this remark. If "to love God and to possess him are identical" (p. 73), how does charity tend to contemplation and vision? When St. Benard utters in a famous phrase: "Its use is its fruit. I love because I love; I love in order to love," is such a love a fruit by virtue of love alone, or by virtue of another element, the experimental knowledge linked in fact with the mystical love?

These are but a few of the considerations that make the work of Dr. Burch a valuable contribution to our knowledge of Mediaeval Philosophy. It should prove illuminating to the many who wish to have some insight into St. Bernard's doctrine and, at the same time, a first hand acquaintance with one of his most typical and inspiring works.

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Iohannis Dominici Lucula Noctis. By Edmund Hunt. (Publications in Medieval Studies, The University of Notre Dame, vol. 4), Notre Dame, Indiana, 1940. xxxi + 432 pp.

After Petrarch and the circle of his humanist followers had given a new impetus to the classical studies in Italy during the second half of the fourteenth century, they met with the opposition of a group of conservative theologians who considered the reading of the pagan classics as superfluous and even as a danger to the ideal of Christian education. The question was discussed at length between Coluccio Salutati (1331-1406), the leading Florentine humanist of the generation following Petrarch, and his opponents, Giovanni da San Miniato and Giovanni Dominici. The latter's *Lucula Noctis,* composed around 1405 and addressed to Salutati, constitutes the most extensive document of the whole discussion and hence deserves the interest of all students of the early Renaissance.

The author, Giovanni Dominici (1356-1419), was born in Florence and became a Dominican friar. He was quite active in the reformation and reorganization of his order and became a Cardinal in 1408. He composed a great number of theological and devotional treatises in Latin and Italian some of which became quite popular. The *Lucula Noctis* is divided into forty-seven chapters. It discusses the question of whether faithful Christians are to be allowed to follow secular studies, listing first twelve arguments for the affirmative answer, and then twelve opposite arguments for the negative answer which is held by the author himself. His main point, to which he returns again and again, is that secular studies are dangerous to the Christian faith or, at least, are superfluous and hence serve to distract the faithful from his efforts directed towards salvation. Besides religious contemplation, only those studies are recognized which are of direct practical use, like canonic and civil law, while the liberal arts, literature and philosophy are of little value. It should be noted that Dominici does not represent the point of Scholasticism vs. Humanism, but rather that of devotional religion vs. secular studies in general. His criticism implicitly hits the scholastic ideal no less than the humanistic one, because it includes dialectic and natural philosophy (only moral philosophy is treated with more favor), and Aristotle is always listed among the dangerous pagan authors. As a matter of fact, Dominici draws mainly on the Church Fathers and on medieval textbooks such

as Vincent of Beauvais and Hugo of St. Victor, but hardly quotes any scholastics except Thomas Aquinas, the leading authority of his order. On the other hand, he makes much use of Cicero, Seneca, and other Latin classics, and treats Petrarch, Boccaccio, Salutati, and Bruni with much respect, recognizing their Christian faith and judging them superior to their pagan models. Thus he seems not to be untouched by the humanistic movement himself, and while his thesis would force him to prohibit the reading of the classics entirely, he is driven to admit more than once that the classics could be read by mature and faithful persons, although not by the unexperienced youth.

Dominici's exposition lacks organic order in the detail and is overloaded with quotations and repetitions which make its reading far from pleasant. Occasionally he touches philosophical questions, but not very profoundly. Once, following St. Thomas, he insists on the superiority of the intellect over the will (ch. 37). The Latin is pretty bad, and the rules of style as well as those of elementary grammar are disregarded rather frequently.

The *Lucula Noctis* has been published once before by R. Coulon (Paris 1908). This edition, apparently, is based only on one manuscript and is full of errors. Mr. Hunt presents a critical edition based on three manuscripts, one of which is of particular importance because apparently read by Salutati himself. The text is very correct on the whole. The occasional misprints which I noted are quite excusable. The critical apparatus is accurate and helpful. The editor is to be commended for refraining from arbitrary corrections and emendations of Dominici's text. In choosing always the worse Latin among two extant variants, he may have exaggerated in a few cases. There is also a useful second apparatus in which the quoted sources are verified.

The work is a useful contribution to Renaissance studies, and it is to be hoped that more critical editions of this kind will be forthcoming.

Paul Oskar Kristeller

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From Beast-Machine to Man-Machine: Animal Soul in French Letters from Descartes to La Mettrie. By Leonora Cohen Rosenfield. With a Preface by Paul Hazard of the Académie française. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941. xxviii + 353 pp. $3.50.

The thesis of the animal machine and the whole problem of animal

intelligence, instinct, soul, or automata is one which has lacked neither proponents nor popularizers since the dawn of man's reasoning and his contact with domesticated animal pets.

Mrs. Rosenfield did not, therefore, undertake an obscure, unknown subject for her thesis, but rather bravely stepped into the midst of a vast accumulation of erudition, some of it known and much of it unknown to present-day research scholars.

By narrowing her field to cover only the period stretching from Descartes' animal-machine to La Mettrie's man-machine, she has fortunately not restricted her discussion in so narrow a fashion as to fail to interest anyone alive to the philosophical implications of this all-engrossing problem, which still haunts the minds of thinkers. Indeed, her discussions have a wide general range, although the limits she had set for herself probably enabled her to fit within the framework of a single volume the vast material she must have accumulated.

The preface to Mrs. Rosenfield's work, written by Paul Hazard, of the Académie française is, in a way, a preview of its contents. In his inimitable style, Professor Hazard re-emphasizes the value of research: "Faced as we are with the invasion of mechanism, what better remedy than to ponder the great problems once again? Confronted with doctrines that exert their contempt of intelligence, what better remedy than the free exercise of the critical mind?"

In the first part of her study, Mrs. Rosenfield discusses the beast-machine and the Cartesians, giving the history or evolution of Descartes' thinking and philosophy which finally led him to the denial of souls to animals.

Analyzing the hypothesis of the beast-machine in various divisions of thought, Mrs. Rosenfield unravels, successively, its spread in the field of physiology. Cartesians, as well as non-Cartesians of the day, were well-versed in the mechanical explanation of animal sensory systems, and although our modern terms of "reflexes" and "conditioning" were not known to the seventeenth century thinkers, their substance was, at the time, common knowledge.

Cartesian metaphysicians, on the other hand, used the theory of animal automatism to further their own doctrines, namely, the Cartesian dualistic metaphysics. But, by far the most universal aspect of the theory of the beast-machine reveals itself when Mrs. Rosenfield discusses its relationship to theology. Famous Christian philosophers, such as Arnauld and Bossuet, felt that it helped the cause of theology

in general, but, gradually, its atheistic tinge was to show its full coloring in La Mettrie's man-machine.

Forgetting the theologians, for a while at least, Mrs. Rosenfield offers a poetic interlude in her presentation of the poets' interest in the beast-machine. Since most poets took sides against Descartes, as was to be expected, she stresses the less-known phases of the problem, namely those dealing with the support, in verse form, of the theory of animal automatism. Thus we find solid argumentation, with citation, of Cardinal de Polignac, who wrote in Latin verse, and of Louis Racine, son of the great poet, who wrote, of course, in French. Both had solid Cartesian-colored backgrounds, which in part help to explain their faithfulness to the master's theory, even in the unexpected domain of poetry.

Generally speaking, after Descartes' time, his theory was used mostly for its theological implications. "The Cartesians stressed even more than had Descartes the fact that any theory other than their own, by reducing the difference between man and beast, weakened proof of the immortality of human soul" (pp. 67-68).

In Part II of her work, Mrs. Rosenfield reviews the general theme of the anti-Cartesians. Here too, she was obliged to make a careful division of her material into traditionalists, empiricists, and poets. It is not too easy to discriminate among some of the figures she handles, in order to call attention to certain favorites, but it is clear that in this second part of her thesis, the layman will be at a loss to follow the general discussions, whereas the competent specialist in the eighteenth century will identify, without any great difficulty, the philosophers whose works are analyzed.

The author must be commended for having ferreted out interesting material relating to the animal soul controversy which had not hitherto been fully exploited. A lively account of Cyrano de Bergerac's satire of the Cartesian position, *Les Estats et empires de la lune* (1657), entertains us with a view of the problem of animal soul as seen from the beasts' point of view.

Mrs. Rosenfield has generally proved the point, namely, that French prose was immeasurably enriched by the debate on the animal soul. As for French poetry, we are indebted to her for a fast-moving account of Mlle. Descartes' (niece of the philosopher) and Mlle. de Scudéry's minor roles in the controversy. Among other figures resur-

rected by Mrs. Rosenfield, and which had not before been included in scholarly accounts on the subject, are: François Bayle, physician and professor of medicine at Toulouse, Edmond Pourchot, professor of philosophy and rector of the University of Paris, François Lamy, Hartsoeker, and De Crousaz.

A word as to the physical qualities of Mrs. Rosenfield's work: we like her use of the appendix as a means of making her text more readable. Each chapter has its own clearly-indicated appendix at the end of the book, readable and replete with information about most of the writers mentioned. She also takes pains to indicate which modern authorities have treated individual figures which she has, therefore, not stressed, and those which have not appeared in accounts other than her own. There is a fine bibliography (pp. 307-40) and a scholarly index which will undoubtedly help to establish the book as a research instrument for those working in the field.

All in all, we are pleased to see, in Mrs. Rosenfield, one of the rare scholars in the field of Romance Languages, who understand both the literary and philosophical aspects of seventeenth and eighteenth century French literature. While her language is, of necessity, quite abstract, her thesis is eminently readable and can interest both the specialist and the layman with an unusual background.

From a broad religious point of view, it is to be regretted, however, that learned men, for the sake of fame, should have thus brought down to the level of the non-initiated in solid Church history, the discussion of problems which lie so much beyond mere human understanding. If anything, Mrs. Rosenfield's dissertation demonstrates the truth that superficial knowledge and unnecessary attacks on Religion can only weaken the moral fiber in man, as is amply revealed by today's assaults on the very foundations of Christianity.

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A Preface to Christian Theology. By JOHN A. MACKAY. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941. x + 187 pp. $2.00.

In recent years, leaders of religious thought have been led to a new approach to theology, or rather have rediscovered the biblical view of God's relation to man and the world, and found it relevant to

our present situation. One result has been the coming together of the contending conservatives and modernists of a generation ago. The issues which divided them seem trivial in the face of the assault upon the entire Christian interpretation of life, and both points of view disclose defects which their proponents acknowledge and seek to correct. Dr. Mackay is president of what has been a most conservative theological seminary; but this book will seem to many liberals of other days, and to men who still believe in liberalism as an open-minded attitude towards truth, an altogether admirable statement of their present convictions.

Its aim is modest: to give "a glimpse at the borderland between religion and theology"; and it is a most valuable introduction in untechnical language to the outlook of an increasing number of the foremost leaders in contemporary Christian thought. It was prepared for the press during the tragic weeks when the Low Countries were invaded and France fell. The crisis in world affairs gives its pages vigor and urgency. It captures and holds a reader's fascinated attention.

Dr. Mackay sums up the mood of today under three headings: quiet desperation, agonizing quest, and theological awakening. He justifies the last by facts adduced in Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and among Protestants. After a chapter in which a distinction is made between the view of life and truth from a spectator's balcony and the view of those on the road whose knowledge is "born in a concern and perfected in a commitment," the essence of religion is found in a quest and an encounter. Truth apprehends men in personal relations and in personal decisions. Among Christians, God meets man through the Bible, particularly in Christ, and this encounter is momentous, for man's response leaves him a skeptic or a saint.

The central chapter of the book, which many will find most arresting and enlightening, gives a Christian interpretation of history under the caption "The Divine Drama." Men today find difficulty, not in reconciling religious faith with their scientific ideas, but in discovering a religious meaning in human affairs. Dr. Mackay follows Toynbee in seeing God entering history in unique events which have universal significance. God "individualizes," coming in particular persons in particular experiences, and He "generalizes," for these unique Self-disclosures embrace all sorts and conditions of men within their gra-

cious effects. Contemporaneously God's encounters are meeting bitter antagonism, because Christ and His Church "both particularize and universalize in a way which is abhorrent to the new Caesars." The current repudiation of Christianity, however, affords a deeper insight into its true character, and should lead not to despair of its victory but to a more steadfast hope.

Over against the moralism which has characterized American Christianity in recent times, Dr. Mackay insists that the primary element in the Christian faith is "a great indicative, something which God has done, and not a great imperative, something that man should do." Man's response to God's personalized truth is to sacrifice his autonomous self, in order that a divine self may live in him, emancipating him spiritually with a freedom which is fulfilled in action.

This leads to a suggestive treatment of Christian social ethics. Mankind is passing from an "I" age to a life in a "We" age. The crucial problem today is that of "corporate goodness." This brotherhood may be achieved on three levels: it may be "a natural heritage," or "a human achievement" (the Pan-American Union is instanced), or the product of supernatural grace. This last is the unique community of the Spirit in the Christian Church, and gives the Church its distinctive mission in achieving a new world fellowship.

Facing the secular order, the Church has the functions of the critic of current society, of the transformer of the spiritual quality of its institutions, and of the unifier binding mankind in a new Christendom. But the Church cannot fulfil these functions unless she becomes and is always the Church God means her to be. Dr. Mackay enriched the Oxford Ecumenical Conference in 1937 with the phrase: "Let the Church be the Church." In pleading for her reunion and self-realization he will have nothing to do with a "watery interdenominationalism." He seeks a unity of all the followers of Christ "full of the strong wine of the Spirit."

No hasty sketch can do justice to this book of a robust and passionate thinker, who grapples with the current movements in the world and shows with penetrating insight the meaning of the Gospel for fateful today.

HENRY SLOANE COFFIN

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The Nature and Destiny of Man. Vol. I, *Human Nature. By* REINHOLD NIEBUHR. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941. IX + 306 pp. $2.75.

There is no question as to the brilliance of many of the insights in this much anticipated first volume of Reinhold Niebuhr's Gifford Lectures. One's immediate thought on reading it is that here, at last, is a book in English which shows both the sensitiveness and the widely ranging imagination that distinguishes so many German books on philosophy and theology. One notes, secondly, that here is a treatment of history which deals with its more profound aspects, especially the dominance of tragedy and frustration. Thirdly, one finds here an able defence of the Pauline-Augustinian-Calvinistic strand in Christianity, and an interpretation of modern psychology in Christian terms rather than a description of religion which leaves with psychology the last word. For so rich a book a brief summary is entirely inadequate, but, in general, the thought moves as follows.

Man is a child of nature, but he also stands outside of nature. His freedom breaks up the harmonies of nature, but his pride prevents the attainment of new harmony. He uses the forces of nature creatively, but he tends to defy the constraints of both nature and reason. He is both insecure and ignorant. He seeks to overcome the insecurity attendant on his position in nature by exerting a will to power which overreaches his capacities as creature. He tries to overcome his ignorance by pretending that he is not ignorant and refusing to recognize the limits of finitude. Thus his rational and cultural pursuits are infected with the sin of pride. The tendency of the knowing self, finding its self-consciousness at the center of the world it beholds, is to believe itself to be the whole world. Reason's "most natural inclination" is to make itself the ultimate principle and thus, in effect, declare itself God. Sin, therefore, arises from man's refusal to admit that he is merely a creature. Man lacks a principle of interpretation which can do justice both to his transcendence over nature and his dependence on nature. As a creature bound and free, limited and unlimited, man is anxious. In his anxiety he seeks to transmute his finiteness into infinity and thus sins through his desire for security as well as through the will to power.

The remedy is a return to Christianity where man is understood not from his own standpoint, nor from that of reason, but from that

of God, and where man can find himself through obedience to the divine will. In Christianity man is judged by an eternal and holy God. "A religion of revelation is grounded in the faith that God speaks to man from beyond the highest pinnacle of the human spirit; and that this voice of God will discover man's highest not only to be short of the highest but involved in the dishonesty of claiming that it is the highest" (p. 203). If man knew, loved, and obeyed God as the author and end of his existence a proper limit could be set for his desires, including his desire to survive—and also (one infers) his desire to be rational.

Of the argument as a whole it seems fair to say, in the first place, that it is more effective in its analysis of the moral than of the religious situation. In this, as in his earlier books, Niebuhr scores heavily when he shows how limited is the application of our moral idealism, and how inevitable it is that we try to subordinate other wills to our own, no matter how sincere our profession of disinterestedness. His discussion of the religious situation is not so immediately convincing. If man's moral aspiration is infected by the relativities of history and society, and if his intellect is infected by his finitude so as to prevent him from reasonably seeking an object of worship, why are not his religious sensitiveness and receptiveness equally tainted? How can he accept a revelation from an absolute outside of history and time and rationality with any assurance that it is truly revelation or truly an absolute? How is man to love and obey God as Creator and Judge if he cannot trust his reason to show that God is Creator or his conscience to show that God as moral has a right to be Judge?

This leads to a second question. While one must grant that many individual liberals have been seriously mistaken in their short-sightedness and optimism, is it true that in the nature of the case the liberal must set himself up as judge and identify his own finite mind with the world as a whole? Niebuhr is sure that this must happen. Man is "betrayed by his very ability to survey the whole to imagine himself the whole" (p. 17). His mind, in its pride, "claims unconditioned validity for its systems of logical coherence and rational unities" (p. 29), the implication being that other systems might have been chosen. "If some vitality of existence, or even some subordinate principle of coherence is used as the principle of meaning, man is involved in idolatry" (p. 164), with the implication again that coherence is

subordinate to a higher law. The finite self "must regard the pretensions of universality, to which idealistic philosophies for instance tempt it, as a sin" (p. 170).

This idea, that reason, instead of being a corrective and critic supreme in its own sphere, and a universal medium within which all minds must work, is rather a part of the equipment of the individual self by which it aggressively and arbitrarily tries to push itself ahead, comes out again when Niebuhr says: "A mind which transcends itself cannot legitimately make itself the ultimate principle of interpretation by which it explains the relation of mind to the world" (p. 165). The reader inevitably asks: Since there is an obvious transcending of itself as finite and individual, is there ever any real temptation to identify its finitude and individuality with the world or to make itself the ultimate principle? Or, if there is such a temptation, can it be laid at the door of "reason"? Is it not, rather, one of those failings to which all human life is subject, but which more "reason" can prevent?

According to this book the basic sin is pride, and the most insidious form of pride is the pride of the knower. One can admit that everyone needs to learn humility, the liberal perhaps most of all. Yet there is a difference between the pride of the Nazi and the pride of the democrat. Perhaps the reason for the neglect of the difference, in this book, is its neglect of the special contribution of the scientific attitude. It is wholly true that the conquest of nature by science may lead to overestimation of man's abilities, but is it not also true that the experimental attitude should and can teach us humility? If we can learn, with Huxley, to "sit down before fact as a little child" shall we not find what humility truly means? Niebuhr seems to believe that this is not possible, since the intellect always glorifies the self and leaves to religion the task of humbling it. Yet theology, if not religion, has its own pitfalls. We recall the Carmelite who remarked: "We may have to yield to the Dominican in orderliness and to the Franciscan in charity, but in humility we can beat the world!" Pride of dogma, in other words, is as serious as pride of intellect. Niebuhr's book, with its penetrating exposure of the omnipresence of pride, should help us to be on our guard against both types. Its argument would be even more forceful if it had taken account of the true humility which some, at least, of the greater liberals and philosophical idealists have won.

Niebuhr's suspiciousness of intellectualism in religion drives him

to adopt a form of theology which is "dialectical" in the sense that, at least at times, it rejects the logic of identity and finds a certain virtue in the paradoxes and actual contradictions of the religious life. Thus there must be "a provisional defiance of logic" (p. 263), and the Christian faith is not so much an answer to the human situation of self-contradiction as "a fuller and clearer revelation of that contradiction" (p. 290). The result is a stress on man's helplessness both intellectually and ethically, and on his need for divine intervention. Yet one finishes the volume with the feeling that this is itself a helpful book and that many of its insights are actually luminous in their reasonable persuasiveness. Whether this is a point for or against the main argument, each reader must judge for himself. And whether or not he finds the book conclusive, he will without fail discover it to be provocative and exciting in a high degree. After all, conclusiveness is the last quality its author would claim for it, especially with a second volume on the way.

J. S. Bixler

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The Meaning of Revelation. By H. Richard Niebuhr. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941. xi + 196 pp. $2.00.

In the first chapter of this book, Professor Niebuhr discusses revelation in its relation to historical relativism, religious relativism, and confessional theology respectively.

Already in the preface, he states clearly that he has found himself unable to avoid the acceptance of historical relativism yet does not believe that the agnostic consequence is necessary. Such relativism, he believes, calls rather for the development of a new type of critical idealism which recognizes the social and historical character of the mind's categories and is "belieffully" realistic, in Professor Tillich's meaning of that phrase.

When expatiating on this, he holds that the recognition of reason's historical limitations can be, for theology in particular, the prelude to faithful critical work in history and in historically apprehended experience. A critical historical theology cannot, to be sure, prescribe what form religious life must take in all places and all times beyond the limits of its own historical system. But it can seek within the history of which it is a part for an intelligible pattern. Moreover, it is not

evident that the man who is forced to confess that his view of things is conditioned by the standpoint he occupies must also doubt the reality of what he sees, or that one who knows that his concepts are not universal must also doubt that they are concepts of the universal. Furthermore, historic faith is not private and subjective, without possibility of verification. Every view of the universal from the finite standpoint of the individual in a particular society is subject to the test of experience on the part of companions who look from the same standpoint in the same direction, as well as to the test of consistency with the principles and concepts that have grown out of past experience in the same community. Finally, historical relativism also means relevance to history. Theology must begin in Christian history and with Christian history because it has no other choice. But such a limited beginning is a true beginning and not the end of inquiry; it is a point of view and not the eclipse of a once illuminated scene.

By religious relativism Mr. Niebuhr means that one can speak and think significantly about God only from the point of view of faith in him. There is no such thing as disinterestedness in theology, since one cannot speak of God and gods at all save as valued beings, or as values which cannot be apprehended save by a willing, feeling, responding self. Furthermore, in the Christian community one's interest must be directed as exclusively as possible to the God of Christian faith, for, when theology turns to the Father of Jesus Christ from the point of view of its dominant faith in another valued entity, it does not really turn to the Christian God at all as Christian faith knows him.

Because of their limited standpoint in history and faith, Niebuhr holds, Christians can only state in simple, confessional form what has happened to them in their community, how they came to believe, how they reason about things, and what they see from their point of view. Moreover, the adoption of the confessional method is necessary because there seems to be no way of avoiding certain static and deistic interpretations of the revelation idea save by its adoption, and because a revelation which exposes human sin no less than divine goodness cannot be dealt with except in confessor's terms.

Having discussed these matters, Mr. Niebuhr attempts to point out that Christian faith cannot escape from partnership with history, however many partners it may choose, and then raises the question, How can it be true? How can revelation mean both history and God?

His answer is given by distinguishing painstakingly between history as lived and as seen, or between internal and external history, and by maintaining that the history to which we point when we speak of revelation is the former and not the latter. He contends that the evangelists of the New Testament and their successors did not speak of events, as impersonally apprehended, but rather of what had happened to them in their community. They recalled the critical point in their own lifetime when they became aware of themselves in a new way as they came to know the self on whom they were dependent. They turned to a past which was not gone but which endured in them as their memory, making them what they were.

Attempting a somewhat more precise determination of the area in which the revelation event is to be found, Mr. Niebuhr observes that revelation does not simply mean inner history as a whole nor any arbitrarily chosen part of it, but that part of one's inner history which illuminates the rest of it and which is itself intelligible. The heart, says Niebuhr, must reason; the participating self cannot escape the necessity of looking for pattern and meaning in its life and relations. It cannot make a choice between reason and imagination, but only between reasoning on the basis of adequate images and thinking with the aid of evil imaginations. Neither the primitive images of animism nor the impersonal patterns of modern scientific or, indeed, of any kind of purely contemplative thought supply a basis for the rational understanding of the self in its community and history. But there is an image, neither evil nor inadequate, which enables the heart to understand, and the event through which that image is given them Christians call their revelation. This event is Jesus Christ.

A revelation, says Niebuhr, which furnishes the practical reason with a starting point for the interpretation of past, present, and future history is subject to progressive validation. But the rational value of revelation is not its first value, and its validation in the reasoning of the heart is not the primary validation. In dealing with revelation we refer to something in our history to which we always return as containing our first certainty. We must ask, therefore, what this self-evidencing content of revelation is and how it comes to us through the historical event.

In answering this we should remind ourselves that assurance in our ultimate convictions is not to be gained without social corroboration,

that the definition of revelation is a social task of the historic Christian community, and that we stand at a limited point in the life of that community. Furthermore, the most important factor about the whole approach to revelation to which we are committed by the acceptance of our existential situation, of the point of view of faith living in history, is that we must think and speak in terms of persons. We need, therefore, to put our question in the following form, "What persons do we meet in the revelatory event and what convictions about personal relations become our established principles in its presence?"

Niebuhr replies, "When we say revelation we point to something in the historic event more fundamental and more certain than Jesus or than self. Revelation means God, God who discloses himself to us through our history as our knower, our author, our judge and our only savior." Revelation means the moment in our history through which we know ourselves to be known from beginning to end, in which we are apprehended by the knower; it means the self-disclosing of the eternal knower.

Though Niebuhr defines revelation in such terms, he also allows that it designates certain truths and moral standards which are connected with the historic events. Through revelation of the person of God in Jesus Christ the moral law gains its imperativeness, is universalized and intensified, and thus reborn. A great process of levelling takes place in which the boundaries of all the successive moralities, of Christendom as of Jewry and paganism, must be erased, and a revolutionary transvaluation occurs in which we recognize that we have used the law in service of self and, in this use, always corrupted it. Furthermore, and this concerns the greatest change, we see the possibility of the conversion of the imperative into an indicative and of the law whose content is love into a free love of God and man. In a sense, then, revelation, which is primarily self-disclosure, includes knowledge of "divine decrees" or of the will of God.

What is true of ethics, Niebuhr holds, is true also of the opinions men hold about the world of nature and about history. Revelation imparts no new beliefs about natural or historical facts; it does involve the radical reconstruction of all our beliefs, since these always reflect both human provincialism and concern for self with its idols as well as objective knowledge.

Finally, our thoughts about deity's nature do not need to be re-

ferred to a source in special revelation. Our ideas of the goodness, omnipotence, and eternity of deity represent the demand of our Western, Hellenized, human reason and come to us in social memories which are not connected with the name of and life of Christ. Revelation is not the communication of new truths and the supplanting of our natural religion by a supernatural one. But it is the fulfillment and the radical reconstruction of our natural knowledge about deity through the revelation of one whom Jesus Christ called "Father."

The preceding appears to be the skeletal thought of a book that will likely be provocative of more on the same subject. In it we feel a pioneer is at work. It is stimulating and challenging, but hardly the last word that will be said.

Among the strong features of the book are its contention that historical relativism does not necessarily involve the agnostic consequence, its emphasis on what Mr. Niebuhr calls religious relativism as far as the realization of revelation is concerned, its distinction between internal and external history, and its view that revelation means that part of one's inner history which illuminates the rest of it and which is itself intelligible.

These features, however, are entwined with many interpretations and propositions that one is less ready to accept. Among the questions that arise are the following.

Is Mr. Niebuhr's acceptance of historical relativism not too unqualified? When he holds that we know ourselves to be social human beings whose reason is not a common reason, alike in all human selves, but one which is qualified by inheritance from a particular society, and that we know ourselves to be historical selves whose metaphysics, logic, ethics, and theology, like their economics, politics, and rhetoric are limited, moving, and changing in time, is he not overlooking mathematical axioms and the laws of thought that are universal; is he not forgetting the intelligent pattern or reason one can search for in any historical movement? Niebuhr says that the great innate ideas of religious rationalism are known to be innate in men of a certain historical culture, rather than in men in general. To what extent would it be truer to say that a certain historical culture has made some men aware of them and would make others aware of them too? Furthermore, to what extent are Niebuhr's own idea of revelation and the revelation he believes in subject to historical rela-

tivism? His position here does not seem clear. On the one hand, he holds that a critical historical theology cannot prescribe what form religious life must take in all places and all times beyond the limits of its own historical system; on the other hand, he affirms that revelation means God and is responsible for a great process of levelling in which the boundaries of all the successive moralities, of Jewry and paganism as well as of Christendom, must be erased. If Niebuhr's revelation has not universal validity, he does not overcome historical relativism; if it has universal validity, can historical relativism be as unqualified as he believes?

In this connection it also seems pertinent to ask whether theology must necessarily begin in Christian history and with Christian history, whether it is restricted to the confessional form as fully as Niebuhr contends, and whether freedom from static and deistic interpretations of revelation is so completely bound up with such restriction as he suggests.

The distinction Mr. Niebuhr makes between external and internal history is helpful and clear; but if the revelation of God in Jesus Christ is something exceptional, a special datum in internal history, why should its occurrence not be manifest in external history? Why, then, maintain that to demand of men that they should exempt certain events in the chain of perceived happenings from the application of the laws or principles with which they apprehend the others is to ask the impossible or to make everything unintelligible? Why not allow the possibility of the inaptness in certain respects of the method used in external history as well as deny its exclusive validity?

When speaking of the illumination of the revelatory moment, Mr. Niebuhr expresses views on church reunion and human brotherhood, and uses the life and death of Christ to interpret man's present in a way that many ordinary readers of the Bible would doubtless question. What is his warrant for such views and interpretations? Is there not greater illumination to be found in the revelatory moment than he finds?

Mr. Niebuhr contends that there is a self-evidencing content of revelation to which Christians always return as containing their first certainty. At the same time, he affirms that assurance that we are not mistaken in our ultimate convictions is not to be gained without social corroboration, and speaks of the fulfilment and the radical recon-

struction of our natural knowledge about deity through the revelation of one whom Jesus Christ called "Father." One wonders how self-evidencing this content of revelation really is, and whether what the content does to one's natural knowledge about deity, the illumination it brings, or the rational value it has, should not, after all, be recognized as its primary validation.

When considering the relations of internal and external history, Mr. Niebuhr observes that only a decision of the self, a leap of faith, a *metanoia* or revolution of the mind can lead from observation to participation and from observed to lived history; but he does not state whether or not God in any special way influences man to come to this decision or to take this leap of faith. Elucidation of this point, it seems, would add greatly to the understanding of his conception of revelation.

There is a final observation we would make. Mr. Niebuhr acknowledges his indebtedness among others to Karl Barth. Though his thought has certain features in common with Barth's, it would be a mistake to regard them as in essential agreement. Though Niebuhr speaks of beginning with revelation, he arrives at an understanding, definition, and at least part of his assurance of revelation, by means of an analysis of human experience, while Barth avowedly begins with an unchallenged occurrence of revelation as an exceptional fact in human life and proceeds merely to describe and clarify its nature and meaning.

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Christian Ethics. By ANDREW R. OSBORN. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1940. v + 369 pp. $4.00.

This is a book of the first rank. It deals with a subject which urgently needs to be considered, and the treatment of the theme is throughout scholarly, critical and constructive. Moreover, the book is written with a commendable clarity of style, concise and graphic in statement without the use of obscuring technical terms, so that the thought of the author can be readily followed.

In view of what is happening in the world, within nations as well as in international conflicts, the writer's initial diagnosis of the situation is one with which there will be general agreement; that "the

supreme need of our distraught civilization is an authoritative system of ethics," that "morality is then the great question of our age." The maintenance of law—in the international sphere the only alternative to war—is dependent upon the support given to it by recognized standards of morality. Economic issues have ultimately to do with right human relationships; as the late Professor Seligman once remarked to the writer of this review, there can be no sound economic principle which is not also sound as an ethical principle.

The questions then arise, as Dr. Osborn perceives, "What is morality? Is it anything more than custom? What are its sanctions? Has it any basis in reality? Can it give us any sure guidance in our perplexity about the meaning of life and history? These are vital questions, and the future depends upon the answers given to them" (p. 2).

In answer to these questions, Christian Ethics has its foundation in the conception of God; it is "deep founded upon the reality of moral order, which, it declares, proceeds from and is manifested in the character of God" (p. 3). "There is order in the physical world—it is unthinkable that in the higher sphere of human relations there is no law nor order" (p. 2). The conception of God is, therefore, not merely the resort to a name. He is the Being in whom moral laws and principles have an origin and a validity higher than in man, of which man, as in his growing knowledge of the physical laws in the universe, can learn and in obedience to them be set free. "Moral laws are principles of the same character as the laws of science; they are not human enactments" (p. 27).

As Dr. Osborn further makes clear, it is necessary for man constantly to examine and to enlarge his understanding of the nature and requirements of moral law, in order that his actions may be brought into an intelligent and a closer conformity. To this end the practice of science should be strictly employed. "Because Christian Ethics is thus connected with moral law in its relation to individuals and society, it is necessary to follow the method of science in its minute and exact examination of social life and its processes" (p. 5). And here it is significant that, "Creativeness is an essential attribute of God, and, because God creates, man must be creative (p. 14)."

For a knowledge of the principles of Christian ethics, the Bible is an indispensable source of information, in the Old Testament, mainly the Prophets, in the New Testament, the life and teaching of Jesus.

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Full use must be made of the technique and of the results of the modern historical study of the Bible. The positive principle so discovered will be seen to be not dictated utterances, but they made their appeal by their inherent truth and by their enduring validity. They thus have an authority, and set forth the standards of a system of ethics which our distraught civilization needs.

In a brief review it is impossible to do more than to indicate the applicability of Dr. Osborn's discussion to the major specific problems of the present. He examines such subjects as "Is the Ethics of Jesus Absolute?" "The Social Ethics of Jesus," "The State, the Church, and the Kingdom of God," "War and Peace," "The Ethics of Capitalism."

In the preface it is said that the book owes its origin to class-room discussion with students, and also to requests for answers to moral problems brought to him by others. The book would serve excellently for stimulating extended discussion by student groups, as well as affording profitable reading by all who are concerned with the constructive task of achieving a truly new world-order.

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Science, Philosophy and Religion: A Symposium. New York: Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, Inc., 1941. VIII + 443 pp. $1.50.

Religion and the Modern World. University of Pennsylvania Bicentennial Conference. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1941. 192 pp. $2.00.

Readers of *The Review of Religion* have probably heard about the meetings held in New York City at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America in September, 1940, under the auspices of a group of scholars known as the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life. The same group has planned meetings for this September, 1941, at Columbia University, and for the year following. The first of the volumes above listed contains twenty-four of the papers presented at the 1940 sessions of the Conference. In addition, it contains an introductory paper by Van Wyck Brooks telling the history of the Conference, and the opening address on "The Aims of the Conference," delivered to the

founding members by Dr. Louis Finkelstein, President of the Jewish Theological Seminary.

The fundamental aims of the Conference are as timely as they are ambitious. It is proposed to further collaboration between scientists, philosophers, and theologians, in the conviction that maintenance of our civilization requires both mutual respect for the autonomous aspects of these disciplines, and also larger co-operation in the interest of pervasive values which all realize can be best advanced through the democratic way of life. It is nothing less than a call for greater spiritual unification of our culture. To what extent it will prove to be an actual search for this unification remains to be seen. At the first meetings in 1940 a wise latitude was accorded to each participant to go his own way. The result appears in the variety and sincerity of the individual contributions, which may fairly be taken to present the scholars as they are. There is little indication in the volume of either expectation or illusion as to any further immediate accomplishment. The twenty-four papers are collected under the headings of the four sessions at which they were presented: (1) The Social Sciences and Humanities, (2) Philosophy, (3) The Natural Sciences, and (4) Religion and the Philosophy of Education. Taken as a whole, the collection certainly furnishes added evidence of the need for such efforts of collaboration as the Conference proposes. It will be important, therefore, to compare the proceedings of the 1940 meetings with those of 1941, where discussion is to start, not from papers contributed by individuals, but from statements prepared by groups that have been conferring during the intervening year.

The present review forgoes any detailed consideration of individual papers in order to focus upon the more significant unities, differences, and problematic issues disclosed at the first conference. To an official "committee appointed to meet representatives of the press at the end of the Conference" it seemed that "the Conference was unanimous in its conviction that modern civilization can only be preserved by a recognition of the supreme worth and moral responsibility of the individual human person" (p. 9). To the present reviewer a significant measure of unity appears to exist on at least two further points: (1) mutual recognition of and respect for the autonomous features of the several intellectual disciplines: theological, philosophical, and scientific; (2) the conviction that the cultural unity sought in the

name of democracy should embrace diversity and fulness of development rather than a constrained uniformity of life. Thus we note three important points upon which this group of American scholars in different fields appear to reach significant agreement.

The differences and problematic issues lie close at hand, however, since it is evident, for instance, that the appropriate methods and autonomies of the several disciplines are not identically construed. Devotion to universal truth was stressed by many at the Conference as a basic common cause uniting all scholars against ideologies and movements that make truth subservient to force. But the adherents of scholastic philosophy conceive the realm of universal truth as a hierarchical one, in which the truths of natural science and of moral wisdom are ordered under the still more fundamental and higher truths of metaphysics and theology, including truths supernaturally revealed. At another extreme are those positivists who would reserve the term "knowledge" for conclusions demonstrated by mathematical and experimental methods, assigning to the rest of philosophy and theology, at best, some different kind of rather dubious and unclear prerogative. Closely related to this issue is the problem of the relations between evaluation and science that bobs up in more than one of the papers without being thoroughly discussed. In the province of theology the question of a "personal God" was raised, conspicuously by Albert Einstein's plea for the abandonment of such a concept, but not exclusively by him. A press release at the opening of the Conference had stated that "a united, democratic American way of life . . . must be based ultimately on the religious principle of the Fatherhood of God and the worth and dignity of Man when regarded as a child of God" (p. 8). But it does not seem likely that the Conference can be united upon such a formula.

At this first Conference, the cause of intellectual unification was more often pleaded in terms of a renewal of metaphysical truths than in terms of combining to clarify the implications and consequences of historical situations and activities. The present reviewer does not mean to suggest that these are alternative enterprises, but he does believe that emphasis upon the former to the neglect of the latter is not likely to serve the avowed purpose of such a Conference. We have conspicuous reason to believe, for instance from the historic example of Thomas Aquinas, that an impressive synthesis of the meta-

physical order can be achieved without its unifying the dynamic course of cultural developments. Van Wyck Brooks, in his most interesting paper, "On Our Literature Today," finds that "most of our current literature is written by adolescent minds . . . and what is the reason but a lack of the sort of attachments—for instance, to the soil, to public life—that develop the sense of responsibility and, with this, maturity of mind?" (pp. 315, 316). Another contributor points out that Professor Merle Curti, "in his study of the social ideas of American educators, discovered that 'science, religion and philosophy were less important in determining (their) social thinking . . . than the pressure, however unconscious it may have been, of the dominant economic forces of the day" (p. 333). Hence, without in the least meaning to advocate some other one-sidedness, the present reviewer thinks that the Conference would be well advised to add some economists and also some scholars acquainted with the Oriental civilizations, to its personnel. Otherwise, in view of the dynamic currents of our day, it seems quite probable that its deliberations will prove reactionary, if not in subjective intention, then, at least, in objective relation to the larger course of human development.

The second of the volumes mentioned above contains the papers read in the University of Pennsylvania Bicentennial Conference at its sessions devoted to the theme of Religion and the Modern World. The more conventional character, by and large, of these papers compared with those of the other conference shows that deliberate planning to meet new issues may have its point. Of special interest, however, are the papers contributed by Jacques Maritain, Paul Tillich, Reinhold Niebuhr, Rufus Jones, and George Shuster. Professor Maritain, discussing "Contemporary Renewals in Religious Thought," gives a succinct and valuable appraisal of Kierkegaard from a Catholic point of view. Professor Tillich, writing on "Ethics in a Changing World," maintains his place as one genuinely aware of the need to adapt the Hebrew-Christian ethics of love to "the coming collectivism." It is significant to have Rufus Jones, well known for his appreciation of the inner and mystic life, align himself with Josiah Royce, rather than with William James and Whitehead, in stressing the fact that religion "is an affair of a beloved community" more than of solitariness. George Shuster makes the sober plea that to educate people "to conserve the polity" that guards human rights is "one of

the great immediate mandates of the Christian social gospel," without which Christianity itself can not be conserved "except as a scattered handful of imperiled believers." Professor Niebuhr espouses the Reformation's emphasis upon justification rather than sanctification, and recommends the Christian awareness that "all human actions remain within the limits of sin." In so far as such an emphasis might conceivably place all actions upon a like level of condemnation, it probably represents an important passage in Professor Niebuhr's thought rather than its ultimate term.

HORACE L. FRIESS

Columbia University

The Religions of Democracy: Judaism, Catholicism, Protestantism in Creed and Life. By LOUIS FINKELSTEIN, J. ELLIOT ROSS, and WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN. New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1941. 256 pp. $2.00.

To affirm the dignity of every human being, of whatever blood or creed, this book was written. Dedicated to the brotherhood of all men, this book expresses our common belief in God, rooted in the one Judaeo-Christian tradition.

This statement on the book-wrapper gives approximately the essence of the book. It renders the apology for 256 pages going to press. And obviously, three men of the social standing of the authors in the field of religious leadership would not, for the mere sake of bookmaking, burden the public or laden the bookshelves. These leaders had a message to deliver, an important and very timely sermon to preach. Not a church sermon limited to one creed or one set of adherents to a creed is herein set forth. In this book three religious leaders speak to all worthy of the name of Catholics, Protestants, and Jews the world over. It is consecrated to civilized humanity.

Controversial, as any statement of value is apt to be, the name of this book—as a mere statement of fact—is no exception to the rule. Is the name of the book superfluous to the contents? Does the name express an erroneous philosophy? No, not when experience is to serve as judge. For nothing, short of Revelation, more than the pragmatic utility of a practice proves the value of that practice.

Over a century and a half, our nation, religiously rooted and motivated, has practiced democracy in government, and developed—by


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virtue of that practice—to its present degree. It is by this that the monotheistic religion of the Judaeo-Christian origin has been fundamentally the religion of democracy.

Normally the teachings of democracy in our public schools suffice to inculcate the tenets of that polity, to imbue our youth with the lasting spirit of the fathers. However, subversive activities that aim at the breaking down of our political system necessitate a deeper apprehension of the Mosaic monotheism whence the three religions, Judaism, Catholicism, and Protestantism derived their origin. This deeper understanding has been supplied by the authors of *The Religions of Democracy* in a very curious manner.

Not a philosophy of religion, a subject of study, nor argumentative essays were the result of the collaborations of the three leading figures in religion, the authors of this book. They collaborated in essays presenting simple statements of fact, the tenets of each of the three religions.

It is this simplicity, the knowledge of the mere facts of the practices of these faiths, that is more convincing than the most powerful argument. Americans are, for the most part, members of the three faiths discussed in the book. It is to them this book is dedicated. A member of either faith, in learning the tenets of his sister faiths will, it is believed, not merely tolerate but appreciate the faith of his neighbor. He will respect that faith—if he respects his own faith; he will respect the adherent to that faith and will co-operate with him in parallel fundamentals of religion and democracy. In the words of Robert A. Ashworth, "we need constantly to bear in mind that Jews, Catholics and Protestants possess a valuable fund of common faith and a wide realm of common ideal and purpose" (page iv).

Contrary to the common belief of existing mysteries in the procedures of the faith of one's neighbor, this volume clearly and concisely reveals those procedures. "The attempt is here made only to give for those who are not Catholics an understandable sketch of Catholic belief and practice," writes Father John Elliot Ross in a footnote to page 91.

To be sure, theological interpretations develop each of the three faiths and their individual subdivisions. The mystic of each sect dwells in a world of his own, completely fenced and gated. This, however, is for the theologian and the mystic. To the ordinary worshiper in

any of the three faiths, the tenets set forth in this volume are complete and sufficing.

The essence of the Judaeo-Christian doctrine is probably best expressed in the opening sentences of Dr. Finkelstein's essay. In it the scholar portrays brilliantly the fundamental tenets of Judaism which are likewise antecedent to Christianity at large. He writes:

> Judaism is a way of life which endeavors to transform virtually every human action into a means of communion with God. Through this communion with God, the Jew is enabled to make his contribution to the establishment of the Kingdom of God and the brotherhood of men on earth.

To illustrate better the general appearance of the Judaeo-Christian faiths one may think of a large family in a homestead where each member owns, besides common privileges, the dining room, the library and the music room, a room of his own for his individual privacies, housing his individual differences.

This very illustration holds for our national state as a political system. The state is a large household, housing all Americans. It confers common privileges and common duties upon all its members. Within this large household every creed has its private locker-room wherein its individual differences are kept. Externally, and with a common zeal and fervent zest, we all are one large family, owing mutual respect to one another:

> Side by side with these external changes which brought together on a single continent representatives of so many different types of Protestant Christianity, a second influence was at work even more far reaching in its effects. This was the tolerant spirit which had challenged the prevailing ideal of uniformity and substituted for the conception of a single type of thought and life to which all must conform that of a family of churches each with its own type of life and doctrine, yet each recognizing the right of the others to a place with itself in the one all-embracing Church, while all owed civil allegiance to the one nation—(William Adams Brown, p. 181).

In perilous times like the present, when totalitarianism threatens to override democracy, when brutalitarianism challenges the inherent freedom of the individual, three of the outstanding leaders and representatives of religion worked mutually and co-operatively in defining their respective religions, an understanding of which should help bring a better understanding between man and man.

Abraham I. Katsh

New York University

BOOK NOTES

The Sacred Tree Script: The Esoteric Foundation of Plato's Wisdom. By Andrew Efron. New Haven: Tuttle, Morehouse and Taylor, 1941. xxiv + 372 pp. $3.75.

This book is probably one of the strangest ever to have been discussed in these columns. It deals with myth but has to be read as a myth in itself. No one approaching it from a different angle is doing it justice.

The entire outcome of Efron's research is founded on one single letter to be found on the Runic stone of Kylfver, a letter which he calls the universal key to ancient knowledge—counting, script, logic, and ethics (p. viii). It is for him the basis of Plato's science of numbers, of the origin of the Runic script, of some legends of the Old Testament, and of Plato's metaphors. To realize all these meanings, however, he feels obliged to interpolate a sacred tree script that was known only to initiates, the secret of which had become lost (p. vii). This conspicuous sign looks to us somehow like a bare fir tree which, as Efron takes it, presented to man's mind a natural counting table (p. 317), a primitive encyclopedia (p. 35). Most of the ancient myths can be explained out of the discrepancies between two different counting systems, which presented a grave problem to the primitive mind and led to elaborate systems of explanation. Here one feels reminded of Christian Morgenstern's passage:

> Der Zwölf-Elf kam auf sein Problem
> Und sprach: Ich heisse unbequem.

The main value of the book is its emphasis on certain passages of ancient literature, especially of Plato, which are unintelligible without knowledge of the ancient gematria, which we lack. This practice of applying numbers as letters, and vice versa, makes Plato appear to be a Pythagorean (p. xvii). Efron tries to recover this unconscious Plato, who was pushed back by Aristotle's positivism, which has determined our usual scholarly approach to Plato. The Pythagorean and Platonic "pan-mathematism" makes our contemporary composers of charades, riddles and anagrams appear as direct successors of ancient professional riddle-makers (p. 34). Thus the entire science of ancient thinkers was based on a distinction between various systems of counting, and most philosophical problems were solved in terms of this almost incredible numerology (p. 13).

We know from Kabbalistic studies that one can do almost anything with this kind of riddle manipulation, combining letters, numbers, and sounds. In scores of books, it has even been tried to prove the National Socialistic race theories, out of such combinations. Efron is dependent upon such political phantasies when he believes that this "divine tradition" did not come from the Orient but from the Indo-Europeans (p. 6).

Strangely enough, all these imaginings of the author are combined with

a great deal of psychological insight into the basic trends of cultural epochs. Tree worship, and contemplation of trees, we are told, led the human mind to its first significant abstraction, due to a primitive attempt to express a tree graphically, to picture it.

The methods of reasoning of the ancient thinkers reveal to us an outstanding quality of their mind. A symbol, an image, or eidolon was something much more meaningful for them than for our contemporary experienced and realistic mind. We know how to separate empirical things from abstract concepts of things. Our power of identification is infinitely greater and preciser than that of the ancients. Our empiricism is more empirical, our abstractions are more detached from empirical things. The ancient thinkers confused both—the thing and its image. The schematized image became reality. One might say that the eidolon "participated" in the thing as such. Hence the "idea," i.e., the rationalized eidolon, remained intimately connected with the thing and represented its essence. Plato clearly expresses this view in his philosophy of ideas (p. 326).

Several remarks (e.g., on p. 177) prove that the author has no knowledge of Sanskrit, but, in view of the character of his research, one wonders whether that is to be regretted or welcomed.

FRIEDRICH SPIEGELBERG

Woman in the Sacred Scriptures of Hinduism. By MILDRETH WORTH PINKHAM. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. xii + 239 pp. $2.75.

The author has done more than take out of the Hindu literature which she examines the principal pertinent passages referring to women. She has, at the same time, given attention to literary and cultural history, especially to religio-social elements, as well. The book is made up largely of quotations which, in each literary work examined, are arranged according to a rather rigid plan. Such topics as marriage and divorce, in their various aspects, *satī*, woman's place in religious rites, the general attitude towards women, together with some of the more generous estimates of feminine character, are reported with a minimum of comment.

This is, of course, a textual method of handling data, a method which often deprives the passage of its context and is, to that extent, unsatisfactory. An example of this may be seen in the handling of verse 1. 41 of the *Bhagavad Gītā*. But, and more important, such a treatment excludes almost entirely the use of the imagination (in a scientific sense) in which a picture of women's life in India is the important thing. What may be termed an ethnographic and, at the same time, feminine account of women would have added to the value of the book. The male point of view practically sets the limits to the study. The *Ramāyanā*, for example, offers more than just the story of Sītā.

The author places emphasis upon the great influence which the scriptures have had upon Indian life through the centuries, and upon the work of priests in their formulation of religious sanctions and social theory:

The priests succeeded in changing the early Nature-Worship of the Hindus into a code of intricate artificial ceremonies of sacrifice which has brought about to the present day endless wasteful expenditures of spiritual energy as well as material substance. These religious leaders unceasingly strove to gain control over the minds of the people. They encouraged a divine halo to be placed upon the priesthood. . . . Likwise woman's sex-nature, giving her the power of motherhood, had to be reckoned with. Her freedom was a hindrance to the power and domination of the priests. The Brahmans felt that this must be conquered; so with verbal agitation they succeeded in lowering the position of woman. She must be considered an inferior creature without a mind. With a heartless cruelty they decided that gradually even religious rights must be taken away from woman. . . . The priests saw to it that their directions for worship contained a tremendous overemphasis on the physical aspect of womanhood.

Following through from the Veda to the Purānas, the author shows the status of women to be steadily one of decline. In the Epics, however, women occupy a slightly different position. The "conclusion" is concerned largely with the contemporary problem.

A question could be raised about the limited definition of "Sacred Scriptures of Hinduism" implied in the choice of literature which is made. There is no use of the Tantras as such, although they are considered by many to be part of the literature of Hinduism. Besides, there is no examination of the writings of famous teachers such as Tulsi Das, Kabir, and Jnaneswara, to mention only three. An extension of the study as just suggested, would be welcome. Also, a further account of goddess worship both in the Artharva Veda and, in the Tantric sense, in the Purānas (limiting ourselves to the literature studied) making use of this phase of Indian religious life to illuminate the scriptural view of women, would be of interest. There are very large implications for women in this aspect of Hinduism. Worship of the Kālī type is one of the oldest and most representative elements in Hindu civilization. The character and activities of the goddesses of disease and female ghosts likewise speak about Indian women.

There is no doubt, as the author points out, that the best antidote to the unfavorable attitude of the scriptures toward women and the authority of these books is the intensive study of the literature itself by both the men and the women of India.

George W. Briggs

The Art of Japanese Gardens. By Lorraine E. Kuck. New York: The John Day Company, 1940. xx + 304 pp. with 68 plates. $5.00.

Since the early days of Western contact with Japan, landscape gardens have been the source of constant interest among the occidentals. As early as 1893, Josiah Conder wrote a book entitled *Landscape Gardening in Japan* and *Supplement*. A pioneer work, it attracted wide attention, serving the useful purpose of general introduction to that substantial art. Practical studies and magazine articles appeared from time to time. A visit of American Garden Club members to Japan in 1934, by invitation of the Society

of International Cultural Relations in Tokyo, however, helped to intensify the interest into an adoration, and a number of important works on Japanese gardens followed in rapid succession. Among them, Dr. T. Tamura's *Art of the Landscape Garden in Japan* and Mr. S. Newsom's *Japanese Garden Construction* deserve special mention. The one represents the Japanese viewpoint in mature, thorough-going manner, while the other is the painstaking and protracted scrutiny of Japanese gardens by a highly technical and scientific method. Both are indispensable to the serious student of the subject. Miss Kuck's new book, however, combines in itself both points of view in happy union. Broadly organized on the historical basis, it traces the developments of the Japanese gardens from Chinese prototypes through their divergent aspects to the present-day gardens and flowers. Political, economic, and social bearings are touched, and the author's discussion of their aesthetic, and religious significance is at once real, true, and enthralling. The excellent selection of plates bears eloquent testimony to her personal and intimate knowledge of representative Japanese gardens.

Two things are to be noted in passing. One is the interesting historical relation of Japanese gardens to Buddhism in general, but to Zen in particular. Japan is a country materially less blessed, and so the construction of great Buddhist temples was the prelude to the downfall of those who sponsored it. By the time Zen Buddhism found its way to Japan, the government finances were in such a predicament as to preclude the raising of expensive monasteries. This was where the landscape garden came in, as a less expensive but withal integral part of the Buddhist temple, though later, in Ashikaga and Tokugaura periods, garden making proved to be just as expensive and elaborate as wooden structures. Miss Kuck's discussion of this aspect, in Chapters VII and VIII, is quite revealing.

The other point to which I wish to call particular attention is the Westerner's partiality towards anything old and traditional, at the expense of anything new and modern; I can mention quite a few who make it almost a profession to extol the old Japan and hate the new. In this regard, the author's impartiality in giving a chapter to the discussion of the latest development of Japanese gardens demands special commendation. When it comes to the comparison of Tokyo gardens with Kyoto gardens, the author is inclined to take the side of the latter. According to her, the Tokyo gardens are more sensitive to modern as well as to Western influences, with the result of going far astray. Unfortunately, this reviewer does not think so.

R. T.

Ezekiel Speaks Today: A Critical Analysis of the Prophecy of Ezekiel in the Light of Modern Events. By ISHMERAI. Boston: The Writer, Inc., 1941. Pp. xiii + 657. $2.00.

When Adolf Harnack was told by an aunt of his that her literary circle was engaged in reading the Book of Ezekiel, he expressed his surprise

at the choice of so difficult a prophecy. She promptly replied, "Oh, when we do not understand we interpret!" In all seriousness, this is exactly what the author of this book, whose identity seems to be hidden under a mysterious *nom de plume* of uncertain symbolical meaning, does in his minute, verse by verse, analysis of Ezekiel's book.

Ever since Hananiah ben Hezekiah in the first century of our era "supplied with three hundred jars of oil, sat in his upper chamber and explained it," the Book of Ezekiel has baffled biblical scholars. But now Ishmerai believes that he has discovered the key that will unlock the door leading to a full understanding of the true meaning and significance of the prophet's obscure oracles. He is convinced that the ordinary exegesis, which seeks to understand these oracles in the light of their historical background, has utterly failed. "The time has come in considering Ezekiel's prophecy when we must part company for good with the literalists" (p. 352). The dilemma, as he sees it, is a choice between the plain and literal meaning of the text, which is so fantastic "that an intelligent and cultivated man . . . can find only nonsense therein" (p. x), and the symbolical interpretation presented in great detail in this volume.

Per se this method of exegesis is by no means new. It is substantially the same as Philo's, in his exposition of the Pentateuch, and of his younger contemporary, the Apostle Paul. The latter, for instance (I Cor. 9:9-10), assures us that the law about not muzzling the threshing ox was written not for the benefit of oxen, but of Christian ministers, who are entitled to a decent salary. Like Swedenborg and others, Ishmerai seeks for the spiritual meaning underlying the biblical words and discovers it by giving to ordinary expressions a symbolical interpretation. Thus, for instance, the story of Elijah and the widow of Zarephtah (I Kings 17:8-9) signifies that a poor and obscure church [the widow] sustained the great prophet through her doctrine and spirituality; as a result Elijah restored to spiritual life her people [her son] and truth, unknown to Pilate, was revealed to her (p. 372).

Since the book is in the form of a running commentary, it is impossible to summarize here the conclusions of the author. A few illustrations may convey some idea of his methods and results. The four living creatures (Ez. 1) or Cherubim (Ez. 10) represent four "Dispensations": the Patriarchal (from Adam to Abraham), the Jewish (from Abraham to the Christ), the Christian (from the Incarnation to the Day of the Lord), and the Millennium (pp. 9-15). The symbolical meaning of common and proper names (fortunately explained, for the most part, in Hebrew and English glossaries) may be illustrated through the following examples. *Water* means knowledge; *woman* represents the Church, but not the institutional Church (symbolized by Jerusalem, Babylon, or Tyre), while her *husband* represents the nation to which the Church belongs; *dew* is a small portion of pure heavenly knowledge, given before the dawn of a

"new day"; *eagle* is the symbol of aspiration of belligerent people; *to eat* means to learn and *to feed* means to teach. *Eden* is the chosen group of men through whom Jehovah's teachings were preserved through the Dispensations; *Edom* is the natural man; *Jerusalem* is the Jewish institutional Church. Thus Ezekiel's message is addressed to the men and Churches of today rather than to the Jewish Exiles by the river Chebar: "we can already verify much of the fulfilling of his forecasts" (p. xiii).

Since the present reviewer belongs to the ranks of the "literalists" who interpret the Scriptures in accordance with historical methods, he is unable to evaluate a commentary conveying an esoteric interpretation which is meaningless to him. Even though the author severely denounces fundamentalism (p. 356), his book will be appreciated more by fundamentalists than by higher critics. Judging from his own reaction, the reviewer surmises that the latter will not be turned from their evil ways by the zeal of the author.

ROBERT H. PFEIFFER

The New Haggadah. Edited by MORDECAI M. KAPLAN, EUGENE KOHN, and IRA EISENSTEIN, for the Jewish Reconstruction Foundation. New York: Behrman's Jewish Book House, 1941. xv + 175 pp. $.65.

Nothing could be more timely than the asseveration of the continual and hopeful pursuit of freedom implied in the Passover Eve service, and the fresh presentation of the ancient ritual offered by Dr. Kaplan and his associates properly emphasizes this aspect of the festival. The traditional service is composed, roughly, of three elements: formal thanksgiving and prayer, selections from rabbinic literature to fulfil the injunction (Exodus 13. 8) to speak of the deliverance from Egypt, and secular songs largely to amuse children. It is in the second of these divisions that the most extensive changes have been introduced in the New Haggadah; much of the familiar has been eliminated, and much new material has been added, the criterion for inclusion being modern aesthetic and ethical standards. A more serious departure, from the traditionalist point of view, is the alteration in the wording of the formal elements, as in the *Kiddush*. The modernizing spirit informs the translations also. In the "four questions," for example, instead of the traditional "unleavened bread" we find "bread and rolls." The gain is questionable, for, aside from being more accurate, "unleavened bread" has a formal dignity and is less subject to vagaries of taste. So the versions offered are, like the illustrations, frequently better reflections of the taste of the editors than representations of the original texts. Some slips go beyond questions of taste, as in the error in objective fact in the note on Rabban Gamaliel (p. 62). But, for one who is not offended by innovations, the freshness of the *New Haggadah* is extremely attractive. The book represents an effort almost unique in modern Jewish liturgical reform in not being content merely to prune and discard; it also adds, and,

significantly, as well from traditional Hebrew literature as from other sources.

MOSES HADAS

An Exegetical Grammar of the Greek New Testament. By WILLIAM DOUGLAS CHAMBERLAIN. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1941. xxi + 233 pp. $4.00.

When the classical languages, Greek as well as Latin, held a leading place in the college curriculum, students usually acquired some familiarity with classical Greek before they undertook the study of the Greek Testament. It was then the task of a grammar of New Testament Greek to point out and explain the peculiarities of the Greek of the New Testament, especially where it departed from classical usage. A knowledge of forms and syntax could be assumed.

Now, however, few of our students have any knowledge of classical Greek when they enter a theological seminary. Some begin the elementary study of Greek in the seminary. Of those who take Greek in college a number elect it for the purpose of preparing themselves for the study of the Greek Testament in seminary, and they begin their study of Greek with the New Testament. After working through the graded exercises of an elementary introduction to New Testament Greek, such students need as a second book a grammar that will provide an outline of inflectional forms and a summary of the principles of Greek syntax, all systematically arranged for convenient reference.

To meet this need Professor Chamberlain has prepared this grammar based upon his experience in the classroom with students who are reading the Greek Testament and face the problems of exegesis. The book is intended to serve as a grammatical handbook for students who have an elementary knowledge of the Greek of the New Testament, to help them to a fuller mastery of the language used by the New Testament writers.

Although Dr. Chamberlain employs the results of the historical and comparative study of the Greek language, his primary interest in this book is not to trace the development of the language but to help students who are trying to understand what the New Testament means. Hence he names the book an "exegetical" grammar. It is an aid to exegesis. But he has not attempted to discuss comprehensively every grammatical question raised in the exegesis of the New Testament. Grammatical principles are stated concisely, explained and illustrated briefly, but for a detailed treatment of many particular questions the advanced student must turn to the larger grammars.

There is an index of scripture passages, but no subject index. In practise the need is felt of a subject index to facilitate the use of the material contained in the grammar. Even the carefully analyzed table of contents does not seem fully to meet this need. While the emphasis in an "exegetical" grammar is naturally upon syntax, upon function rather than forms,

paradigms are included for convenient reference. Students who have an elementary knowledge of New Testament Greek should find this a useful handbook to meet their need of a reasonably complete and systematic summary of both forms and syntax. It will be unfortunate if its cost places it beyond the reach of many students who really ought to own the book in order to have it at hand for frequent reference.

HAROLD H. TRYON

New Testament Literature in 1940. A Bibliography prepared by the New Testament Club of the University of Chicago. Mimeo. 35 pp.

This very useful annotated survey of books and articles in the NT field appearing in 1940 was prepared by the New Testament Club of the University of Chicago—a very active organization of which William Nelson Lyons is president. It is practically complete, though some foreign titles had not arrived when the bibliography was mimeographed. Especially useful is the listing of reviews of books. The notes are signed with initials. It is to be hoped the work may be so well received that the Club may decide to make the publication an annual one.

FREDERICK C. GRANT

The Character of Christ: As Man's Spiritual Example. By FLORENCE L. IVES. Boston: The Writer, Inc., 1941. viii-316 pp. $2.00.

This book, finished by Miss Ives shortly before her death, is an attempt to present the character of Christ according to the teaching of scripture. The framework has been drawn from the prophetic passages of the Old Testament, and the frames have been filled with passages from the Gospels. Occasionally the author has used paraphrase, and the quotations are tied together with comments, but the bulk of the book is merely a rearrangement of scriptural passages.

Miss Ives obviously had no knowledge of the historic evaluation of scripture and completely misunderstood the nature and meaning of Hebraic prophecy. The meanings given to the various passages are impossible, even as a poetic interpretation, because it is made clear that they are intended to be taken literally. We have so many biographies of Jesus that have failed to interpret his character that it would be of inestimable value to have a competent study of the subject undertaken by this work. This book does not meet this need.

The organization of material may be of homiletical value to clergymen if used with discrimination and careful selection. However, the entire book is more superficial than significant.

WILFRED I. ORR

Discussion of Holidays in the Later Middle Ages. By EDITH COOPERRIDER RODGERS. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940. 147 pp. $1.50.

This is an extremely competent treatise on a subject which has long

needed a thorough examination based on original sources. Although the main principles of the proper use of holidays (holy days) may be deduced from the theology and ethics of the Christian Church, it is valuable to have gathered in a short compass the concrete evidence. Furthermore, the statement of the principle is only one section of this study. Miss Rodgers also discusses the protests against the non-observance of holidays and objections raised to their observance. The concluding chapter deals with attempts of pre-Reformation days to correct evils arising out of too frequent holidays. In the Middle Ages holidays included all Sundays and thirty-six to forty feast days. On these days the faithful were expected to attend Mass and to refrain from servile labor under pain of fine or excommunication. Intellectual work, especially that devoted to the welfare of the Church, and certain necessary occupations, were exempted. Common sense mitigated the rigidity of law. The evidence points to a sad misuse of the freedom of the holiday. The bishops vainly protested against the feasting and revelry that so often led to quarrels and blows. In the late Middle Ages, the growing religious indifference of the peasantry is well illustrated by their abuse of holidays. Both religious and secular authorities now attempted to curb their growing number. In the sixteenth century, both Luther and Cranmer reduced the number drastically by including only Sundays and a few major feasts besides. In 1642, Pope Urban VIII reduced the holy days of obligations for Catholics. It is interesting to note that with our half-holiday on Saturdays we today enjoy practically the same number of holidays during the year as our medieval forebears did. Miss Rodgers must be congratulated for her excellent thesis.

IRVING RAYMOND

Chronicle of John Malalas, Books VIII-XVIII. Translated from the Church Slavonic by MATTHEW SPINKA, in collaboration with GLANVILLE DOWNEY, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1940. vi + 150 pp. $1.50.

This volume more than adequately fulfils its expressed purpose, "to supply a faithful and accurate translation of V. M. Istrin's edition of the Slavonic version of John Malalas' *Chronicle*, Books VIII-XVIII" (p. 1). This edition was published with some critical commentary, but with almost no explanatory notes. The translation made by Professor Spinka and Dr. Downey is a careful piece of work in which the awkward style of the Slavonic version is rendered into intelligible English, and in which there is a large number of notes and comments.

It was no easy matter to translate the original text with its numerous unclear and corrupt passages, but the authors have added a great deal by their identifications of the various proper names. The result is, however, a certain amount of inconsistency between English, Latin, Greek, and transliterated Slavonic forms, but this was unavoidable with the purpose

of the edition, and the confused state of present usage. It does render the volume more accessible for scholars, and we can overlook the apparent lack of a clear system. The bibliography is arranged chronologically, which is somewhat awkward, but it seems to be complete. All in all, the publishers and scholars can be well satisfied with the volume which will be adequate for all who are interested in the subject matter rather than in the philological peculiarities of the text.

C. A. M.

Studier i den svenska andaktslitteraturen under stormaktstidevarvet. By David Lindquist. Stockholm: Svenska kyrkans diakonistyrelses bokförlag, 1939. xliii + 434 pp.

During Sweden's "Period of Greatness," devotional literature was published in great abundance. That this literature was also virile in quality is attested by the fact that much of it has lived even to the present time. Through the centuries it has been widely used, especially by the laity, and its influence in promoting piety among the masses of church folk can hardly be overestimated. Up to the present time no scientific study has been made in this field. However, the prayer books issued during the period of the Reformation have been accorded a thorough study by Dr. Sigfrid Estborn, in his monumental work *Evangeliska svenska bönböcker under reformationstidevarvet* (Lund, 1929), and Lindquist continues from the findings of Estborn. Because of the wealth of the material, Lindquist has been forced to delimit his survey to prayer books, "comfort" books, and communion books, omitting from his study works of a liturgical character, manuals, etc.

Following a very brief introduction, Lindquist makes a study of forty-six of the devotional works of the period. To be sure, many of the titles appear to us today quite naïve and almost amusing, but they are from a period when the "practise" of religion was a most serious matter. Following the analysis of these writings, the author continues with a valuable summary of the outstanding characteristics of this literature.

For all the wealth of the devotional literature during this period very little of it is of direct Swedish origin. The major portion consists of translations from the German. Works originally in English or French (and even Danish) have commonly been published in Sweden only after first being printed in German, the translation being made from the German. Of the English works, Baylys' *Praxis Pietatis* seems to have enjoyed the greatest use. Some of the more popular works, such as *Een Andeligh Watukälla* and *Tolf andelige Betrachtelser,* were probably printed in as many as 50,000 copies during the course of the years.

Many of the emphases of the medieval period—e.g., the pessimistic conceptions of the world and of man, devotion to the cross, mystical interpretations of Jesus, etc.—live on in the devotional literature of the era here

considered. There are many citations from the church fathers as well as medieval authors. One often notes a syncretism of evangelical and catholic piety.

Following a study of this work one is convinced that the "Period of Greatness" was, in Sweden's religious life, something more than an interval of cold formalism between the two movements of spiritual renewal, the Reformation and Pietism. It was certainly an age when people considered their religious life with great seriousness. They knew the proper nurture of their souls demanded of them earnestness and thoroughness.

EVALD BENJAMIN LAWSON

Freiheit und Notwendigkeit. By RUDOLPH OTTO. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1940. 39 pp. R. M. 1.20.

The scope of this essay is clearly indicated in its sub-title: *Ein Gespräch mit Nicolai Hartmann über Autonomie und Theonomie der Werte.* From the time of its initial appearance, Otto was stirred by Hartmann's work on *Ethics*, not only because it afforded influential confirmation of his own theory of value but because, also, of its, to him, unacceptable interpretation of religion. An inescapable antithesis betwen an auonomous morality and religious faith is depicted by Hartmann. This has its focus, he feels, in the problem of human freedom, but it likewise directly involves the relation of God to a realm of autonomous values, and it is the latter question that is of particular concern to Otto.

As early as 1932, Otto announced the immediate appearance of a volume entitled *Sittengesetz und Gotteswille*, which was to incorporate five recently published articles of his on various aspects of the problem, and he also chose this subject for the Gifford Lectures which he was invited to give at about the same time. But poor health interfered, and neither the Gifford Lectures nor the proposed volume materialized. The present brief essay, written during the months just prior to Otto's death in March, 1937, and published posthumously last year with an epilogue by Th. Siegfried, is of some interest, therefore, as his final word on an issue of large import to his whole theory of religion.

Agreeing in general with Hartmann's defense of moral autonomy, Otto is here concerned with the *Freiheitsantinomie* in terms of which Hartmann defines the antithesis between morality and religion. It is his contention, indeed, that at this point Hartmann misinterprets both the moral consciousness and the religious experience. Thus, after correctly identifying the moment of redemption or salvation as the heart of genuine religion, Hartmann concludes that religious faith necessarily involves a predestinarian *Unfreiheit*, since redemption for the religious man can never come through free human effort, but always comes through the grace of God. Otto points out, however, that this is not an adequate account of the religious experience. A *Freiheitsantinomie* does not set religion and ethics in opposition, as Hart-

mann suggests, but rather is to be found within the sphere of religion itself. The sense of sin involves the very conviction which Hartmann has identified as the criterion of moral freedom, the clear and inescapable insight: "You should have done otherwise and you could have done otherwise."

Hartmann's contrast between religious faith as otherworldly and ethics as essentially this-worldly in import is likewise attacked by Otto. For mature religion has definite relevance to man's conduct in this world, he maintains, while the deeper insights of the moral consciousness inevitably transcend the world of human experience. Thus the relation between man's moral endeavor in this world and a moral purpose that transcends human life is, for Otto, the common concern of high religion and profound morality.

In brief but suggestive fashion, Otto finally outlines his own position. The autonomy of human values need not be rejected, he insists, in order to establish a meaningful theonomy. To argue thus is simply to repeat the old fallacy which opposed the laws of nature to the acts of God. The values which we recognize as autonomous and obligatory in human experience are not separate from or merely similar to the transcendent meaning and value of God (*dem ewigen Gottes-sinn und -werte*), but in some sense *are* that eternal meaning and value as apprehended in and through the world of human experience. "Rightly understood then the 'will' of God is initially only a human expression for the obligatory moment that belongs to eternal value and its reflection in the creature." All higher values, however, have their foundation for Otto in creative personality, and the eternal realm of value which he here recognizes points likewise in his opinion to a transcendent personality whose eternal purpose unites the obligatory chaim of both autonomous value and divine will.

Otto's essay faces none of the difficulties, of course, in Hartmann's general theory of ethics, but it does indicate clearly the limitation in Hartmann's treatment of religion—upon the premises which Hartmann himself accepts. This certainly appears to be its major contribution. Otto's constructive theory needs a much more careful substantiation than he had the time or strength to give it.

ROBERT F. DAVIDSON

The Great Century, 1800-1914, Europe and the United States. Volume IV in *A History of the Expansion of Christianity*. By KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941. 516 pp. $3.50.

It is an extraordinarily difficult task to write a history of the expansion of Christianity. Not only must one cover all the centuries of the Christian era, but all the varied areas of the earth with its many peoples, races, and cultures. While one could list many general histories of missions and numerous accounts of the expansion of Christianity in single countries, for limited periods, or through special agencies, we have had no satisfactory comprehensive treatment. This fourth volume is another outstanding con-

tribution by Professor Latourette in his monumental work surpassing all others in scope. The first three volumes covered the expansion of Christianity during the first five centuries, A.D. 500-1500 and A.D. 1500-1800, respectively. This fourth volume is the first of three dealing with the nineteenth century expansion, and is to be followed by one dealing with Latin America, the islands of the Pacific and Africa, and by one on Asia.

Professor Latourette does much more than detail facts—balanced and proportioned as those are, for throughout there are scholarly judgments, indications of trends, and illuminating comparisons. This volume begins with a thoughtful analysis of thirteen movements which characterized the nineteenth century and in the midst of which the expansion of Christianity was accomplished. This century is shown to be a time of unequalled expression of the vitality in the Christian faith; never before had Christianity shown such vigor and upsurging creative impulse from within. In this period there were even more new movements in Christianity than in any preceding period of equal duration. For the first time, plans were seriously elaborated for bringing the Christian message to all peoples. Never before had Christianity, or indeed any other religion, developed such elaborate and extensive machinery for its propagation. Never before had the spread of any set of ideas, religious or secular, been maintained by the voluntary gifts of so many millions of donors.

We read how, in this remarkable century, surveys of the whole world were made with the announced purpose of "carrying the Gospel to all the non-Christian world"; and how hundreds of languages were reduced to writing and an attempt made to make the Bible available to every people in the entire world. The slogan for the last part of the century was "the evangelization of the world in this generation." Daring vision, comprehensive plans, and large-scale offerings of life and money sent missionaries to all quarters of the globe. The processes by which Christianity spread in this period were different from those of any preceding era and unlike the spread of any other religion at any other time. Hospitals were erected, educational systems evolved, modern medicine introduced, and (on the part of Protestants more than of Roman Catholics) the transformation of society was attempted. Women and laymen had a larger place, and new organizations and new societies multiplied.

One marked merit of Professor Latourette's history is that it deals with missions of the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Churches, as well as with the more familiar work of Protestants. Nowhere else can one find a similar comparison of Roman Catholic objectives, methods, and results with those of Protestantism. As in other volumes, the author attempts to indicate what kind of Christianity spread, why it spread, by what processes, and what reciprocal influences Christianity and its environment had on each other. Scholars will be grateful for references to sources in the copious notes (over 2000), for over five hundred titles in the bibliography, and for an

index of twenty pages. This book is unhesitatingly commended, not only to scholars, but to the general reader who would learn how Christianity kept up with the advancing wave of the American frontier, won the immigrants, Indians and Negroes, and how in Europe Christianity reached out to Jews, pagans and Moslems.

DANIEL J. FLEMING

The Problem of Liberty. Proceedings of The American Catholic Philosophical Association, XVI. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1941. 293 pp.

This collection of essays, addresses, and round-table discussions shows that the Thomistic language and philosophy may be used as a vehicle for the discussion of the problem of liberty. Since this problem is one that especially concerns us at this time, we look forward, on taking up the book, to the new light which these discussions will shed on it. However, we must be content with the reiteration of the same "truths" that we have become accustomed to expect from the Thomists. Liberty is not to be confused with license. Liberty does not consist in the right to choose between good and evil. Liberty does not consist in choosing the end, which is given, but in choosing the right means for the end. One new note is struck by Yves R. Simon, who admits that among those who fell away from liberty in recent years "were some people accustomed to pay lip service, and possibly more, to St. Thomas." According to Simon's article, "Liberty and Authority," one of the most valuable in the book, the function of authority is "to assure the unity of action of a plurality of men in the pursuit of their common good" (p. 103). In these terms he can show that, while authority is necessary in any society, it complements true liberty. Another article, interesting for another reason, is J. B. McAllister's "The Influence of Immanuel Kant's Concept of Liberty." McAllister saddles Kant and his doctrine of the impossibility of knowledge of the thing-in-itself, the human personality in this case, with responsibility for the development of Bolshevism (through Hegel, Marx, and Lenin) on the one hand, and Nazism (through Fichte and Hitler) on the other. This heavy burden must be shared, I am sure, by many other persons and events.

HENRY M. MAGID

Nature and Functions of Authority. By YVES SIMON. (The Aquinas Lecture, 1940, under the Auspices of the Aristotelian Society of Marquette University.) Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1940. 78 pp. $1.50.

This is a clear, succinct, and systematic discussion of the relations between authority and liberty. The lecturer's chief task is to discover whether authority is ever more than "substitutional," i.e., an expedient due to imperfect conditions. In the realm of theoretical judgment, he concludes,

authority is merely substitutional, since a "theoretical judgment is not perfect unless the object is the only sufficient principle of its determination" (p. 9). In practical matters, when authoritative decision is exercized over a person by a master in the master's interest, it is exploitation and should be reduced to a minimum; when it is exercised over a person by an authority in the subject's interest (as in parental jurisdiction) it is good, but merely "substitutional." The essential role of authority is in matters of common good where a prudential judgment is necessary to provide united action. Such authority is an instrument of liberty and is also a form of certainty in the practical sense and hence a form of truth. "We recognize that prudence, like science, is an indefectible principle of certainty, provided that we distinguish between the theoretical implications of the prudential judgment, which can be but probable, and the prudential judgment itself which, as a rule of direction, enjoys an absolute certainty" (p. 26).

This is confusing language. What is gained by asserting that an authoritative rule is a "certain" judgment because it is a final decision? It may be imprudent though "certain," and then it is neither a "practical truth" nor a common good, but merely a command or decision without appeal or reason. In other words, the major assumption of the author is that authority is prudent as well as decisive, which means that an authority should be subject to theoretical "determination by its object," viz., the common good. The notes appended to the lecture are valuable, especially the discussion of the relation between impersonal law and personal rule.

H. W. S.

Current Religious Thought: A Digest. By CHARLES S. MACFARLAND. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1941. 185 pp. $1.50.

This is the fourth in a series published during the past five years, and is like the others, as the name implies, a digest or summary of important religious books. This volume reviews forty-five of the late contributions to religious thought. Dr. Macfarland, General Secretary *Emeritus* of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, with his comprehensive knowledge of religious literature over a long period of years, and his mature wisdom and sympathetic understanding, is well qualified for this task.

The treatment is objective, in that the central thought of each thinker is presented in a succinct manner without being subjected to critical examination. Occasionally Dr. Macfarland raises a question or makes a comment, but for the most part he is content to give a digest rather than an evaluation. A brief chapter of analysis is added, in which it is pointed out that we are in a period of theological transition. This accounts for the controversies and varieties of opinions. Although the author is not optimistic that any great creativeness will come out of contrariety, he recognizes that there is more sincere and sustained thinking today than at any time

during the past half-century. The arrangement is helpful. The books are grouped under the following eight headings: Contemporary Theology, Religious Philosophy, Studies of Jesus, the Church and the Kingdom, the Social Gospel, Psychology and Religion, Personal Religion, and Christianity and Crisis.

As a compendium of religious books, and as a guide to wise selections this volume is of definite value. Every busy clergyman could use it to advantage as a means of keeping abreast of theological thought. However, such a conspectus is not a substitute for the books themselves. Some reading in digest form is good; too much is bad.

WILFRED I. ORR

The Unobstructed Universe. By STEWART EDWARD WHITE. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1940. 320 pp. $2.50.

A report of "divulgences" received through a medium, in Mr. White's belief, emanating from his dead wife, Betty. Aside from the interest of the "evidential" material, which was thoroughly convincing to Mr. White and his friends, the book is valuable chiefly for its fresh approach to the ancient subject of the "future life." In its exposition, the book makes use of the terminology of modern science, frequencies, space-time, subconscious mind, etc., but it is remarkable how closely, nevertheless, the system resembles that of the eighteenth century psychic, Emanuel Swedenborg, who used the scientific terminology of his own day. Betty's "degrees," "law of parallels," "trilogies," and "beta body," are all familiar to the student of Swedenborg under different names. Perhaps C. G. Jung is right in his contention that the "collective unconscious" is the same for all peoples and all times.

M. B.

Handbook of the Bible. By G. E. SEBOYAR. New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1940. viii + 247 pp. $1.25.

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